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I. INTRODUCTION
The courts' and the Internal Revenue Code ("Code")2 presently treat
1. The term "courts" here refers to federal, not state, courts; this is due to the fact
that trials concerning tax matters occur only in the U.S. Tax Court, U.S. Court of Claims,
and district courts. See JAMES J. FREELAND, DANIEL J. LATHROPE, STEPHEN A. LIND &
RICHARD B. STEPHENS, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 28-31 (11th ed. 2000); GAIL LEVIN RICHMOND, FEDERAL TAX RESEARCH:
GUIDE TO MATERIALS AND TECHNIQUES 120-21 (5th ed. 1997) (stating that the United
States Bankruptcy Court is another venue for tax litigation, although a district court
judge reviews each decision).
2. The "Code" refers to the Internal Revenue Code found in Title 26 of the
United States Code. The Internal Revenue Code is divided and applied to tax-exempt
organizations as follows: title (26), subtitle (A - income taxes), chapter (1 - normal taxes
and surtaxes), subchapter (F - exempt organizations). See I. RICHARD GERSHON, A
STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE I (4th ed. 1999). After subchapters
the Code is further divided into parts, subparts, sections, subsections, paragraphs,
subparagraphs, sentences, and clauses. See GERSHON, supra, at 3-4, 7. This paper will
primarily use sections (e.g., § 501) and subsections (the number or letter after the section
number (e.g., (a)), and paragraphs. Generally, a number will be followed by a smaller
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income received by a tax-exempt organization for affinity card
programs' and mailing list rentals4 similarly; neither type of income is
subject to taxation.5 This Article asserts that equal treatment should not
be the case. Because donors have not consented to sell their personal
information, the exception for royalty income from the unrelated
business income tax ("UBIT") should not permit the tax-free rental of a
nonprofit organization's mailing list. Affinity card income, on the other
hand, should continue to be nontaxable since any income received from
these programs comes from the donors themselves and therefore should
be treated as a form of nondeductible contribution.
Organizations qualified under section 501 of the Internal Revenue
Code are known as "tax-exempt" or "nonprofit" organizations.' Both
descriptions are misleading. The term "tax-exempt" is inaccurate
because section 501 organizations are subject to taxation in certain
cases; most notable for this Article is the taxation of unrelated business
income under section 5l.' The term "nonprofit" gives the impression
case letter, then by a number, then by a larger case letter. See GERSHON, supra. at 8 n.4.
For example, § 501(c)(25)(A)(iii)(-) refers to section 501, subsection (c), paragraph (25),
subparagraph (A), sentence (iii), and clause (1). I.RC. § 501(c)(25)(A)(iii)l) (2000).
3. Affinity cards are typically credit cards which bear a name and logo of a group
or organization. Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 86 F.3d 1526, 1528 n.2 (9th Cir. 1996);
Miss. State Univ. Alumni, Inc. v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 458,459 (1997).
4. Unless specified otherwise, references to mailing list rentals or exchanges
describe those persons or entities which have not specifically authorized such activity.
For the types of personal information contained on mailing lists, see infra note 21. For
information on "opt in" versus "opt out" provisions of mailing lists, see infra note 350.
5. For the exclusion of income from mailing lists and affinity cards, see infra text
accompanying notes 270-326.
6. These organizations compose the "third sector." The first two sectors
comprise government and private businesses. Donald L. Sharpe. Unfair Business
Competition and the Tax on Income Destined for Charit: Forty-SLr Years Later, 3 FLA.
TAX REV. 367, 369 (1996). Aside from "tax-exempt" and "nonprofit," other terms which
are used to describe organizations qualifying under § 501 are "charitable sector"
(focusing on how their support is received), "independent sector" (focusing on the fact
that these organizations are neither businesses nor government), and "voluntary sector"
(focusing on the use of volunteers for management and operations). LESTER M.
SALAMON, AMERICA'S NONPROFIT SEcTOR: A PRIMER 6-7 (1992).
7. LR.C. § 511 (2000). Unless otherwise specified, all references in this Article
to a section of the Code are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. See also
L1RC. § 501(b) (2000); 4 BoRis . BIrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATON
OF iNCO~m, ESTATES AND G-rs 100-3 (2d ed. 1992) (stating that the term "exempt" is "a
misnomer because most exempt organizations are taxed on 'unrelated business income'
and are subject to other forms of taxation); Charles T. Clotfelter, Tax-Induced
Distortions in the Voluntary Sector, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663 (1988-1989)
(suggesting that both the unrelated business income tax and the deduction permitted
under LR.C. § 170 (2000) create tax-induced distortions in the allocation of resources for
that these organizations never make a profit and/or always distribute
their gains. However, "nonprofit" organizations can, and do, make and
keep profits, although distributional constraints are imposed on the
money received.8
In fact, as a group these organizations have substantial revenues. In
1995, section 501(c)(3) organizations alone, excluding churches and
small section 501(c)(3) organizations, had revenues of $663.4 billion
and held total assets worth over one trillion dollars.9 In 1995, section
501 organizations had total revenues equal to eleven percent of the
United States gross domestic product; this share increased to twelve
percent by 1999.10
The amount of income earned by nonprofits is extraordinary, and their
growth is also amazing. In 1986 a total of only $300 billion in revenues
was reported by nonprofits, which accounted for just seven percent of
the gross national product at that time." Going back another ten years
shows even more growth for the nonprofit sector. In the period between
1975 and 1995 the revenues of nonprofit organizations tripled, while the
gross domestic product increased by only seventy-four percent.'
2
These large and growing revenue streams have attracted the attention
of Congress, which is ever mindful of possible new revenue sources."
Affinity card income received by tax-exempt organizations is one area
itemizers versus nonitemizers).
8. 4 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 100-3. On the other hand, an
organization which maintains that it is not organized and operated for-profit will not
automatically be exempted from federal income taxation. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-l(a)(2)
(1998) (as amended in 1992).
9. Cecelia Hilgert & Melissa Whitten, Charities and Other Tax-Exempt
Organizations, 1995, 18 SOI BULL.: Q. STAT. INCOME REP. (I.R.S.) 105, 105-06 (1998-
1999).
10. Marlis L. Carson, Revenue Thirst Could Lead Lawmakers to Eye Tax-Exempts,
Owens Says, 69 TAX NOTES 954, 954 (1995); Martin K. Pelcin & Fred Stokeld, Owens
Discusses Unrelated Business Income Issues, IRS Restructuring, 83 TAX NOTES 631
(1999) (reporting statement of director of the IRS Exempt Organizations Division that
tax-exempt organizations had more than $1.9 trillion in assets and $899 billion in
revenues). Some authors give larger assessments of income of tax-exempt organizations.
See John M. Strefeler & Leslie T. Miller, Exempt Organizations: A Study of Their
Nature and the Applicability of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 12 AKRON TAX J.
223, 227 (1996) (attributing $750 billion in revenues and fifteen percent of the nation's
GNP to tax-exempt organizations).
11. House Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee UBIT Recommendations,
DAILY TAX CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS, June 24, 1988, at 3035 [hereinafter UBIT
RECOMMENDATIONS].
12. Jane Bowling & Sindhu G. Hirani, IRS Scrutiny of Tax-Exempt Organizations
Likely to Increase, Agency Official Predicts, 67 U.S. L. WK. (BNA), June 1, 1999,
at 2718. The director of the IRS Exempt Organizations Division stated that the
"[e]conomic activity in tax-exempt organizations is exploding in comparison to
economic activity as a whole." Id.
13. See Pelcin & Stokeld, supra note 10, at 631.
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which has been set apart for review by Congress for additional tax
revenue.
14
Generally, affinity card arrangements provide credit cards which
indicate the cardholder's preference toward the group, individual, or
organization named on the card.' 5  Affinity cards of tax-exempt
organizations are sponsored by an organization, like a university alumni
association or the Sierra Club, which permits its name and logo to be
used on a credit card. 6  Tax-exempt organizations allow their names
and/or logo to be used on the cards since they make money from such
arrangements, typically a portion of the fee charged by banks to
merchants who take the cards.' With this "easy" money to be made,
14. See id.
15. Andrew Stark, Selective Affinities: Who Are You, Anyway? For Starters,
Check the Logo on Your Credit Card, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2000, at W13. Affinity cards
are now present in 63 million homes in the United States. Id. Stark points out that the
oddity of affinity cards is that cardholders can only show their "affinity" by using the
card, primarily done only when purchasing an item. Id. This means they are advertising
to salespersons and vendors. 1d.
16. Or. State Univ. Alumni Ass'n v. Comm'r, 193 F.3d 1098, 1099 (9th Cir.
1999); Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 86 F.3d 1526, 1528 n.2 (9th Cir. 1996).
17. Banks impose a charge of approximately three percent of the purchase price to
merchants who accept credit cards. Credit Cards for Causes, CONSUtER REP., March
1988, at 190, 190. This three percent is split between the merchant's bank and the card-
issuing bank. Id. In affinity card agreements the card-issuing bank's share of the three
percent charge is divided between the bank, the organization, and the marketer who
promoted the idea and arranged the contract between the bank and organization. Id.
Typically, an organization will receive 50 cents for every $100 charged to the card.
Should You Get an Affinity Card?, CONSUMER REP., Sept. 1999, at 8, 8. To review an
affinity card agreement, see Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 307, 312-15 (1994),
affd in part and rev'd in part, 86 F.3d 1526. Normally, however, individuals are not
able to determine the exact amount the nonprofit organization will receive through their
use of the affinity card. David Evans, A Closer Look at What Charity Credit Cards
Issuers Won't Tell, HOUSTON CHRON., June 21, 1999, at DI.
Banks enter into affinity card arrangements for several reasons. First, these
arrangements allow additional entry into a crowded credit market. Credit Cards for
Causes, supra, at 190. Second, cardholders with affinity cards tend to charge more on
their affinity cards. Id. The cards have also historically carried higher annual percentage
interest rates on outstanding credit card balances. Should You Get an Affinity Card?,
supra, at 8. It is also a way to market credit cards to college students. Marcia Vickers,
Big Cards On Campus, Bus. WK., Sept. 20, 1999, at 136. College students are a
desirable market segment since many carry debt on their credit cards, they are a lower
risk since parents often pay their bills, and the card issuer has an entry to market other
products (e.g., first mortgages, car loans, or debt consolidation loans) to those students.
Id. at 136-37.
Nonprofits can make substantial sums from affinity card programs. For example, the
Oregon State and University of Oregon alumni associations made over S500,000 each in
a two-year period, while the Sierra Club made over $300,000 in the first two years of its
many tax-exempt organizations look toward affinity cards to raise
revenue.'8 These cards are extremely popular, accounting for one-third
of all credit cards. 9
The other source of income discussed in this Article is that earned by
permitting other nonprofit organizations or businesses the use of a tax-
exempt organization's mailing list.2" The mailing lists are typically
composed of names, addresses and other information pertaining to the
members, donors, and other supporters of the organization,2' This sale to
other nonprofit or for-profit organizations is normally done without the
consent of those on the mailing list. The rental or exchange of a mailing
list between organizations whose donors are allowed to deduct their
contributions is specifically exempted by the Code from taxation."
program. Or. State Univ. Alumni Ass'n, 193 F.3d at 1099; Sierra Club, 103 T.C. at 320.
See also Evans, supra, at D5 (reporting that the University of Southern California
Alumni Association, with a database of 175,000 people, earns about $1.2 million
annually from its affinity card program); Vickers, supra, at 136 (describing the
University of Tennessee's agreement with a credit card issuer in which the university
received $16 million over seven years and 0.5% of each transaction in return for
allowing use of its logo and school's picture on a credit card).
18. Kenton D. Swift, The Tax Treatment of Royalty Income from Affinity Card
Programs, 73 TAXES 575, 575 (1995) (stating that "thousands" of tax-exempt
organizations are using affinity cards to make money). "Tax-exempt organizations are
finding it very lucrative to market the sentimental kind of affinity card, while lenders,
whose image has never been cute or cuddly, seek a competitive advantage by associating
their services with a good cause." Lee A. Sheppard, Time to Revisit the UBIT Royalty
Exception?, 71 TAX NOTES 858, 858 (1996).
19. Should You Get an Affinity Card?, supra note 17, at 8. MBNA, "[t]he
Wilmington, Del., bank ... has some 4,500 [affinity card] programs." Id.
20. The Sierra Club received mailing list rental income of $142,636, $317,579,
and $452,042 in the tax years 1985, 1986, and 1987, respectively. Sierra Club, 86 F.3d
at 1528. The Disabled American Veterans made over $16 million from 1974 to 1985.
Disabled Am. Veterans v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 60, 67 (1990). "Non-profit organizations
also rent the names and personal information of their contributors to other direct mail
solicitors, in both the for-profit and non-profit sectors. In conjunction with list rentals,
non-profit organizations may lend their name to a for-profit activity for a percentage of
the profits." Rita Marie Cain, Marketing Activities in the Non-profit Sector-Recent
Lessons Regarding Tax Implications, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 349, 349 (1998-1999). See also
GILBERT M. GAUL & NEILL A. BOROWSKI, FREE RIDE: THE TAX-EXEMPT ECONOMY 32
(1993) (stating that a large part of the twelve billion fund-raising letters sent each year is
a result of the "renting" of mailing lists); Leslie G. Espinoza, Straining the Quality of
Mercy: Abandoning the Quest for Informed Charitable Giving, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 605,
610, 678-83 (1991) (discussing the costs of fund raising and asserting that the public
should be provided with information about such costs to make "informed giving
decisions").
21. Sierra Club, 86 F.3d at 1527. The mailing list for Common Cause, a section
501(c)(4) organization, contained information such as name, address, gender, frequency
of contribution, date of recent contributions, amount of contributions, and ethnicity.
Common Cause v. Comm'r, 112 T.C. 332, 334, 336-37 (1999).
22. I.R.C. § 513(h)(1)(B) (2000). Congress added § 513(h)(l)(B) in 1986 in an
attempt to make some mailing list income subject to taxation. Commenting on the
results, one nonprofit tax practitioner stated, "Congress didn't do a very good job when
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Generally, however, the courts have excluded from taxation any income
received from the rental of mailing lists.'
If the underlying rationale of the nonprofit tax exemption is applied to
these nonprofit income sources, Congress has it totally reversed, while
the courts have it half-right. Congress has exempted certain mailing list
income and seeks to tax affinity card income. In general, the courts have
excluded both sources of income from taxation. This Article proposes
the taxation of mailing list rental income, while those amounts received
from affinity card programs should remain excluded from the UBIT.
The remainder of this Article is divided into four sections. Part II
discusses which organizations are exempt from taxation and how that
is accomplished in the Code. Part II reviews the major rationales
given for the tax exemption provided for qualifying nonprofit
organizations and suggests that the underlying rationale for all non-
economic theories is based on the public's trust of those organizations.
Part IV looks at the history and statutory requirements of the unrelated
business income tax. This section also includes the
exceptions/exclusions from the UBIT and how the courts have applied
the royalty exclusion to the mailing list and affinity card income of
nonprofit organizations. Finally, the Article will propose that when the
underlying rationale of the nonprofit tax exemption, public trust, is
applied to mailing list and affinity card income, it results in taxation of
the former but the continued exclusion of the later.
I. BASIC STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF THE TAx EXEMPTION
The tax-exempt status of certain charitable and religious organizations
dates back to 1601 and the English Statute of Charitable Uses."' In the
they tried to make certain mailing lists subject to tax; they failed miserably." Carolyn
Wright & Fred Stokeld, Sierra Club Wins Again in Tar Court, 82 TAX NoTES 1898,
1899 (1999).
23. Common Cause, 112 T.C. 332; Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am.. Inc. v.
Comm'r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 2227 (1999); Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r. 103 T.C. 307
(1994), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 86 F.3d 1526. For income from affinity cards
excluded from the UBIT, see Oregon State Universi., Alumni Association, 193 F.3d
1098, 1099. For cases excluding income from mailing lists, see Common Cause, 112
T.C. 332; Planned Parenthood Federation, 77 T.C.M. 2227; Sierra Club, 103 T.C. 307.
24. 4 BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 100-2. For a copy of the preamble to
the Statute of Charitable Uses, see JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 27 (2d ed. 2000) (quoting the Preamble to the
Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz., c. 4 (Eng.)). See also Nina J. Crimm, An
Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations: A
United States, this exemption has been included in every income tax act
since 1894.'
Subchapter F of subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code sets out the
basic rules for determining tax-exempt status.26  Specifically, the
exemption from taxation is set forth in section 501(a). That section
provides that only organizations described in subsection (c) or (d) of
section 501 will be granted an exemption from federal income tax.28 If
an organization does not meet one of the prescribed purposes found in
these subsections, it will be subject to taxation, and the amount of tax
due depends on the category into which the organization is classified
Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 U. FLA. L. REV. 419, 425 (1998); Mark A. Hall & John
D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J.
1379, 1384 (1991). For an excellent discussion on the early English and American
history of the tax exemption of nonprofit organizations, see Chauncey Belknap, The
Federal Income Tax Exemption of Charitable Organizations: Its History and Underlying
Policy, in IV RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE [FILER] COMMISSION ON PRIVATE
PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS 2025 (1977).
25. The exemption from tax was first enacted in the Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, §
32, 28 Stat. 509, 556 (1894). The tax was passed on August 15, 1894 and was entitled
"An Act To reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the Government, and for other
purposes." Id. It was later declared unconstitutional in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). See Kevin M. Yamamoto, A Proposal for the
Elimination of the Exclusion for State Bond Interest, 50 FLA. L. REV. 145, 162 n.83
(1998). The exemption was later placed in the Tariff of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112
(1909) and Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(G)(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172 (1913). 4 BITrKER &
LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 100-2. For additional history on the tax exemption in
American history of nonprofit organizations, see Belknap, supra note 24, at 2025-26;
John D. Colombo, Why is Harvard Tax-Exempt? (And Other Mysteries of Tax Exemption
for Private Educational Institutions), 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 841, 844-45 (1993) (giving the
history of tax exemption for educational institutions); Crimm, supra note 24, at 427-29
(providing a brief history of the tax exemption for nonprofits). See also Erika King, Tax
Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 971, 973 (1999)
(maintaining that the tax exemptions granted to religious institutions and organizations
do not violate the Establishment Clause ban on direct aid to religion).
The first income tax was enacted by Congress in 1861 to finance the Civil War. See
PAUL R. MCDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (3d
ed. 1994); RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 9-11 (1954); SIDNEY
RATNER, AMERICAN TAXATION: ITS HISTORY AS A SOCIAL FORCE IN DEMOCRACY 65-68
(1942). The tax was only on taxable income greater than $600 and was three percent of
the first $10,000 and five percent on all income thereafter. Yamamoto, supra, at 162
n.83. The rate was reduced in 1867 and 1870, and repealed completely in 1872. Id.
26. I.R.C. §§ 501-528 (2000).
27. Id. § 501(a). "Exemption from taxation. An organization described in
subsection (c) or (d) or section 401(a) shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle
unless such exemption is denied under section 502 or 503." Id.
28. Section 501(d) covers certain religious organizations and will not be discussed
in this Article. See id. § 501(d). The organization must also not be a "feeder
organization" under § 502(a) or, for a narrow group of organizations, may not engage in
a list of prohibited transactions. See I.R.C. §§ 502(a), 503(a)-(b) (2000). A "feeder
organization" is one that pays all of its profits to an exempt organization under § 501.
Id. § 502(a).
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under the statutory scheme.2
Section 501(c) contains prescribed purposes," listing twenty-five
different types of organizations which may qualify for tax exemption?'
While there are many different types of organizations listed in section
501(c), they can primarily be grouped into two classes: public service
organizations and mutual benefit groups?" Public service organizations
include charitable organizations, private foundations, and social welfare
organizations." Mutual benefit groups include social clubs, labor
unions, and homeowners' associations. -
The largest and most desirable classification for tax exemption is
found in section 501(c)(3)? s These organizations receive a host of
special benefits, not the least of which is allowing donors to the
organization to deduct their donations." To qualify under section
501(c)(3) an organization must be organized and operated for one of the
29. LR.C. § l(e) (2000) (taxation of trusts); I.R.C. § II (2000) (corporate
taxation).
30. LR.C. § 501(c)(1)-(25).
31. Id. Some examples of qualifying organizations are: civic leagues, id. §
501(c)(4); professional football leagues, id. § 501(c)(6); certain cemetery corporations,
id. § 501(c)(13); and organizations formed before 1880 to provide insurance and other
benefits for a group-seventy-five percent of which are in the Armed Forces, veterans,
or their dependents, id § 501(c)(23). For additional information on the various
classifications of § 501(c), see James J. McGovern, The Exemption Provisions of
Subchapter F, 29 TAx LAw. 523, 527-42 (1976).
32. 4 BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 100-4.
33. Id.
34. ld at 100-5.
35. See FlSmiAN & ScHvARz, supra note 24, at 57 tbl. 1.4 (showing that of the
approximately 1.2 million section 501(c) organizations listed with the Internal Revenue
Service in 1997, over fifty-six percent were listed under section 501(c)(3)).
36. See I.R.C. § 170(a) (2000) (income tax deduction); I.R.C. § 2055(a)(2) (2000)
(estate tax deduction); I.RC. § 2522(a)(2) (2000) (gift tax deduction). Other benefits of
§ 501(c)(3) status include, but are not limited to, the ability to issue tax-exempt bonds.
LR.C. § 145 (1994); exemption from federal unemployment taxes, I.R.C. § 3306(cf(8)
(2000); more advantageous tax-deferred retirement plans for their employees, I.R.C. §
403(b) (1994); no minimum wage requirement, 29 C.F.R. § 779.214 (1998); and lower
postal rates, 39 C.F.R. § 111.1 (2000). For other lists of benefits, see FISHMAN &
SCHWARZ, supra note 24, at 330; Crimm, supra note 24, at 421 n.3; Bazil Facehina et al.,
Privileges & Exemptions Enjoyed by Nonprofit Organizations, 28 U.S.F. L REV. 85
(1993) (a complete discussion of the various benefits to section 501 (c)(3) organizations);
Henry Hansmann, The Evolving Law of Nonprofit Organizations: Do Current Trends
Make Good Policy?, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 807, 810-11 (1988-1989). While tax-
exempt organizations qualify for lower postal rates, mailed items which support an
affinity card program (mailings which contain the word(s) "Visa" or "MasterCard") do
not qualify for the lower rates. Fred Stokeld, Postal Senice Clarifies Erempts' Affinity
Credit Card Mailings, 74 TAX NOTES 724 (1997).
229
prescribed purposes,37 must not inure to the benefit of private parties,"
may engage only in very limited legislative activity,39 and must totally
abstain from political campaigning.
37. To qualify under section 501(c)(3) an organization must operate "exclusively
for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational
purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition... or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals." I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). See also Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 585-92 (1983) (holding that public policy can deny
tax-exempt status to schools that racially discriminate). While the statute says
"exclusively," an organization may still qualify under section 501(c)(3) if the unrelated
activity is "insubstantial." See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(b) (as amended in
1990). See also Ind. Retail Hardware Ass'n v. United States, 366 F.2d 998 (Ct. Cl.
1966) (revoking section 501(c)(6) business organization's exemption for "substantial"
unrelated activities); BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAx-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 646
(7th ed. 1998). But see Comment, Preventing the Operation of Untaxed Business by
Tax-Exempt Organizations, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 581 (1964-1965) (stating that unrelated
activities should not cause the loss of the tax exemption, but should be taxed as unrelated
business income under I.R.C. § 511(a)). To obtain a letter ruling from the Internal
Revenue Service determining the status of a section 501(c)(3) organization the unrelated
activities must be "de minimis." See Carolyn M. Osteen & A.L. Spitzer, When
Nonprofits Make a Profit: The Taxation of UBI, 20 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 261, 262
(1998) (stating "de minimis" as being less than five percent).
While the listed "purposes" for section 501(c)(3) are few, they encompass a wide
range of organizations. Examples include one-room soup kitchens, large hospitals,
museums, and art galleries, day-care centers, and a host of other specialized institutions.
Nancy J. Knauer, How Charitable Organization Influence Federal Tax Policy: "Rent-
Seeking" Charities or Virtuous Politicians?, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 971, 981.
38. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) ("[N]o part of the net earnings of [may inure] to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual .... "). "[T]he private inurement
doctrine forbids the flow or transfer of income or assets of a tax-exempt organization...
[to] persons associated with, or for the benefit of one or more persons with some
significant relationship to, the organization, for nonexempt purposes." HOPKINS, sutpra
note 37, at 428. If any private inurement is present, an organization may be forced to
pay penalties, known as "intermediate sanctions" since they are in lieu of losing tax-
exempt status. See I.R.C. § 4958 (2000). See also FIS-MAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 24,
at 512-18.
The nondistributional constraint applies to all tax-exempt organizations. See Henry B.
Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 501 (1981).
See also Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the
Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 457, 458 n.8
(1996) (citing as examples of the nondistributional constraint CAL. CORP. CODE § 5410
(West 2000); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFrr CORP. LAW § 102(a)(5) (McKinney 1997); REv.
MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 13.01 (1987)). For additional information on the
rationale for the nondistributional constraint, see Hansmann, supra, at 501-03.
39. "[N]o substantial part of the activities [may include] carrying on propaganda,
or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation" unless allowed for by section 501(h).
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
40. The organization may "not participate in, or intervene in (including the
publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in
opposition to) any candidate for public office." Id. Congress enacted the ban on
nonprofit political activity to codify Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
In Slee, Judge Learned Hand wrote, "Political agitation as such is outside the statute,
however innocent the aim .... Controversies of that sort must be conducted without
public subvention .... " 42 F.2d at 185. See also 4 BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, at
230
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III. RATIONALES FOR THE TAX EXEMPTION
A. Introduction
Why does the federal government forego so much potential taxable
revenue by allowing certain organizations an exemption from taxation of
their income? The answer to this question was never fully expressed
when the first exemption statute was passed, nor in reenactments of the
tax exemption, thus leaving the exact reason up to conjecture."'
Many theories have been put forward as a rationale for the nonprofit
tax exemption.'2 This Article will present the theories in three groups:
(1) social and public policy theories, " (2) economic theories," and (3)
hybrid theories (part social, part economic).' s There have been other
attempts at grouping the numerous theories to provide a rationale for the
federal tax exemption under section 501, but the following taxonomy,
the author believes, is simpler and more descriptive. 6
100-50.
41. See Belknap, supra note 24, at 2031 (stating that the first federal tax exemption
"was enacted without debate and virtually without comment .... The exemption
provision was accepted as a matter of course."); 4 BrrTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7. at
100-3, 100-4; Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahder, The Exemption of Nonprofit
Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 302-04 (1976); Hall &
Colombo, supra note 24, at 1382 n.4.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 48-150.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 48-60.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 62-85.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 86-150.
46. Some other groupings of theories include:
(1) James T. Bennett, Unfair Competition and the UBIT, 41 TAX NOTES 759 (1988).
Bennett presented six rationales for the tax exemption, three economic and three
noneconomic. The economic theories were "thin markets"; "market failure," see infra
text accompanying note 121; and transaction in public goods by nonprofit organizations.
See Bennett, supra, at 761-62. The noneconomic theories were that nonprofits promote
equity, are more accountable to the public, and existed in certain industries before any
for-profit providers. ld. at 762-63. Bennett criticizes all six theories.
(2) BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXMPr ORGANIZATIONS 57-66 (6th ed.
1992). Hopkins breaks down the rationales into four groups: (a) technical corporate law
(looking to how the organization is structured); (b) policy-oriented rationale (looking at
what the organization program activities are); (c) tax-oriented rationale (the activities of
nonprofits are not taxable events); and (d) rationale from another body of law (like
employee benefits law). Id.
(3) Crimm, supra note 24, at 430-39. Unlike the previous sources mentioned in this
footnote, Professor Crimm presents only those rationales which have been discussed in
law review journals. She divides the theories into three parts: (a) basic notions (early
rationales); (b) subsidy theories (federal government provides the tax exemption since
This overview will show that the public's increased trust in these
organizations is the common theme throughout all nonexclusively
economic rationales. This central premise of public trust will be used
later as the determinant of whether mailing list or affinity card income
should be taxable to these organizations. '
B. Social and Public Policy Rationales
The social and public policy rationales focus on the effect a nonprofit
organization has on society as the reason, or reward, for being given the
exemption from taxation. Discussed first is the traditional historical
rationale for why nonprofits are afforded tax exemptions, followed by
the "altruism" theory originated by Rob Atkinson.
1. Traditional Social and Public Policy Rationales
Among the first rationales expressed for exempting certain
organizations from taxation was that government had a "higher regard"
for these activities.4" The exemption was therefore allowed in order to
nonprofits relieve a government burden); and (c) alternatives to subsidy theories (all
other academic theories). Id.
(4) SALAMON, supra note 6, at 7-10. Salamon breaks the rationales into five
categories: (a) historical (volunteer organizations predate government); (b) market
failure (see infra text accompanying note 121); (c) government failure (government
action requires majority support; nonprofits exist so smaller groups can address needs
that the majority does not support, or has not yet begun to support); (d)
pluralism/freedom (encourage pluralism); and (e) solidarity (allows for unified joint
action). Id.
For additional critiques of the various rationales for allowing tax exemption, see Rob
Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charities: Thesis,
Antithesis, and Syntheses, 27 STETSON L. REv. 395 (1997).
An additional way in which the rationales for tax exemption might be broken down is
by their various perspectives, whether they are internal or external. "Internal" theories
are those which focus on how the donors, members, or the public views the organization.
Examples of "internal" theories are Hansmann's capital subsidy theory or the donative
theory of Hall & Colombo. See infra text accompanying notes 89-129. "External"
theories are those which look to the effect of the nonprofit organization on the public, but
it does not matter what the public's perception is of the organization. An example of an
"external" theory is Atkinson's altruism theory. See infra text accompanying notes 52-
60.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 327-392.
48. Belknap, supra note 24, at 2033 (stating that a controlling motive of
government in granting the tax exemption was its "higher regard for public benefit").
See also 4 BrIrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 100-4 (stating that part of the reason the
tax exemption was granted was due to the "benevolent spirit animating their activities");
Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption,
23 J. CoRp. L. 585, 586 (1998) (using "sovereignty" as the rationale for the tax
exemption since "Caesar should not tax God"); McGovern, supra note 31, at 526
(postulating that morality played a part in the tax exemption since Congress felt it was
"simply wrong to tax certain types of organizations"). Another early rationale was
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encourage the activities of certain favored organizations or institutions."'
This early rationale for exempting nonprofits is sometimes confused
with subsidy theory, an economic theory.-0 The difference between the
two will be examined when subsidy theory is discussed below?
2. Altruism Theory
One of the newer rationales, a "neo" social and public policy theory, is
the altruism theory advanced by Rob Atkinson.- Under this theory
those actions that are "positive acts" or that provide "metabenefits"
would be tax-exempt? The altruism theory is very broad in scope and
would allow more organizations to qualify for the exemption than are
now exempt from taxation.?4
Under the altruism theory, most, if not all, of the present exempt
classifications allowed under the social and public policy theories would
be permitted (charities, education, etc.) since those organizations engage
income based: Congress felt that the tax revenue from these organizations was not worth
the trouble and expense of collecting or forcing the group to keep records. See 4
BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 100-4. Assuming that Congress did not want to go
against historical precedent is another early rationale for the tax exemption. See id. For
additional discussion of early nonprofit rationales, see Rob Atkinson. Altnism in
Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REv. 501, 606 n.292 (1990); Bittker & Rahdert,
supra note 41, at 305-06 (critical of early rationales since they did not distinguish
between the various forms of nonprofit organizations); McGovem, supra note 31, at
525-27.
49. "The true explanation.., is that government relieves from the tax burden
religious, educational, and charitable activities because it wishes to encourage them as
representing the highest and noblest achievements of mankind." Belknap, supra note 24,
at 2033-34. A proposed House subcommittee report on the unrelated business income
tax stated that the exemption was provided since:
Nonprofit organizations are a part of the basic fabric of this country. Their
value, whether put in terms of serving the public benefit or easing human
suffering or lessening the burdens of Government, is much heralded, and
rightly so.... The Federal government has responded in kind. Special benefits
and exemptions are afforded to nonprofit organizations throughout the Federal
government ... to foster and encourage their existence.
UBiT RECOMIENDATIONS, supra note 11, at 3035.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 62-64.
51. See infra note 64.
52. See Atkinson, supra note 48. For additional discussion of the altruism theory,
see FSHmiAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 24, at 343-44; Atkinson, supra note 46; Crimm.
supra note 24, at 435.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 55-58.
54. See Atkinson, supra note 46, at 423-24 (admitting that the theory "makes for
an exemption that is extremely, perhaps shockingly, broad" and much wider than any
other theory under present law).
in "preferred services."55 The theory adds to the traditional framework
the inclusion of organizations which provide "metabenefits" to society.6
These "metabenefits" are derived not from what an organization does,
such as aiding the poor or sick, but from how the goods or services they
provide are produced or distributed.57  Both classes, positive acts and
provision of metabenefits, are considered altruistic; therefore,
organizations which provide either should be exempt from taxation. 8
Atkinson's theory has not been without its detractors. The altruism
theory has been criticized on the grounds that an organization's founders
might not have had an "altruistic" motive when creating the nonprofit."
Additionally, Atkinson provides no mechanism to reevaluate an
organization if its purpose is to change over time.'
As can be seen from the above discussion, the social and policy
rationales focus on the benefits that nonprofit organizations provide
to the public. These benefits can be most simply described as
organizations doing good for society. If this is the justification for the
tax exemption for nonprofits, it is not only important for the public to be
able to place its trust in the various organizations, but also for those
organizations to refrain from acts that are less than noble and good. This
element of public trust in nonprofit organizations will be shown to be a
major factor in determining which sources of income should be taxed or
exempt from taxation.
55. See Atkinson, supra note 48, at 618 (allowing for the exemption because
"favorable tax treatment of altruistic nonprofits is an affirmative preference for
something they provide").
56. Id. at 618, 628-30. As Atkinson writes, the altruism theory "builds on the
traditional theory's insight that the desirable attributes include not only primary benefits,
but also metabenefits." Id. at 618.
57. See id. at 605 & n.291. Examples of organizations which promote
metabenefits are those which foster "voluntarism," "pluralism," "a pioneering element,"
"diversity of views and approaches," and "experimentation in new untried ventures." Id.
at 605 n.291. See also Crimm, supra note 24, at 435.
58. See Atkinson, supra note 46, at 424 ("[Altruistic supply of a good or
service-any good or service-is a metabenefit worthy of consideration for tax
preference."). Atkinson does not discuss why an altruistic organization should be
provided a tax exemption, stating only that to do so would be "too ambitious." Atkinson,
supra note 48, at 628. See also Colombo, supra note 25, at 873 (criticizing altruism
theory on this point).
59. See Colombo, supra note 25, at 872. Colombo proposes that organizers might
just have the desire to be able to distribute more of the income to salaries. See id. See
also Bennett, supra note 46, at 762. Bennett brings up the same issue with respect to the
capital subsidy theory. See infra note 107.
60. See Colombo, supra note 25, at 872-73, See also Crimm, supra note 24, at
457-60 (recognizing that a nonprofit's motives may change over time as the organization
evolves).
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C. Economic Rationales
These theories cover those rationales based on purely economic
reasoning to support the nonprofit tax exemption."' Economic theories
have been severely criticized in academic circles. The first of these is
the subsidy theory, and the second is the income measurement theory of
Boris Bittker and George Rahdert.
1. Subsidy Theory
The subsidy theory postulates that a tax exemption is granted as a way
for the government to compensate nonprofits for the goods or services
they provide.' This theory assumes that if nonprofit organizations were
not present in society, the government would be required to perform
their functions.63 And, while it might be possible for the government to
provide these types of goods or services, it would do so only at a much
greater cost. 4
Subsidy theory has been much criticized. Some cite the fact that many
61. "Economic" is meant in the sense that consumers are assumed to make
decisions in a rational manner. See JERALD SCHIFF, CHARITABLE GIVLG AND
GOVERNmENT POLICY: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 2 (1990). The term, as used here, is also
meant to apply to those theories which do not use any social policy as justification for
the nonprofit tax exemption.
62. One congressional report stated it like this:
The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable and
other purposes is based upon the theory that the Government is compensated
for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would
otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the
benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.
H.R. REP. No. 1860, at 19 (1938). The above statement was a called a "rare
Congressional pronouncement on the matter" of a rationale for federal tax exemption of
nonprofits. Sharpe, supra note 6, at 376. Other authors add to the tax subsidy theory by
saying that the tax exemption is required since nonprofits provide public goods which
would be underproduced in the private sector, and not produced at all in the public sector
without government subsidy. See Dennis Zimmerman, Nonprofit Organizations, Social
Benefits, and Tax Policy, 44 NAT'L TAX J. 341,342 (1991).
63. For other papers discussing the subsidy theory, see HoPKINs, supra note 46. at
58-60 (referring to the subsidy theory as "program rationale"); Crimm, supra note 24, at
430-31; Janne G. Gallagher, The Case for the Charitable Tar £renmption, 41 TAX NOTES
765 (1988) (stating that the government saves money by the work nonprofits do and that
nonprofits foster volunteerism which additionally helps the government); Sharpa, supra
note 6, at 376-77.
64. See Sharpe, supra note 6, at 376-77. The subsidy theory is different from the
traditional social theories in that social theory allows for the tax exemptions based on the
government's "higher regard" for certain activities irrespective of the economic impact.
See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
nonprofits perform functions which would not be contemplated by
government if nonprofit organizations were not present, such as
missionary work in foreign countries.65 The purely religious activities
engaged in by these organizations (e.g., "preaching the gospel") are
services that the federal government could not provide since it is
prohibited by the Constitution from the establishment of religion."
Another criticism is that the subsidy rationale is based on a tax
expenditure analysis,67 which has its own inherent problems."8
2. Income Measurement Theory
Boris Bittker and George Rahdert wrote the first ma or academic
paper on the rationale for tax exemption for nonprofits. The paper
espoused a theory which is now known as the income measurement
theory.70 While the theory has not been widely accepted as justification
65. See Belknap, supra note 24, at 2033. This criticism assumes that missionaries
only proselytize their religious beliefs. However, many missionaries provide critical
social services such as education, medical care, clean water, shelter, and farming
methods which the federal government can, and does, provide.
66. U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "). See also
Belknap, supra note 24, at 2033.
67. Tax expenditures are any "revenue losses attributable to provisions of the
Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross
income or which provide special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax
liability." Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
344, § 3(3), 88 Stat. 297, 299. Tax expenditures are estimated each year and placed into
the federal budget. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAx
ExPENDrruRES FOR FISCAL YEARS 1998-2002 2 (J. Comm. Print 1997).
68. See Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARv. L. REV.
1578, 1620-21 (1992). The article notes that tax expenditures are inefficient in
allocating government resources, inequitable since they provide the greatest benefit to
those that least need the assistance, and force the executive branch, not Congress, to
make critical decisions about implementation. See id. at 1621. See also Crimm, supra
note 24, at 431.
69. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 41. George Rahdert was a student of Bittker.
Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals:
Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307, 385 (1991). Mr.
Rahdert was also an editor on the YALE LAW JOURNAL; he now practices law in St.
Petersburg, Florida. 6 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY FL1 276B (2000).
70. The first mention of the theory as "income measurement" is in Hall &
Colombo, supra note 69, at 313 n.12. The income measurement theory does not apply to
"mutual benefit" organizations. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 41, at 348. Mutual
benefit organizations "are operated to provide goods and services to their members at
cost," id., and include social clubs, I.R.C. § 501(c)(7) (2000); consumer cooperatives,
I.R.C. §§ 521, 501(c)(8)-(10) (2000); labor unions, I.R.C. § 501(c)(5) (2000); or trade
associations, I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) (2000). See also Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 41, at
306. Bittker and Rahdert suggest mutual benefit organizations should not be taxed, but
rather an individual member should be taxed if income earned by the organization is
imputed to that member. See id. at 306, 348-57.
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for the tax exemption, the Bittker and Rahdert article provided a major
impetus for research and writing in the area."
The income measurement theory is based on two separate grounds.
First, nonprofits should not be taxed since "they do not realize 'income'
in the ordinary sense of that term."n Second, even if the amount of
income could be measured, a tax rate could not be readily found to
apply.?3 Various authors have discredited both arguments."
On the inability to measure income, Bittker and Rahdert argued that
the basic premise underlying the income tax, that organizations seek to
maximize profits, does not by definition fit nonprofit organizations."
The article goes into detail about how it is impossible to account for
income such as endowments, dues, and gifts which are received by
nonprofits. ' This difficulty in classifying or categorizing income items
also applies to deductions, since if no profit motive exists there can be
no deductions for "ordinary and necessary business expenses.""
The second prong of the income measurement theory focuses on the
rate of taxation which should be applied to nonprofits. The article states
that since the burden of taxation falls on the ultimate beneficiaries, the
organization should be taxed at the nonprofit beneficiaries' personal tax
rate.78  This would be difficult or impossible since many times the
beneficiaries are unknown when the income is received, and tax rates
could differ among beneficiaries.
The criticisms of the income measurement theory are relatively
simple. Regarding the inability to measure income, critics point to the
fact that the wide majority of nonprofit organizations earn the bulk of
their income not from donations, but from the sale of goods or services."
71. See FISHmAN & SchwARZ, supra note 24, at 340 (stating that the work
"stimulated" interest in the area); Hall & Colombo, supra note 69, at 385 (commenting
that the article was the "first notable, comprehensive treatment of the federal income tax
exemption"); Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations
from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE LJ. 54, 55 (1981-1982) (calling Bittker and
Rahdert's article the "most comprehensive and thoughtful" of the attempts to rationalize
the tax exemption up to that time).
72. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 41, at 305, 307-14.
73. See id. at 305, 314-16.
74. See infra text accompanying notes 80-84.
75. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 41, at 307-08.
76. Id. at 308-09.
77. Id. at 309.
78. Id. at315.
79. See i.
80. Hansmann, supra note 71, at 59 n.21 (stating that in 1976 only fifteen percent
Examples of commercial nonprofits include hospitals, nursing homes,
and private schools."' Since many nonprofits are commercial in nature,
it is not a problem to account for their income like any other business."
Accounting for "profits" could also be applied to nonprofit organizations
which receive a majority of their income from donations. The donations
could be viewed as compensation for services and goods provided to
third parties.83
The absence of a tax rate is also criticized summarily. Most critics
note that income taxation on corporations is seldom justified based on
the ability to pay by those individuals who must bear the ultimate burden
of the tax. 4
Since the income measurement theory does not adequately apply to
many nonprofit organizations, other hybrid theories, discussed below,
have been postulated.' These theories, while constructed on economic
reasoning, also have incorporated social and public policy rationales
upon which to base the tax exemption.
D. Hybrid Theories
The hybrid theories are those which combine social and public policy
rationales with economic justifications. These theories have been
created more recently. They seek to explain the nonprofit tax
exemptions while avoiding the weaknesses of those theories based
purely on social and public policy or economic rationales. The theories
discussed here are the "capital subsidy" theory by Hen7  Hansmann,
86
the "donative" theory of Mark Hall and John Colombo, and the "risk
of nonprofit income was received from donations). See also Atkinson, supra note 48, at
614-16 (citing Hansmann in agreement); Colombo, supra note 25, at 841 (agreeing with
Hansmann); Crimm, supra note 24, at 432 (stating that the "theory has not been favored
by other academicians" since it does not deal with commercial nonprofits); Sharpe,
supra note 6, at 375, n.16 (in agreement with Hansmann's criticisms).
81. Hansmann, supra note 71, at 59.
82. Atkinson, supra note 48, at 614-16; Colombo, supra note 25, at 841;
Hansmann, supra note 71, at 59.
83. Hansmann, supra note 71, at 61. Hansmann uses the Red Cross as an example.
Any donation would be treated as income, unless the Red Cross used it for disaster relief
in that same tax year. See id.
84. Atkinson, supra note 48, at 612-14; Colombo, supra note 25, at 859;
Hansmann, supra note 71, at 65.
85. See Hall & Colombo, supra note 69, at 386 (calling the income measurement
theory "ultimately unconvincing"). Another argument against the income measurement
theory was that it did not account for the property tax exemption which was afforded
nonprofit organizations by state and local government. See Colombo, supra note 25, at
858-59; Hall & Colombo, supra note 24, at 1387; Developments in the Law-Nonprofit
Corporations, supra note 68, at 1622.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 89-108.
87. See infra text accompanying notes 109-129.
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compensation" theory of Nina Crimm."
1. Capital Subsidy Theory
Henry Hansmann's "capital subsidy" theory9 is the most widely
accepted theory for the tax exemption of nonprofit organizations,
although it has been heavily criticized.9' The capital subsidy theory was
published soon after, and in response to, the income measurement theory
of Bittker and Rahdert.9 The capital subsidy theory combines elements
of both an economic and a social policy nature. The economic element
is based on "contract failure," the idea that nonprofit organizations are
the most efficient providers of goods and services in their areas.' The
social policy element is the proposition that economic efficiency is
based on the increase in public trust due to the nondistributional
constraint on nonprofit organizations."
Hansmann states that the tax exemption compensates nonprofit
organizations for their inability to tap into capital markets due to the fact
they cannot, by law, distribute profits to members or investors." This
statement, however, can best be understood within the context of
Hansmann's entire theory of nonprofit organizations.
The starting point is that nonprofits, under state and sometimes federal
law, are not allowed to distribute the net earnings of the organizations to
88. See infra text accompanying notes 130-50.
89. Hansmann, supra note 71, at 55, 72-76. See also Hansmann, supra note 36, at
813-14; Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE LJ. 835
(1980) [hereinafter Hansmann, Nonprofit Enterprise] (explaining the economic role of
nonprofits); Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business
Income Tax, 75 VA. L. REv. 605 (1989) [hereinafter Hansmann. Unfair Competition and
the UBIT] (arguing that the unrelated business income tax is economically efficient).
90. See FISHmAN & SCHvARZ, supra note 24, at 47 (calling Hansmann's work
"enormously influential"); Ira Mark Ellman, Another Theory of Nonprofit Corporations,
80 MICH. L. REy. 999, 999 (1981-1982) (stating that Hansmann's "two lengthy articles
dominate the field and establish the topics for discussion"); Zimmerman, supra note 62,
at 341-42 (calling Hansmann's theory one of two economic theories to explain the
existence of nonprofit organizations).
91. For criticisms of the capital subsidy theory, see infra text accompanying notes
106-08.
92. See Hansmann, supra note 71, at 55 (calling Bittker and Rahdert the "most
comprehensive and thoughtful" of the articles rationalizing the tax exemption to date, but
"ultimately unsatisfying.")
93. See infra text accompanying notes 98-100.
94. See infra text accompanying notes 96-97.
95. Hansmann, supra note 71, at 55. See also FisHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note
24, at 341.
officers, directors, or members.96  Hansmann calls this the
"nondistributional constraint."" This constraint makes nonprofits the
most economically efficient legal entity to provide goods and services in
areas where "contract failure" occurs."
Hansmann defines contract failure as occurring:
when, owing to the nature of the service itself or to the circumstances under
which it is consumed, the purchasers of the service-whether we style them
donors or consumers-are likely to have difficulty in (1) comparing the quality
of performance offered by competing providers before a purchase is made, or
(2) determining, after a purchase is made, whether the service was actually
performed as promised.
Since nonprofits are the most economically efficient providers of
certain goods and services, Hansmann believes nonprofits serve an
important role in society and should be encouraged.'o
The nondistributional constraint, however, hampers nonprofit
formation and expansion. If nonprofits are to grow and expand, they
require capital just as for-profit businesses require capital.' °' However,
the nondistributional constraint prevents nonprofits from raising equity
capital, and they are therefore limited to raising capital by debt,
donations, or retaining earnings."° Hansmann believes that nonprofits
cannot adequately expand by debt (they cannot borrow enough) or
donations (since they often provide public goods and suffer from free
rider problems),'" and they, therefore, must depend on retained
earnings."
96. Hansmann, supra note 71, at 56; Hansmann, Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note
89, at 838. For examples of state laws forbidding the distribution of net earnings see
CAL. CORP. CODE § 5410 (West 2000); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 102(a)(5)
(McKinney 1997); REv. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 13.01 (1987). See also Brody,
supra note 38, at 458 n.8.
97. Hansmann, supra note 71, at 56.
98. See id. at 69-71, 74.
99. Id. at 69. Some of the examples Hansmann gives are Red Cross disaster relief,
higher education, and those providers of "complex personal services" (day care and
nursing homes). Id. at 69-70. See also SCHIFF, supra note 61, at 3 (stating that nonprofit
donations are unusual "in that donors often have poor information about the marginal
impact of their gift.")
100. Hansmann, supra note 38, at 508-09 ("I am suggesting that the essential role
of the nonprofit organization is to serve as a fiduciary for its patrons in situations of
contract failure.").
101. See Hansmann, supra note 71, at 72.
102. Id. at 72-74.
103. The "free rider" problem is a characteristic of public goods. See TIE MIT
DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 163 (David W. Pearce ed., 4th ed. 1992). Since
there is no way to prevent those who do not pay to have access to public goods (i.e.,
national defense or clean air), consumers have an incentive to take a "free ride" while
others pay. Id.
104. Hansmann, supra note 71, at 73.
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This is where the tax exemption enters. Capital subsidy theory asserts
that government should promote activities in areas of contract failure
and thus should not tax a nonprofit's earnings in order to allow
nonprofits to accumulate retained earnings more quickly. In this way the
tax exemption serves to compensate nonprofit organizations for the
effects of the nondistributional constraint. It therefore allows nonprofits
to provide goods and services in areas of contract failure where they are
the most efficient providers of goods and services."
The capital subsidy theory is not without its critics. One of the
difficulties of the theory is its reliance on the nondistributional
constraint." While this constraint prohibits profits to be directly
distributed, profits can be distributed indirectly as salaries, thereby
lowering quality or increasing the cost of goods or services provided.'
Others point out problems in the way the subsidy is provided. They call
the tax exemption a "crude mechanism" for providing the subsidy, and
say that it is impossible to ascertain which organizations are suffering
from a capital formation problem.n
These criticisms are not completely unfounded. At the heart of the
capital formation theory is the concept of the public's trust in nonprofit
105. Id. at 74. "[The] rationale is that the exemption serves to compensate for
difficulties that nonprofits have in raising capital, and that such a capital subsidy can
promote efficiency when employed in those industries in which nonprofit firms serve
consumers better than their for-profit counterparts." Id. at 72.
106. See Bennett, supra note 46, at 762.
107. See ida In this way the nonprofits "have wide discretion to promote their own
careers and increase their personal wealth." d See also GAUL & BOROWSKI, supra note
20, at 114-42 (discussing the pay and fringe benefits received by nonprofit executives).
108. See Colombo, supra note 25, at 870-71. Colombo also states that the capital
subsidy theory is deficient since it does not account for the state property tax exemptions
granted to nonprofits. Id. at 871. See also Hall & Colombo, supra note 69, at 388-89
(discussing the same criticisms).
For an additional criticism, see Brody, supra note 38, at 459-60. Brody says the
capital subsidy theory is circular since the public goes to nonprofits due to a lack of
information, but cannot get any additional information after giving the nonprofit funds.
Id. Brody's criticism misses the point, however. Capital subsidy theory does not posit
that the public will form nonprofits to gain more information, but only that they can be
somewhat assured that their donations will not go to make a profit for the organization
and their shareholders or members. For other criticisms, see Crimm, supra note 24, at
432-34 (criticizing the capital subsidy theory on grounds similar to Brody); Ellman.
supra note 90, at 1050 (stating that Hansmann's theories should be limited to nonprofits
which subsist on donations, but Ellman creates a separate theory for nondonative
nonprofits); Sharpe, supra note 6, at 375 n.16, 377-80. But see Richard Steinberg &
Bradford -. Gray, "The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise" in 1993: Hansmann Revisited, 22
NoNpRorr & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 297, 312-13 (1993) (reviewing and agreeing with
Hansmann's contract failure theory).
organizations. If this public trust is breached, these organizations would
no longer be the most efficient providers of certain goods and services
because they could not be the most economically efficient providers in
areas of contract failure. Therefore it is important that nonprofits
maintain the public's trust at the highest levels possible.
2. Donative Theory
A second hybrid theory is the donative theory developed by Mark Hall
and John Colombo.'09 The donative theory blends social policy, the
"deservedness" of an organization,10  and economics (tax-exempt
nonprofits should exist only where there is both "government failure"
and market failure)."' This theory attempts to provide a more solid
rationale with which to determine which organizations should be tax-
exempt and which should be taxable.'
The donative theory is easy to state but difficult to understand with all
its implications. The theory states that tax exemptions, both federal and
state, should be awarded only to those organizations which are able to
obtain adequate donations." 3 By linking the tax exemption to the level
of donations received, the donative theory would have the general public
choose in a market-like fashion which organizations should receive the
109. JOHN D. COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION
(1995); Colombo, supra note 25, at 873-88; Hall & Colombo, supra note 24, at 1450-
73; Hall & Colombo, supra note 69, at 389-411. See also FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra
note 24, at 344-50 (excerpt of the law review article discussing donative theory and a
short discussion of the donative theory); Crimm, supra note 24, at 435-39 (summarizing
and questioning theory); Sharpe, supra note 6, at 379-80 & n.25 (questioning the
validity of application of donative theory); Developments in the Law-Nonprofit
Corporations, supra note 68, at 1623-25 (questioning donative theory).
110. "Deservedness" is defined by those "activities that are both worthy of, and in
need of, a social subsidy." Hall & Colombo, supra note 24, at 1384.
111. These terms are covered infra text accompanying notes 116-21.
112. "Other theories more discriminating in their determination of worthiness are
nevertheless flawed under the deservedness criterion because they do not explain why
valued activities need support to exist at a socially optimal level." Hall & Colombo,
supra note 24, at 1385. Hall and Colombo limit their explanation of the tax exemption to
only those nonprofit organizations which are exempt under I.R.C. section 501 (c)(3). See
id. at 1382 n.3.
113. "In order to place the exemption on firmer theoretical footing, we then
proposed a donative theory of the charitable exemption-one that considers as charities
only those institutions that are capable of attracting a substantial level of donative
support from the public." Hall & Colombo, supra note 24, at 1383-84. This is in part
due to the fact that donations as a source of income are becoming less important to
nonprofit organizations. See Sharpe, supra note 6, at 407 (stating that income from
donations for section 501(c)(3) organizations dropped to eighteen percent in 1982 (citing
Unrelated Business Income Tax: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the
House Comm. On Ways and Means, 100th Cong. 139 (1987) (statement of Jennie S.
Stathis, Associate Director, General Government Division, U.S. General Accounting
Office))).
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benefits of tax exemption." 4 By looking at the amount of donations
which an organization can procure, the public decides what
organizations are deserving of special status." '
Hall and Colombo write that tax exemption is warranted only in areas
in which there exists "twin failure."' 6 "Twin failure" occurs in areas
where the goods or services cannot be provided at optimal levels due to
both "government failure" and private market failure."7  Government
failure occurs when there is a failure to attract a majority of votes
(federal, state, or local) to enact a desired government programt 'S
Therefore, even if a minority of the population greatly desires a certain
program, the government will not provide that good or service."'
However, while the majority may not vote for the good or service, they
are willing to subsidize it with tax exemptions.' Market failure appears
in the for-profit setting since nonprofits are providing public goods
which will be undersupplied in a private market due to free rider
problems.
One major question under the donative theory concerns the
"appropriate" level of donations that is required. Hall and Colombo
114. See Hall & Colombo, supra note 24, at 1388.
115. The donative theory "reasons that donative institutions deserve a tax subsidy
because the willingness of the public to contribute demonstrates both worthiness and
neediness." Hall & Colombo, Donative Theoty, supra note 24, at 1385. In this manner
the donative theory is the exact opposite focus of Atdnson's altruism theory discussed
earlier. The donative theory has an interior focus, how the organization is being viewed
by the world. The altruism theory has an exterior focus, how the organization affects the
general public by the distribution of "metabenefits." See supra text accompanying notes
55-58.
116. Colombo, supra note 25, at 874-75; Hall & Colombo, supra note 69, at 391-
96.
117. Colombo, supra note 25, at 874-75; Hall & Colombo, supra note 69. at 391.
118. See Colombo, supra note 25, at 874.
119. See id at 874-75.
120. See i. at 875; Hall & Colombo, supra note 69, at 392-94.
Colombo states the subsidy as:
[A]lthough a majority of voters may resist paying the full cost of government
directly providing certain goods and services, a majority may be willing for
government to "contribute" to such production because, while they do not
value the particular good or service enough to pay for all of it, they recognize
that they would receive some marginal benefit from increased production and
hence would be willing to pay for a portion of that increased production,
especially if such agreement would permit a partial cross-subsidy of their own
special interest.
Colombo, supra note 25, at 875.
121. See Hall & Colombo, supra note 69, at 391 & n.301. For the definition of the
of "free rider" problem, see supra note 103.
would require that at least one-third of an organization's gross revenues
be from donations in order to qualify for tax-exempt status.12 2  The
reasons for the one-third level are both historical (studies show that this
is the average level of donations for nonprofit organizations) and
practical (one-third is already used in other areas of federal taxation of
nonprofits).'2 Presently many organizations receive more than one-third
of their income from donations, so their tax exemption would not be
disturbed. However, most hospitals '2' and some educational institutions
do not receive this level of donative support.2'
The donative theory has met with some criticism. 6 One criticism is
that the theory is inconsistent, since when an organization receives one
hundred percent of its support from donations, and is therefore very
deserving of the tax exemption, the tax exemption is no longer helpful
because donations are already excluded from income under present tax
law. 7 Second, only individuals with money to donate can help qualify a
nonprofit organization for the tax exemption by helping to meet the
donation level required under the donative theory.2 Finally, it is noted
that the number of donors might be a better indication of public support
than the amount of total donations. 9
The donative theory exemplifies public trust as its paramount aspect.
If the public does not trust a nonprofit organization, the organization
could not be expected to receive many donations. The public would not
elect to provide support to those organizations which they did not trust,
122. Hall & Colombo, supra note 24, at 1454-55. "Gross revenues" would be
calculated under I.R.C. section 509(d) (2000), although the receipts from the sale or
exchange of capital assets would be included in the base. Id. at 1452-53.
123. Id. at 1454-55. The authors in their later published book on the same topic
stated that the one-third requirement could be relaxed to 10% or 20% for organizations
which have historically been tax-exempt. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 109, at 200.
But see Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, supra note 68, at 1624
(stating that the level of donation required is "inherent arbitrariness").
124. See Hall & Colombo, supra note 69, at 409-10.
125. See Colombo, supra note 25, at 887.
126. See Atkinson, supra note 46, at 428 (pointing out the paradox expressed by
Hall and Colombo that the more donations an organization receives, the less useful the
tax exemption becomes); Crimm, supra note 24, at 438-39 (asking nine questions about
the validity of the theory); Sharpe, supra note 6, at 379-80 n.25 (questioning the theory);
Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, supra note 68, at 1624-25 (pointing
out the arbitrariness of creating a threshold level of donation and that the level of support
does not necessarily correlate with the amount of donations received).
127. I.R.C. § 102(a) (2000) (excluding gifts from gross income). See also
Atkinson, supra note 46, at 428 & n.107 (stating that this inconsistency was pointed out
by Hall and Colombo themselves (citing Hall & Colombo, supra note 24, at 1453, and
Hall & Colombo, supra note 69, at 403 n.342)).
128. See Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, supra note 68, at
1624-25. But see Hall & Colombo, supra note 24, at 1459 (discussing how to account
for donated labor).
129. Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, supra note 68, at 1625.
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or which acted in an unworthy manner.
3. Risk Compensation Theory
The most recent attempt to provide a unifying theory to tax-exempt
organizations is the "risk compensation" theory proposed by Nina
Crimm.'3 The risk compensation theory separates the question of why
to permit the exemption from federal taxation from the question of
whether an organization should be allowed tax-exempt status."3 ' This
theory's economic aspect bases the tax exemption on the fact that it
provides an economic incentive for organizations to take on "pure
risk."132 The social portion of the theory is that for an organization to
maintain its tax-exempt status it must strive to complete its tax-exempt
purpose "in a constructive, progressive, and tolerant fashion."''
Professor Crimm writes that the exemption provides a subsidy to tax-
exempt organizations. To Crimm the subsidy is not designed to increase
altruism, like Atkinson," or to aid in capital formation, like
Hansmann,"3' but to provide a subsidy to nonprofits for the increased risk
that they face in providing pure public goods or mixed public goods.'
Providing pure or mixed public goods is associated with pure risk, that
risk which has no upside potential and from which one can only be left
at a neutral position or with a loss.37 Due to this risk, Crimm states that
no for-profit firm would provide these goods without the tax exemption
130. Crimm, supra note 24. Professor Crimm limits her explanation of the tax
exemption to only those nonprofit organizations which are exempt under I.R.C. section
501(c)(3). Id. at 424.
131. See Ud at 424-25.
132. See infra text accompanying notes 137--40.
133. Crimm, supra note 24, at 461.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 52-60.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 89-108.
136. Crimm, supra note 24, at 440-41. A "public good" is one in which: (1) the
consumption cannot be given to only those who pay (nonexcludability), and (2) one
person's use does not interfere with another person's consumption of that same good
(nonrivalry). Id at 440; Yamamoto, supra note 25, at 150 n.17. A "mixed public good"
provides a pure public component, but also directly benefits one group. See Crimm,
supra note 24, at 441. Crimm gives the example of low-cost housing to replace slum
housing in an urban renewal program. Id. The neighborhood benefits, but the residents
of the low-cost housing directly benefit. Id.
137. Crimm, supra note 24, at 443. Crimm uses theft and fire as examples of pure
risk. Id. at 443 n.98. 'ure risk" is contrasted to "speculative risk" (outcome can be
gain or loss), "systematic risk" (risk which cannot be eliminated by diversification), and
"diversifiable risk" (risk which can be reduced and is faced by particular providers of
goods and services). Id. at 443-44.
since there is no possibility of gain.'38
Since the government's size and immobility prevent it from providing
many pure public goods and services which the public desires, the
nonprofit sector is needed to fill in this gap.'39 The federal tax exemption
provides this incentive, or as Professor Crimm states, the exemption is
"insurance" which provides a boost to the expected return of the
nonprofit organization and helps to offset the risk involved.'0
For Professor Crimm, the question of why to permit tax-exempt status
for some organizations is a separate issue from what organizations
should be allowed the privilege of the tax exemption. 4' According to
her theory, the question of why one is allowed the tax exemption is
primarily economic, ' and all charitable organizations deserve to be tax
exempt when they begin operations with donations.' After this initial
phase, however, the lack of continuing "deservedness" of an
organization might cause the loss of the tax exemption.'" She goes on to
say that under other theories this reexamination is not likely to occur.'4
Public trust pervades the "deservedness" portion of the risk
compensation theory. For Crimm, deservedness is based on the
"worthiness of the projects carried on,"'46 the "benefits to society,' 47 and
how close those activities conform with the organization's original
purpose.'* She also states that any noncharitable activities should either
be taxed or cause the organization's tax-exempt status to be revoked. 49
The "worthiness" of an organization, or its "benefit to society," must be
reflected in the amount of public trust the organization receives. If a
nonprofit organization violated the public's trust, those activities should
not be "deserving" and should be taxed.' 0
138. Id. at451.
139. Id. at 442.
140. Id. at 454. "The tax exemption is a charitable organization's return on its
investment in the public portion of public goods and services, and its very nature assures
non-volatile [stable] returns" which make an investment have lower risk. Id. at 456-57.
141. Id. at 424-25, 455-56.
142. Id. at 462.
143. Id. at 455-57. Professor Crimm points out that since the initial income would
most likely be from donations, it most likely would be excluded from tax regardless of
I.R.C. § 501(a). Id. at 455 n.160.
144. Id. at 457-58. "I would submit that the moral ethic is cloning-that is, the
replication over time of the nonprofit organization and its original purpose-and the tax
exemption may not be justified for those organizations that do not continue to 'clone'
themselves as time progresses." Id. at 458.
145. Id. at 459-60.
146. Id. at 462.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 461.
150. Id.
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E. Summary: Public Trust as the Center of Noneconomic
Nonprofit Tax Exemption Rationales
While the social and hybrid theories rationalize the federal tax
exemption for nonprofit organizations in different ways, all take into
account the public's trust and confidence in nonprofit organizations.' If
the notion of public trust is part of the bedrock upon which the tax
exemption is based, then it follows that any behavior by nonprofits
which decreases the public trust should be either eliminated or taxable.'"2
This should be true regardless of what the income is ultimately used for
or whether some of the public would not distrust the actions undertaken.
However, before examining the income received by nonprofits from
mailing list rental and affinity card programs under this microscope, a
general overview of the taxation of nonprofits and the history of that tax
is in order.
IV. UNRELATED BUSINESS INCOME
A. History
As stated earlier, the term "tax exempt" does not accurately describe
section 501(a) organizations.' 3 The term is inaccurate due to the UBIT
which is imposed on certain nonprofit income under I.R.C. section
51 l(a)."s The UBIT is best understood by looking at its history.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 60 (social and policy rationales focus on
the benefits nonprofit organizations provide, so public trust is imperative), 108 (capital
subsidy theory based on public trust of nonprofit organizations), 129 (public trust
paramount to donative theory), and 146-50 (public trust is important to the
"deservedness" of an organization). While several of the hybrid theories are said by
their authors to only apply to section 501(c)(3) organizations, others attempt to explain
the tax exemption of all nonprofit organizations. See Atkinson, supra note 48. at 510,
565-66 (stating that the altruism theory applies to all nonprofits, except those which sell
goods to members); Hansmann, supra note 71, at 93-94 (stating that the capital
formation theory applies to all nonprofit organizations, with the possible exception of
social clubs). But see Crimm, supra note 24, at 424 (applying the risk compensation
theory to only charitable organizations); Hall & Colombo, supra note 24, at 1382 n.3
(stating that the donative theory only applies "to justify the charitable exemption").
152. See infra text accompanying notes 345-72.
153. See supra text accompanying note 7.
154. I.R.C. § 511(a) (2000). Section 511(a) imposes a corporate income tax on
"unrelated business taxable income" of organizations which are described in sections
401(a) (certain pension plans) and 501(c) and state colleges and universities. Id. I.R.C.
section 511(b) imposes a tax under section l(e) on the same income of section 501(a)
trusts. Id. § 511(b). See also .LRC. § 512(a) (1994) (defining "unrelated business
Before the UBIT was enacted in 1950 no tax was imposed on the
income of nonprofit organizations. The only deterrent against a
nonprofit organization venturing into business opportunities and
receiving income tax-free was loss of its tax-exempt status under I.R.C.
section 501.'
Loss of tax-exempt status, however, was very unlikely under the
"destination of income" test. The test was first enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores.'6
Trinidad revolved around a claim for refund brought by an ancient
Philippine religious order, which was exempt from taxation under what
is now I.R.C. section 501(a).' 7 At the time, the Philippine Islands were
a territory of the United States and, therefore, under its tax jurisdiction."'
The government taxed the entire income of the organization, claiming
that the religious order was not "operated exclusively" for its exempt
purpose.'59 This claim was based on the fact that they had incidental
income from the sale of wine, chocolate, and "other articles," accounting
for 2.8% of their income." All of the disputed items were "purchased
and supplied for use in its churches, missions, parsonages, schools, and
other subordinate agencies. '  The lower courts held that no tax was
due since the organization was exempt from taxation.' 6
The Supreme Court held that the religious order should not lose its tax
exemption since the statute granting the exemption made "the
taxable income"); infra text accompanying notes 200-47.
155. See Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 579 (1924)
(superseded by statute as stated in W. Va. State Med. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 91 T.C. 651
(1988)). See also HOPKINS, supra note 37, at 634; Carla Neeley Freitag, Estates, Gifts,
and Trusts: Unrelated Business Income Tax, 874 TAx MGMT. A-I (1993) (stating that
before the UB1T "the only potential adverse impact of operating a business was the loss
of [tax] exempt status").
156. 263 U.S. 578 (1924). See also Maurice Finkelstein, Freedom from
Uncertainty in Income Tax Exemptions, 48 MICH. L. REv. 449, 453-56 (1950)
(discussing Trinidad).
157. See Trinidad, 263 U.S. at 578. The organization was based in the Philippines
and was "organized and operated for religious, benevolent, scientific and educational
purposes in these Islands and in its Missions in China, Cochinchina and Japan." Id. at
579. For references to the organization as an "ancient religious order," see FISHMAN &
SCHWARZ, supra note 24, at 754; Sharpe, supra note 6, at 380.
The income was earned in 1913, see Trinidad, 263 U.S. at 579, the same year the
Sixteenth Amendment was adopted, which permitted the enactment of the income tax.
See James J. McGovern, The Use of Taxable Subsidiary Corporations by Public
Charities-A Tax Policy Issue for 1988, 38 TAx NOTES 1125, 1125 (1988).
158. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 24, at 754; McGovern, supra note 157,
at 1125 n.3.
159. Trinidad, 263 U.S. at 580-81.
160. Id.at580n.1.
161. Id. at580.
162. Id. at 579. The tax exemption at the time was granted under the statutory
equivalent to the present I.R.C. section 501(c)(3). Id.
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destination [of income] the ultimate test of exemption."'" This
statement by the Supreme Court was taken by later courts to mean that
the only consideration for determining if a nonprofit's income should be
taxed was the ultimate use of the income earned, such as a charitable
purpose, and not its source.'64 Therefore, this analysis became known as
the "destination of income test." While the facts indicate that no sale of
wine, etc. was to the public or in competition with others, subsequent
courts did not limit the destination of income test to the facts of
Trinidad.1
5
Subsequent case law did not confine the destination of income test
only to incidental sales of unrelated goods.'6 One of the more egregious
163. Id. at 581. The Supreme Court did look to the de mininis nature of the sales of
chocolates, wine, etc. in making its decision. Justice Van Devanter wrote for the Court,
"the fact that the limited trading, if it can be called such, is purely incidental to the
pursuit of those purposes, and is in no sense a distinct or external venture" has no
bearing on the tax exemption of the organization. Id. at 581.
This led one commentator to say Trinidad was "excellent authority" for the
proposition that interest, dividends, and rents will not affect an organization's tax-
exempt status, but "it is negligible authority for holding that the [tax] exemption extends
to organizations which operate ordinary commercial enterprises." Comment, Colleges,
Charities, and the Revenue Act of 1950, 60 YALE L.J. 851, 853-54 (1951). See also
FISinAN & ScInvApz, supra note 24, at 754 (stating that "[a] close reading of [the case]
does not reveal that the religious charity was engaged in any business that was unrelated
to its exempt purposes").
164. For the expansion of the destination of income test, see 4 BrrrE & LOKKEN,
supra note 7, at 103-3 ("From this acorn grew a mighty oak-the... destination of
income rule...."); Osteen & Spitzer, supra note 37, at 261; Sharpe, supra note 6. at 381
(commenting that the destination of income test would be used for the next twenty-four
years); Robert H. Swart, Using (or Abusing) an Exempt Organization's Tax Exemption,
74 TAXES 1034, 1035 (1996); Katherine A. VanYe, Sierra Club v. Commissioner and the
Royalty Exemption to the Unrelated Business Income Tax: How Much Is Too Much, 72
WASH. L. REv. 1171, 1172 (1997); Comment, Colleges, Charities, and the Revenue Act
of 1950, supra note 163, at 854 (stating that later courts used the destination of income
test without boundaries); Comment, Preventing the Operation of Untaxed Business by
Tax-Exempt Organizations, supra note 37, at 583 (stating that "business profits [of
nonprofits] could not be taxed if used to finance exempt activity"). For criticism of the
destination of income test, see John Copeland & Gabriel Rudney, Business Income of
Nonprofits and Competitive Advantage, 33 TAX NOTES 747, 750 (1986) (criticizing the
destination of income test as "permitting: (1) unfair competition with taxable trade or
business; (2) loss of tax revenue; and (3) trading on the exemption").
165. See Trinidad, 263 U.S. at 582. None of the religious order's sales were made
to the public or in competition with other business. The sales of wine, chocolate, etc.
were "merely bought and supplied for use within the plaintiff's own organization and
agencies." Id. Additionally, the income from the sales was "all ... held and used as
sources from which to obtain funds or revenue for carrying on its religious, charitable
and educational work." Id. at 580.
166. See Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Comm'r, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938); Sand Springs
examples occurred in Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, where a
corporation ran an extensive business on a section of beach in New York
state. '67 The corporation's profits were the sole support of a tax-exempt
charitable foundation.6' The Court of Appeals held that the income
from the beach operation was not taxable since the "destination of the
income is more significant that its source."' 69 It took twelve more years
after Roche's Beach for Congress to act."'
The congressional call to action came swiftly after the facts of C.F.
Mueller Co. v. Commissioner were made public.'7' At issue in C.F.
Mueller was the purchase and subsequent transfer to New York
University Law School of the stock of a company that made noodles."'
Home v. Comm'r, 6 B.T.A. 198 (1927). For additional cases using the destination of
income test, see George R. Blodgett, Taxation of Businesses Conducted by Charitable
Organizations, in N.Y.U. FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 418, 426
n.14 (1946).
167. See Roche's Beach, 96 F.2d at 777.
This business was quite extensive. There were 3,000 bath houses to be let to
transient bathers; 34 employees were engaged during the summer; as many as
6,000 persons might patronize the beach on pleasant days; suits and towels
were rented; caps, belts and shoes were sold; and restaurant, soda and candy
concessions were given out.
Id.
168. See id. The foundation was formed "for the purpose of establishing a fund for
the relief of destitute women and children." Id.
169. Id. at 778. In holding that the beach operation was not taxable, the court wrote
that "[n]o reason is apparent to us why Congress should wish to deny exemption to a
corporation organized and operated exclusively to feed a charitable purpose when it
undoubtedly grants it if the corporation itself administers the charity." Id. at 779.
170. See Sharpe, supra note 6, at 381 (stating that Roche's Beach dispelled any
doubts that the destination of income test would apply to a business). See also FISHMAN
& SCHWARZ, supra note 24, at 755 (discussing Roche's Beach).
171. See C.F. Mueller Co. v. Comm'r, 190 F.2d 120 (3rd Cir. 1951), superseded by
statute as stated in Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst. v. Comm'r, 732 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir.
1984). The Court of Appeals actually decided the case after the unrelated business
income tax was passed. See id. at 120 ("What we do here with the problem is of little
importance for the future, since Congress has entered the area of dispute and declared the
rule for the taxable years commencing after December 31, 1950."). For more
information on C.F. Mueller, see McGovern, supra note 157, at 1125-26 (commenting
on C.F. Mueller as "one of the most celebrated cases"); Sharpe, supra note 6, at 381-82,
394-96 (discussing C.F. Mueller).
172. See C.F. Mueller, 190 F.2d at 121. At the same time New York University
also operated Howes Leather Company (valued at $35 million), American Limoges
China, Inc. (valued at $3.3 million), and the Ramsey Corporation, a piston ring
manufacturer (valued at $3 million). See Benjamin Fine, University Dollars Yielding
Tax-Free Business Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1948, at Al (discussing the rise of
business and real estate holdings of nonprofit institutions). See also Revenue Revisions
of 1947-48: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 80th Cong., 3529,
3540 (1948) (testimony of John Gerdes); Gallagher, supra note 63, at 766 n.8; Sharpe,
supra note 6, at 382 (commenting on C.F. Mueller); Comment, Colleges, Charities, and
the Revenue Act of 1950, supra note 163, at 851 n.5, 863 n.57 (giving more particulars
on the various transactions of New York University).
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The stock was purchased by benefactors of the law school who then
donated it to the law school.'7 The company purchased was the largest
noodle maker in the United States.'74 After the stock transfer, the
corporation was merged into the law school and the profits from the
noodle operation went to support the school's operations."' ' Profits from
the noodle operation were tax-exempt under the destination of income
test."
The effect on Congress was stated to be "galvanic."'" One Member of
Congress was so upset by the facts of C.F. Mueller that he stated that if
Congress did not act "[e]ventually all the noodles produced in this
country will be produced by corporations held or created by
universities.' 1'  However, while New York University business
operations were the most publicized, the school was not alone in
business operations."9 It was the extent to which the "acorn" of the
destination of income test had grown which caused President Truman to
call for change and Congress to act."O
173. See Note, The Macaroni Monopoly." The Developing Concept of Unrelated
Business Income of Exempt Organizations, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1280, 1281 (1968).
174. Id. at 1281.
175. C.F. Mueller, 190 F.2d at 121.
176. Id. at 123. "he policy.., is that the benefit from revenue is outweighed by
the benefit to the general public welfare gained through the encouragement of charity."
Id. at 122 (citing United States v. Proprietors of Soc. Law Library. 102 F.2d 481. 482
(1st Cir. 1939)).
177. Note, The Macaroni Monopoly, supra note 173, at 1281.
178. Revenue Revisions of 1950: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 81st Cong. 579-80 (1950) (statement of Rep. Dingell, D.-Mi.).
Congressman Dingell said in debate for the UBlT:
Mhe advantage of a tax-exempt corporation... is so great that, if something
is not done to level it off, the macaroni monopoly will be in the hands of the
universities or their subsidiary companies.... Eventually all the noodles
produced in this country will be produced by corporations held or created by
universities... and there will be no revenue to the Federal Treasury from this
industry.... There is no question about the fact that the advance of tax-exempt
institutions, such as the macaroni concern, is so great that eventually it is
bound to put the privately owned noodle corporations out of business.
Id.
179. Educational institutions were said to be operating banking institutions,
"haberdasheries, citrus groves, movies, cattle ranches, the Encyclopedia Britannica
(owned by the University of Chicago), and a large variety of other enterprises." 96
CONG. REC. 9273-74 (1950). The federal tax due if the income were taxed was reported
to be $173 million. See id. at 9274.
180. PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN, REVISION oF THE TAX LAWS: MESSAGE FROM
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNrrED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 451, at 5 (1950) (stating that
changes to the nonprofit tax exemption should be made to halt "glaring abuses of the tax-
exemption privilege"). For additional discussion of the legislative history, see Kenneth
The congressional "remedy" was the unrelated business income tax, or
UBIT, applied to all nonreligious nonprofit organizations.'' The bill
was drafted and passed by the House of Representatives and sent to the
Senate.' Due to pressure from nonprofit organizations which opposed
the UBIT, the Senate intended not to act on the bill.' However, the
start of the Korean War that year put pressure on Congress to raise
revenue by closing tax loopholes and the House bill was passed with
"few and minor changes."'
'
The UBIT was designed to accomplish two goals: (1) raise revenue,
and (2) prevent unfair competition between nonprofit organizations and
for-profit businesses. Arguably, the UBIT has failed on both counts. On
the revenue side, in its first year the UBIT was expected to generate
$100 million of tax revenues, but raised only $37.00. "' To date it has
failed to be a significant source of income for the federal government. 1
86
C. Eliasberg, Charity and Commerce: Section 501(c)(3)-How Much Unrelated Business
Activity?, 21 TAX L. REv. 53 (1965-1966); Sharpe, supra note 6, at 382-85. For
previous congressional hearings on nonprofit unrelated business operations, see Revenue
Revision of 1942: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 77th Cong.,
89 (1942).
181. The UBIT was originally enacted by the Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-
814, §§ 301, 331, 421, 64 Stat. 906, 947-52 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 511,
512). When it was first enacted, the UBIT received negative commentaries. See
Comment, Colleges, Charities, and the Revenue Act of 1950, supra note 163, at 875
(stating that "the Revenue Act of 1950 is a fairly inept piece of legislation" and that
"Congress was lenient when it should have been harsh and harsh when it should have
been lenient"). See also John H. Myers, Taxing the Colleges, 38 CORNELL L. REv. 368,
379-84 (1953) (providing an overview of 1950 legislation).
182. Myers, supra note 181, at 376.
183. Id. at 376-77.
184. Id. at 377.
185. George D. Webster, Effect of Business Activities on Exempt Organizations, 43
TAXES 777, 777 (1965); Comment, Preventing the Operation of Untaxed Business by
Tax-Exempt Organizations, supra note 37, at 581 n.2. See also Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1017, 1017
(1982) (stating that "[vlery little money has been collected under [the UBIT]"). But see
George Cooper, Trends in the Taxation of Unrelated Business Activity, in 2 N.Y.U.
TWENTY-NINTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 1999, 2019 (1971) ("This
drop from expected to actual revenues does not necessarily indicate that the tax failed in
its purpose. Rather it could merely indicate that the maximum effect of the tax was in
driving business activities out of tax-exempt organizations."); Hansmann, Unfair
Competition and the UBIT, supra note 89 (arguing for the continuation of the UBIT).
186. The latest estimates show that in 1995 $277.5 million was collected under the
UBIT. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 24, at 800 (citing Alicia Meckstroth & Paul
Arnsberger, A 20-Year Review of the Nonprofit Sector, 1975-1995, 18 SOI BULL.: Q.
STAT. INCOME REP. (I.R.S.) 149, 165 (1998)). See also Margaret Riley, Unrelated
Business Income of Nonprofit Organizations: Highlights of 1995 and a Review of 1991-
1995, 18 SOI BULL.: Q. STAT. INCOME REP. (I.R.S.) 80, 81 (1999) (reporting a 137.2%
increase in UBIT tax liability from 1991 to 1995 and a 44.4% increase from 1994 to
1995).
Several articles have debated the continued enactment or repeal of the UBIT. For
articles supporting the UBIT, see Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the UBIT, supra
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While the need for additional revenue might have been the final
impetus to push the bill past the Senate, the primary rationale for the
UBIT was to prevent unfair competition." As compared with for-profit
firms, nonprofits purportedly presented two forms of unfair competition.
First, it was assumed that nonprofits would engage in predatory pricing
by lowering the amount they charge for goods and services, thereby
driving competitors out of the market.'n However, legal commentators
note 89, at 605, 614-16 (suggesting the continuation of the UBIT since if it were not
present nonprofit organizations would be motivated to take over corporations which
would decrease diversification and the businesses would be managed inefficiently). For
articles critical of the UBIT, see Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 41, at 316-26
(questioning the unfair competition rationale and "passive/active" labels for the
exceptions to the UBIT); Hall & Colombo, supra note 24, at 1442-46 (maintaining that
the UBIT is not required under the donative theory since tax-exempt status is allowed
only if a certain percentage of the nonprofit's overall income is from donations); William
A. Klein, Income Taxation and Legal Entities, 20 UCLA L. REv. 13, 61-68 (1972)
(questioning the unfair competition rationale); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 185, at 1038
(proposing the repeal of the UBT since "the tax on unrelated business activity creates
more unfairness than it can possibly prevent."). For additional comments on the Rose-
Ackerman article, see Copeland & Rudney, supra note 164, at 750 (stating that Rose-
Ackerman's analysis was based on faulty assumptions and criticizing her idea of repeal
of the UBIT as impractical); Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the UBIT, supra note
89, at 613-14 (suggesting that Rose-Ackerman looks at the equity, but not the economic
efficiency, of the UBLT).
187. " he primary objective of adoption of the unrelated business income tax was
to eliminate a source of unfair competition by placing the unrelated business activities of
certain exempt organizations upon the same tax basis as the nonexempt business
endeavors with which they compete." Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (as amended in 1983).
For additional papers which state that unfair competition was the primary rationale, see 4
BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 103-9, 103-10 (noting that "unfair competition" is
not present for finding any UBIT due, even though that was the primary rationale for its
enactment); Bennett, supra note 46, at 759; Thomas J. Gallagher, When is a Business Not
a Business? Exploiting Business Opportunities and Enhancing Economic Returns By
Capitalizing on the Income Tax Exemption of Tax-Exempt Organizations, 75 TAXES 928,
929-30 (1997); McGovern, supra note 157, at 1126; Thomas A. Troyer, Changing
UBIT Congress in the Workshop, 41 TAX NOTES 1221, 1226 (1988). See also UNITED
STATES GENERAL AccOuNTING OFFICE, TAX Poucy: COMPETITION BEwmEEN TAXABLE
BuSiNEssES AND TAX-EXEiPT ORGANIZATIONs (1987); UNITED STATES SMALL BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION, UNFAIR CoMPETTrION BY NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS WITH SMALL
BUSINESS: AN ISSUE FOR THE 1980s 15-24 (1984) (providing case studies of suggestions
for stopping unfair competition of nonprofits with small businesses); Note, Tax-Exempt
Entities, Notional Principal Contracts, and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 105
HAIv. L. REv. 1265, 1273-75 (1992) (reviewing the importance of unfair competition to
the application of the UBT to a nonprofit's activities).
188. For articles which state that this is part of the unfair competition rationale, see
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 185, at 1021; Comment, Colleges, Charities, and the
Revenue Act of 1950, supra note 163, at 876; Note, The Macaroni Monopoly, supra note
173, at 1281.
have widely refuted the possibility of predatory pricing by nonprofits."9
The second way in which nonprofits are said to be able to compete
unfairly is that they can more easily accumulate capital.' This ability to
accumulate capital is said to permit nonprofit organizations a greater
ability to expand, giving them an unfair advantage over their for-profit
counterparts. 9' However, while the ability to accumulate capital is one
of the supporting rationales for nonprofit organizations, this rationale
does not apply to those areas which do not possess incidences of
"contract failure."' ' For-profit firms exist in those areas where contract
189. See Klein, supra note 186, at 64-65 (asserting that there are too many factors
against predatory pricing by nonprofits to justify the UBIT); Rose-Ackerman, supra note
185, at 1038 (proposing that the UBIT actually causes unfair competition since
nonprofits "must now concentrate their profitable endeavors in those few lines of
business judged to be related" while if the UBIT did not exist the effects of nonprofits
would be across the economy where "they would be unlikely to have much competitive
impact") (internal quotation omitted); Comment, Colleges, Charities, and the Revenue
Act of 1950, supra note 163, at 876 (stating that "it seems unlikely that exempt
institutions... which are clamoring for funds, will forego current income on the risk that
they can drive out a competitor after a lengthy price war"); Note, The Macaroni
Monopoly, supra note 173, at 1281-82 (questioning the rationale since traditional
economic theory does not treat a profit tax as a cost, and there would be little economic
incentive to forego current profits to monopolize markets). See also A.L. Spitzer,
Reform of the UBIT: An Open Letter to Congress, 43 TAX NOTES 195, 196 (1989)
(stating that the competitive advantage of nonprofits is from state and local subsidies
(exemption sales and property taxes) and other federal subsidies (e.g., lower postal rates)
and that "[i]n many cases these subsidies may be more responsible for creating a
competitive imbalance than is tax exemption, and yet they are unaffected by changes to
the UBIT").
190. The Senate report accompanying the bill enacting the UBIT said that the
"problem at which the tax on unrelated business income is directed is primarily that of
unfair competition. The tax-free status of [section 501] organizations enables them to
use their profits tax-free to expand operations, while their competitors can expand only
with the profits remaining after taxes." S. REP. No. 2375, at 28 (1950), reprinted in
1950-2 INTERNAL REVENUE BULL. 483, 504. See also H.R. REP. No. 2319, at 36 (1950),
reprinted in 1950-2 INTERNAL REvENUE BULL. 380, 409.
191. See Comment, Colleges, Charities, and the Revenue Act of 1950, supra note
163, at 876 (providing as a solution to the unfair accumulation of income the
requirement that nonprofits distribute a portion of their income to beneficiaries each
year); Note, The Macaroni Monopoly, supra note 173, at 1282 (stating that the "exempt
enterprise will have a greater surplus to invest in production and distribution facilities").
See also Copeland & Rudney, supra note 164, at 748 (giving other ways in which
nonprofits might have an unfair advantage which is not addressed by the UBIT).
Copeland and Rudney suggest that unfair competition exists since nonprofits have a
marketing advantage due to public trust, lower labor costs due to the use of volunteer
workers, and greater access to subsidies from government grants and private donations.
Id. But see Klein, supra note 186, at 65-68 (disputing that nonprofits would accumulate
capital); Comment, Preventing the Operation of Untaxed Business by Tax-exempt
Organizations, supra note 37, at 592 (stating that "the ability to accumulate funds faster
would give the exempt organization no advantage because if there is opportunity for
profitable expansion taxed businesses will be able to obtain funds in money and capital
markets").
192. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
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failure is not present.
In 1969 the UBIT was expanded to cover all nonprofit organizations
under I.R.C. section 501(a).' Except for the expansion of the UBIT in
1969, the changes to the UBIT have not been substantial since its
enactment in 1950."4 In 1986 Congress added a provision exempting
income received on the exchange or rental of donor or member lists
between organizations whose contributors receive a tax deduction.'
In 1987 a House Ways and Means subcommittee undertook a
comprehensive review of the UBIT.V 6 The subcommittee held five days
of hearings in 1987 and in addition heard comments in 1988.' ' After the
review was completed, a proposal to change the UBIT was drafted but
never submitted to the House of Representatives. 'H While never
193. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Sta. 487, § 121(a)l)
(codified at LR.C. § 511 (2000)). See also H.R. REP. 91-413, at 46, reprinted in 1969-3
C.B. 230; 4 BITrKEP & LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 103-8; Copeland & Rudney, supra note
164, at 750 (stating that the 1969 Act "brought all section 501 ... organizations under
the scope of the [UBIT]"); Gallagher, supra note 187, at 930 (stating same); McGovern,
supra note 157, at 1127 (stating that Congress was concerned that "organizations that
were excepted from the unrelated business income rules (including churches) were
engaging, or were apt to engage in, unrelated business"); VanYe, supra note 164, at 1173
n.17, n.23 (stating same and giving examples of churches' unrelated business activities).
For the dates for which the UBIT applies to various nonprofit organizations, see Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.511-2(a)(1)(ii), (a)(3)(i), (a)(3)(iii) (as amended in 1979).
The 1969 legislative changes also allowed for one of the most specific and blatant
pieces of tax special interest legislation. Section 512(b)(15) allows for the exemption
from the UBIT of certain radio stations. Subparagraphs (A)-(C) spell out the station's
letters to which the exception was specifically drafted-NVNVL. 4 BITxER & LOKKEN,
supra note 7, at 103-32, -33; FISmAN & ScVARZ, supra note 24, at 818; PHILIP A.
STERN, THE RAPE OF THE TAXPAYER 40-41 (1973). See also Sharpe, supra note 6. at 403
(saying that "section 512(b)(15) resurrected the 'destination of income"' test).
194. Gallagher, Exploiting Business Opportunities, supra note 187, at 930 (stating
that none of the modifications since 1969 have "been very far reaching"). In the late
1980s a subcommittee of the House of Representatives held hearings on the UBIT.
See UBIT RECOhMENDATIONS, supra note 11, at 3037-47 (giving the final
recommendations, which were not adopted by the subcommittee).
195. LR.C. § 513(h)(1)(B) (2000). See also VanYe, supra note 164, at 1174
(discussing the change); infra text accompanying notes 291-97.
196. See UBIT RECOSENDATIONS, supra note 11, at 3028.
197. See id. at 3029-30.
198. Though the report was not adopted by the subcommittee, it was published. See
id. For articles that say the report never made it out of the House Subcommitte, see
Michael Moriarty, Nonprofits Expected to Escape UBIT Reform This Year, 43 TAX
NOTES 783, 783 (1989) (giving several reasons why the report was stalled in the House
Ways and Means subcommittee); Ellin Rosenthal, UBIT Recommendations Likely To
Remain in Limbo This Year, 40 TAX NOTES 328, 328 (1988) (stating that the
"recommendations do not address many of the members' specific concerns and thus have
not generated the support necessary to pass out of the subcommittee"); Spitzer, supra
adopted, the report is beneficial to an understanding of how some in
Congress felt after intense study of the issue.1
B. The Elements of the Unrelated Business Income Tax
The UBIT, contained in subtitle A, part HI of the Internal Revenue
Code, is a complex and somewhat clumsy piece of tax law." The
sections of the UBIT important to this Article are I.R.C. sections 511,
512, and 513.20' The tax itself is actually imposed under section 51 1.2°
An overview of the UBIT is helpful prior to examining its details.
Section 511 imposes a tax on the "unrelated business taxable income" of
note 189, at 195 (commenting on the various proposals in the subcommittee's report).
See also Pat Jones, Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee Members Given List of
UBIT Proposals, 39 TAX NOTES 1498, 1498 (1988) (commenting that the subcommittee
was under "intense lobbying" by small business, which wanted UBIT reform, and
nonprofits, which did not).
199. See UBIT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 11 (giving the final report issued by
the subcommittee). For a discussion of the report's contents, see Troyer, supra note 187,
at 1224 (giving as the report's major recommendations: (1) retain the "substantially
related" test, (2) tax sale of articles by mail order or catalog or in gift shops or book
stores, (3) tax sales and rentals of certain medical equipment and devices unless they
benefit patients, (4) tax all travel tours, (5) tax all affinity card arrangements, and (6)
several adjustments regarding the computations of deductions and aggregation rule).
200. For additional discussion of the UBIT and its elements, see United States v.
American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834, 837-39 (1986); 4 BITrKER & LOKKEN,
supra note 7, at 103-8; John M. Donahue, Unrelated Business Income of Tax Exempt
Organizations, in 2 N.Y.U. THiRTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION
27-1, 27-3 (Nicolas Liakas ed., 1979); FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 24, at 764-829;
HOPKINS, supra note 37, at 646-49; Gallagher, supra note 187, at 930-32; Osteen &
Spitzer, supra note 37, at 262-63; J. Mark Stanley & David R. Ward, UBIT May Hit
Common Transactions, 25 TAX ADVISER 557, 557-58 (1994); Swart, supra note 164, at
1035-38; Vicky Tsilas, Sierra Club Inc. v. Commissioner: Why Is the IRS Continuing to
Fight a Losing Battle?, 24 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 487, 487-88 (1999).
There have been many proposals made over the years to change the UBIT. See
Bennett, supra note 46, at 759 (suggesting that all "commercial activity" [a term not
defined in the article] by nonprofits should be through taxable subsidiaries); John
Copeland, Some Suggestions for Revision of Tax-Exempt Organization Rules, 51 TAX
NOTES 911, 912 (1991) (advocating the repeal of most of the exceptions to the UBIT);
McGovern, supra note 157, at 1130-31 (proposing the repeal of the UBIT and
substituting I.R.C. section 4943 (2000) (excess business holding rules) to nonprofit
income); Sharpe, supra note 6, at 388-89, 404-12 (proposing a mandatory distribution
of a set percentage of income received from any unrelated businesses); Eric W. Sokol,
Comment, Making Tax-Exempts Pay: The Unrelated Business Income Tax and the Need
for Reform, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 527 (1991) (proposing that nonprofit organizations which
engage in "substantial commercial activity," i.e., those making more than $25,000 in
unrelated income, be forced to use taxable subsidiaries to create that income).
201. I.R.C. §§ 511, 512, 513 (2000). Part III also contains provisions which cover
unrelated debt-financed income and a credit for foreign tax paid. I.R.C. §§ 514, 515
(2000). This Article will not discuss the implications of I.R.C. section 514 or section
515.
202. I.R.C. § 511(a), (b). Organizations use form 990-T to report their unrelated
business income to the Service. Osteen & Spitzer, supra note 37, at 265.
256
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a nonprofit organization at either corporate or trust income tax rates,
depending on the nature of the organization.' The term "unrelated
business taxable income" is defined in I.R.C. section 512 as any gross
income from any regularly carried on "unrelated trade or business,"
minus associated deductions.' I.R.C. section 513 defines what
constitutes "unrelated trade or business." To complicate matters there
are many exceptions and exclusions from the UBIT.17 I.R.C. section
512(b) contains many important exclusions from the UBIT, while
section 513(a) contains three exceptions from what is considered
"unrelated trade or business."
203
Under I.R.C. section 511 the UBIT is imposed on trusts at the tax rate
for trusts under section 1(e), and on all other organizations listed in
section 501(a) at the corporate tax rate.m The UBIT also applies to
certain organizations not listed in section 501 (a).2"'
203. LR.C. § 511(b) (2000) (taxation under I.R.C. section l(e) for trusts exempt
from tax under section 501(a)). See I.R.C. § 511 (a) (corporate tax rates under section 11
for all other nonprofit organizations); Treas. Reg. § 1.511-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1979);
4 Brrrcun & LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 103-9. See also Osteen & Spitzer, supra note 37,
at 262 (stating that the "existence of the unrelated business income tax does not mean
that charitable organizations must operate their charitable activities at a loss but merely
that income earned outside exempt functions will be taxed at ordinary corporate or trust
rates depending upon [an] organization's structure").
204. "Gross income" is defined in LIRC. section 61(a) (2000) as "all income from
whatever source derived" unless otherwise provided in subtitle A (Income Taxes) of
Title 26 (Internal Revenue Code). I.R.C. § 61(a) (2000). "Income" is defined as the
"undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have
complete dominion." Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
205. L.RC. § 512(a) (2000). See infra text accompanying notes 214-47 for
additional discussion of section 512.
206. I.R.C. § 513 (2000).
207. I.R.C. § 512(b) (containing nine exclusions frm "unrelated business taxable
income"); § 513(b)(l)-(3) (listing exceptions to the "trade or business" requirement in
section 513(a)). For more discussion of the various exclusions and exceptions, see infra
text accompanying notes 248-69.
208. LR.C. §§ 512(b), 513(a)(1)-(3). I.R.C. section 513 contains many other
exceptions to what is considered an "unrelated trade or business." See, e.g., id. § 513(d)
(excluding certain "public entertainment" and "convention and trade show" activities);
hi. § 513(e) (excluding certain small hospitals); id. § 513(f) (excluding certain bingo
games); id. § 513(g) (excluding pole rentals by mutual or cooperative telephone and
electric companies); hi § 513(h)(1)(B) (excluding the sale of mailing lists between
section 170(c)(3) and (c)(4) organizations).
209. LR.C. § 511(a), (b) (2000).
210. See id. § 511(a)(2)(B) (applying the UBIT to state colleges and universities
which are exempt from tax under LIRC. § 115). See also 4 BrFKER & LOKKE.S, supra
note 7, at 103-8.
1. Unrelated Business Taxable Income
The UBIT is only applied to a nonprofit's "unrelated business taxable
income."2 ' "Unrelated business taxable income" has three elements,
which can be synthesized after reading both I.R.C. sections 512 and
513 . I.R.C. section 513 defines an unrelated trade or business as any
trade or business which is not substantially related to any nonprofit
purpose, apart from the income being used to further that purpose.21
The unrelated trade or business income is not subject to tax, however,
unless it is "regularly carried on" as provided by section 512.214
Therefore, the three elements which must be met before any income
made by a nonprofit is taxable under the UBIT are as follows: (1) the
income must be from a trade or business, (2) which is "regularly carried
on by the organization," and (3) is "not substantially related (other than
through the production of funds) to the organization's performance of its
exempt functions. ,215 Each of these elements will be taken up briefly in
turn.
a. Trade or Business
"Trade or business" is defined in two different ways: positively in the
Code and by analogy to the same language in the deduction sections of
the Code.2 6 The positive Code definition is in I.R.C. section 513(c),
211. I.R.C. § 511(a).
212. I.R.C. §§ 512(a), 513(a).
213. I.R.C. § 513(a). This section states:
The term "unrelated trade or business" means, in the case of any organization
subject to the tax imposed by section 511, any trade or business the conduct of
which is not substantially related (aside from the need of such organization for
income or funds or the use it makes of the profits derived) to the exercise or
performance by such organization of its charitable, educational, or other
purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption under section 501
(or, in the case of an organization described in section 511 (a)(2)(B), to the
exercise or performance of any purpose or function described in section
501(c)(3)) ....
Id.
214. Id. § 512(a). This section states:
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the term "unrelated business
taxable income" means the gross income derived by any organization from any
unrelated trade or business (as defined in section 513) regularly carried on by
it, less the deductions allowed by this chapter which are directly connected
with the carrying on of such trade or business ....
Id.
215. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a) (as amended in 1983).
216. See HOPKINS, supra note 37, at 649-50. For additional discussion on the
"trade or business" element, see 4 BITrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 103-10, 103-11;
HOPKINS, supra note 37, at 649-59; Osteen & Spitzer, supra note 37, at 262; Sharpe,
supra note 6, at 412-27 (providing an extensive background into the legislative history,
case history, and various regulations which have defined the term "trade or business");
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which defines a trade or business as "any activity which is carried on for
the production of income from the sale of goods or the performance of
services."' 7  This broad language covers a great many activities of
nonprofits. 211 The regulations, however, by analogy apply the standards
of the trade or business deduction of I.R.C. section 162."9 In cases
which interpret the "trade or business" requirement by using section 162
as an analogy, the courts have had some difficulty in defining "trade or
business," since the definition is so broad, and since there is not a great
deal of case law defining "trade or business" under section 162.
Stanley & Ward, supra note 200, at 557; Swart, supra note 164, at 1035.
217. LR.C. § 513(c).
218. See Deirdre Dessingue Halloran, UBIT Update, 36 CAmi. LAW. 39. 40-41
(1995) (maintaining that "the IRS treats most activities as constituting a 'trade or
business').
219. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (as amended in 1983). Trade or business "has the
same meaning it has in section 162, and generally includes any activity carried on for the
production of income from the sale of goods or performance of services." Id. See also
Sharpe, supra note 6, at 413 ('The Senate Report accompanying the 1950 Revenue Bill
offered the assurance, however, that [trade or business] had the same meaning for
purposes of the tax on unrelated trade or business as it had elsewhere in the Code, citing
as a specific reference the predecessor of section 162 .... ").
I.R.C. section 162 is entitled "Trade or Business Expenses" and is the primary
deduction section for businesses. Deduction under section 162 is permitted for (1)
ordinary and necessary (2) expenses (as opposed to capital expenditures), (3) paid or
incurred during the taxable year, (4) in carrying on any trade or business. I.R.C. § 162(a)
(2000). Even if the basic elements for the section 162 deduction are met, however, there
still may be other requirements or limitations. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) (traveling
expenses allowed only if not "lavish or extravagant" and "away from home"); I.R.C. §
274 (2000) (listing limitations for entertainment and education expenses); I.R.C. § 469
(2000) (restricting any "passive" losses).
220. See 4 BrITKER & LoKKEN, supra note 7, at 103-11 (maintaining that the
reference to I.R.C. section 162 "does little to clarify" if something is a trade or business
because there is little litigation defining "trade or business" in the context of section
162-if an expense is not deductible under section 162, it normally will be deductible
under section 212, relating to deductions for the production of income): BoRIs I.
BrrrKER & MARTIN J. MCMAHON JR., FEDERAL INCO.NiE TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS, 11-5
(2nd ed. 1995) (stating that "there is no authoritative judicial definition" of "trade or
business"). There has been however a great deal of litigation challenging what is, or is
not, deductible, under section 162. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Bar Endowment. 477
U.S. 105, 110 n.1 (1986).
The case law focuses on the statement in the regulations and attempts to ascertain if
the nonprofit activity is a trade or business in the context of I.R.C. section 162. See Am.
Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 110, 116 (applying regulation 1.513-1(b)'s incorporation of
section 162 to hold that business activities should be analyzed as a whole, rather than
separated into artificial steps); Am. Acad. of Family Physicians v. United States, 91 F.3d
1155, 1157-58 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that UBIT requires both a profit motive and "the
general characteristics of a trade or business"); S.S. Trade Ass'n v. Comm'r. 757 F.2d
1494, 1497 (4th Cir. 1985) (applying section 162's profit motive test when tax-exempt
In interpreting the trade or business requirement, the courts have
focused on an organization's "profit motive."2 ' The profit motive is
applied activity by activity, and an activity does not lose its identity as a
trade or business solely because it is part of a larger trade or business."'
Once a separate activity is determined, its "profit motive" is tested by
looking to see if the activity was commenced "with the dominant hope
and intent of realizing a profit" or producing income."'
Even if an organization is found to be engaged in a trade or business
separate from its charitable purpose, there are three statutory exceptions
to the trade or business requirement." The first exception provides that
a trade or business as defined by I.R.C. section 513(a) does not include
those activities where "substantially all" the work is performed without
compensation. The second exception allows untaxed income for
organization performed "comprehensive and essential business services in return for a
fixed fee"); Prof I Ins. Agents v. Comm'r, 726 F.2d 1097, 1102 (6th Cir. 1984)
(reasoning that the intent to earn a profit is the key inquiry); Carolinas Farm & Power
Equip. Dealers Ass'n. v. United States, 699 F.2d 167, 170 (4th Cir. 1983) (finding that
the plain language of section 513(c) directs that an activity constitutes a trade or business
when an exempt organization conducts the activity for the production of income); La.
Credit Union League v. United States, 693 F.2d 525, 531 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that
section 513(c)'s 'trade or business' "generally conveys the same meaning as it does in §
162," then imposing a profit-motive standard).
221. See Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at I 10 n. 1; Osteen & Spitzer, supra note
37, at 269.
222. I.R.C. § 513(c) (2000). "[A]n activity does not lose identity as a trade or
business merely because it is carried on within a larger aggregate of similar activities or
within a larger complex of other endeavors which may, or may not, be related to the
exempt purposes of the organization." Id. For example, a pharmacy can have one
activity selling to the general public and a separate activity selling to the hospital and
patients. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (as amended in 1983). I.R.C. section 513(c) was
enacted to reach advertising income of periodicals where the advertising was unrelated to
a nonprofit's exempt purpose, but the periodical contained exempt-purpose-related
articles and editorials. 4 BrrrKER & LoKKEN, supra note 7, at 103-11. See also Swart,
supra note 164, at 1035 (stating that section 513(c) can cause "significant difficulties"
for nonprofits in determining if something is subject to the UBIT, accounting for the
profits and allocating costs).
223. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. at 110 n.1. See also Prof'l Ins. Agents, 726
F.2d at 1102; 4 BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 103-11 (discussing National Water
Well Ass'n v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 75, 91-92 (1989)); HOPKINS, supra note 37, at 650-51;
Lee A. Sheppard, Aspirin and the Ultimate Tax Shelter, 64 TAx NOTES 420, 422 (1994)
(relating the profit motive standard to the Arthritis Foundation's marketing of an aspirin
product).
224. I.R.C. § 513(a)(1)-(3).
225. Id. § 513(a)(1). This is the "volunteers" exception. For example, in one case
ninety-four percent of the work being performed by volunteers has been found to be
"substantially all." St. Joseph Farms of Ind. Bros. of Congregation of Holy Cross v.
Comm'r, 85 T.C. 9 (1985). For additional discussion of section 513(a)(1), see 4
BrITKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 103-19; HOPKINS, supra note 37, at 741; Osteen &
Spitzer, supra note 37, at 264.
Some examples of activities which qualify under the volunteers exception are retail
stores staffed by volunteers and weekly dances held by a volunteer fire department. See
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certain organizations if the trade or business is carried on "primarily for
the convenience" of its constituents, as in student dining halls, for
example.2 6 The final exception, from a trade or business, concerns those
in which substantially all of the merchandise sold is received by gift or
contribution. ' The convenience exception can be supported from a
policy perspective since growth in these areas is limited (for example, to
the number of students at a school),m The volunteer and donated goods
exceptions to the trade or business rule fit within the broader scope of
the basic public trust and support rationale for allowing nonprofit
organizations to exist.'
b. Regularly Carried On
Not all activities with a profit motive and determined to be a "trade or
business" are subject to the UBiT. The trade or business must still meet
several more requirements, the next being that the "trade or business"
must be "regularly carried on."2 0 In viewing whether a trade or business
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(e) (as amended in 1983) (retail store operated by orphanage and
staffed by volunteers not subject to UBIT); Rev. Rul. 74-361, 1974-2 C.B. 159-60
(volunteer fire department operating weekly public dances not subject to UBH'). See
also Freitag, supra note 155, at A51-A58.
The volunteer exception to "trade or business" is consistent with the policies
underlying the UBIT. The volunteers, as a subset of the public, demonstrate a general
level of support for the organization through their service. Additionally, volunteers
receive neither income nor a deduction for their services. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(g)
(as amended in 1996).
226. LR.C. § 513(a)(2). The Code specifically mentions members, students,
patients, officers, and employees. Id. See also 4 BrrrKE & LOKKEN, supra note 7, at
103-20; HOPKINS, supra note 37, at 742; Freitag, supra note 155, at A58-A63; Osteen &
Spitzer, supra note 37, at 264; Swart, supra note 164, at 1037. An example of an activity
which is not subject to the UBIT is college and university dining halls for student
dormitories. See Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the UBIT, supra note 89, at 631-
33 (agreeing with the convenience exception to the UBIT for dining halls since it
furthers the academic mission of universities and because they would provide the
services, whether or not the UBIT applied, and pass on the additional cost of the tax to
students).
227. LR.C. § 513(a)(3). See also 4 BrrrKER & LoKKEN, supra note 7, at 103-19;
HOPKINS, supra note 37, at 743; Freitag, supra note 155, at A63-A64; Osteen & Spitzer.
supra note 37, at 264; Swart, supra note 164, at 1037.
228. See Note, The Macaroni Monopoly, supra note 173, at 1282-83. See also
Hansmann, Unfair Competition and lte UBIT, supra note 89, at 631-33.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 151-52.
230. I.R.C. § 512(a) (2000). For additional discussion of the "regularly carried on"
requirement, see HOPKINS, supra note 37, at 659-63; Gallagher, supra note 187, at 931;
Osteen & Spitzer, supra note 37, at 262; Sharpe, supra note 6, at 412 n.124; Stanley &
Ward, supra note 200, at 557; Swart, supra note 164, at 1035-36. See also Mary E.
is regularly carried on, the regulations focus on the frequency and
continuity of the income-producing activity and the manner in which the
exempt organization conducts the activity." The Internal Revenue
Service (hereinafter "Service") takes the position that the time preparing
for an activity or event should be included when determining whether
the activity is regularly carried on, but courts reviewing the issue have
disagreed.3 2 Besides the amount of time spent on a particular activity,
the regulations suggest determining the frequency and continuity of a
trade or business by looking at similar comparable commercial activities
of for-profit businesses." Therefore, a sandwich stand operated for only
two weeks at the state fair is not "regularly carried on," but a parking lot
operated once per week is.21
Monahan, Comment, Unfair Competition or Fundraising? A Proposal to Modify the
Regularly Carried On Test of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 10 AM. J. TAX POL'Y
73, 73-74 (1992) (providing for a two-part test to replace the regularly carried on test:
(1) whether the purchaser of the goods or services derives more than an insignificant
commercial benefit from the purchase, and (2) whether the activity was intended and
operated as a fundraiser with full disclosure of profits and approval of the membership of
the organization).
231. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1983).
232. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Comm'r, 914 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir.
1990), action on dec., 1991-015 (July 3, 1991) (in the action on decision the
Commissioner "strongly disagreed" with the case's holding). See also HOPKINS, supra
note 37, at 662; Gallagher, supra note 187, at 931.
In NCAA, the 10th Circuit held that advertising in the NCAA basketball program,
while a trade or business, was not "regularly carried on" since the tournament only
encompassed several weeks on an annual basis. See NCAA, supra, at 1423-24. The
Service contended that the "regularly carried on" requirement should be viewed after
considering all the preparatory time required to solicit the advertisements and prepare
them for publication. See id. at 1422. The 10th Circuit rejected the Service's inclusion
of preparatory time, stating that the "position is contrary to the regulations and to
existing case law." Id. at 1422. For additional discussion of NCAA, see HOPKINS, supra
note 37, at 662; Deborah M. Beers, Affinity Credit Card Income Is Tax Exempt Royalty-
Sierra Club v. Comr., 36 TAX MGMT. MEMORANDUM 147, 148 (1995); Osteen & Spitzer,
supra note 37, at 262; Swart, supra note 164, at 1036. See also Paul Streckfus, IRS
Staying Tough on Royalty Issues, 66 TAX NOTES 1761, 1761-62 (1995) (stating that
Private Letter Ruling 95-09-0002 indicated the Service was not changing its position on
including preparatory time). The Service has maintained for many years that preparatory
time must be considered for purposes of determining if a trade or business is "regularly
carried on." See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-424, 1973-2 C.B. 190, 190-91 (holding that
advertising in a nonprofit's annual year book was considered "regularly carried on" since
it used a commercial service whose activities were year-round to handle the advertising).
233. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1983). See also Swart, supra note
164, at 1035 (stating that the "operation of a facility one day each week ... would be
considered 'regularly carried on' if such conduct is 'of a kind normally undertaken by
non exempt commercial organizations' on the same basis").
234. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(i) (as amended in 1983).
262
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c. Not Substantially Related
If an activity is deemed to be a regularly carried on trade or business,
it still will not be taxed unless it is "not substantially related" to the
organization's exempt purpose.'" The relationship must be one other
than the use of the money generated by the trade or business to further
the nonprofit organization's exempt purpose.' The not substantially
235. LR.C. § 513(a) (2000). The tax will be imposed only if the activity is:
not substantially related (aside from the need of such organization for income
or funds or the use it makes of the profits derived) to the exercise or
performance by such organization of its charitable, educational, or other
purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption under section 501
(or, in the case of an organization described in section 51 l(a)(2)B). to the
exercise or performance of any purpose or function described in section
501(c)(3)) ....
Id. See also HOPKIS, supra note 37, at 663-73 (discussing the "not substantially
related" requirement); Sharpe, supra note 6, at 427-43 (in-depth discussion of legislative
history, cases, and regulations on the not substantially related element); James Bennett &
Gabriel Rudney, A Commerciality Test to Resolve the Conmmercial Nonprofit Issue, 36
TAX NOTES 1095 (1987) [hereinafter Bennett & Rudney, Commerciality Test] (criticizing
the relatedness test and providing as a replacement a "commerciality test").
Bennett & Rudney suggest replacing the "not substantially related" requirement with a
"commerciality test" which would tax all activities of a tax-exempt organization found to
be commercial in nature. See id. at 1095. The commerciality test looks at ten factors:
(1) what is being sold (service v. commodity) and to whom (individual, business,
government, other tax-exempt organization); (2) the price, if any, for the sale; (3) the
amount of other available options a purchaser has for the service or commodity; (4) the
tax-exempt organization's options on price; (5) whether the price will be paid by a third
party (e.g., government, insurance); (6) other investments of the tax-exempt
organization; (7) how the activity is financed (if financed greater than fifty percent by
government or donation, the activity would be per se noncommercial); (8) how the
income is generated by the activity used; (9) activity must be directed toward a charitable
group or purpose deemed charitable; and (10) disregard any public benefit derived from
the activity. Id. at 1097-98. The factors are meant to ascertain if the "nonprofit activity
is commercial if operated in the marketplace." James T. Bennett & Gabriel Rudney,
Bennett and Rudney Respond to YMCA's Criticisns of Their Conunerciality Test, 37
TAX NOTES 535, 535 (1987) [hereinafter Bennett & Rudney, YMCA's Criticisms]. No
guidance is provided as to which factors are the most important, nor is it stated how the
factors interact. The commerciality test has been criticized in several articles. See
Gallagher, supra note 63, at 765 (stating that the test is unworkable since allowing a tax
on all activities where "competition" exists is overly broad); Harrison Wellford & Robert
Boisture, YMCA Takes Issue With "Conin:ercialith" Standard for UBIT, 37 TAX NOTES
317, 317-18 (1987) (criticizing the commerciality test on several different grounds). For
a response to the Wellford & Boisture comments to the commerciality test, see Bennett
& Rudney, YMCA's Criticisms, supra, at 535.
236. See LR.C. § 513(a) (2000). "The organization's need for money, which is the
purpose of fund raising, does not make an activity related to its exempt purposes."
Deirdre Dessingue Halloran, Show Me the Money. Legal and Prudential Considerations
for Religious Organizations Participating in Fund Raising Ventures, 39 CArH. LAw. 7, 8
related requirement is the most difficult of the three for the courts and
the Service to define and for organizations to apply.27 It, therefore, has
generated a significant number of rulings by the Service.38
Under the regulations one must determine "if the conduct of the trade
or business which produces the income is not substantially related (other
than through the production of funds) to the purposes for which
exemption is granted." 9 In order to be related, the trade or business
must bear a causal relationship to the nonprofit's exempt purpose, other
than merely the production of income." To decide whether the causal
relationship is substantial, the activity must "contribute importantly" to
the nonprofit's exempt purpose." Whether the required relationship
(1999) (citing Treasury Regulation § 1.513-1(a)).
237. See 4 BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 103-15 (stating that when applying
the tests "fine lines and debatable distinctions are virtually unavoidable"); Gallagher,
supra note 187, at 931 ("This prong of the test is one in which the IRS can become
enamored of the finest and most minute details of the tax-exempt organization's
activities.").
A proposed House Subcommittee report on the UBIT stated "the 'relatedness'
standard in its current form is often vague, difficult to administer and even harder to
ensure voluntary compliance." UBIT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 11, at 3036. Even
though the Subcommittee believed the test was difficult to apply, the report
recommended its continued use. See id. at 3037. This was due to the fact that any new
standard would "generate uncertainty" as to the application of the regulations, IRS
revenue and private letter rulings, and cases interpreting the "substantially related"
standard. See id. at 3038. Accord Troyer, supra note 187, at 1222 (reporting that the
"Subcommittee was presented with a variety of alternative formulations... which added
no certainty or predictability to the tax-but which effectively wiped away" much of the
existing cases and commentary on the UBIT).
238. Stanley & Ward, supra note 200, at 557. "The majority of the rulings issued
by the IRS on unrelated business income issues focus on whether the activities in
question are substantially related to the organization's exempt purposes ... ." l.
239. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(1) (as amended in 1983).
240. See id. "[T]he nature and extent of the business activities engaged in must
bear a reasonable nexus to the tax-exempt function which they serve or support."
Gallagher, supra note 187, at 931.
241. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (as amended in 1983). The legislative history
gives the following examples of "substantially related" activities: athletic activities of
schools (e.g., basketball tournament); school income from dining halls, restaurants, and
dormitories operated for the convenience of students, and income from a university
press. S. REP. No. 2375 (1950), reprinted in 1950-2 INTERNAL REVENUE BULL. 483, 505.
See also H.R. REP. No. 2319 (1950), reprinted in 1950-2 INTERNAL REVENUE BULL 380,
409 (stating same). The only Supreme Court case to deal exclusively on the
"relatedness" issue is United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834
(1986). The case held that the proper inquiry focuses on the conduct of the entity
claiming relatedness, rather than on the quality of the specific activity. See id. at 848-
49. Here, the College, a section 501(c)(3) organization, claimed that income arising
from drug advertisements published in its periodical was related to educating its
members and subscribers. See id. at 848. In imposing a UBIT on the advertising
income, the Court reasoned that "the advertising in Annals does not contribute
importantly to the journal's educational purposes." Id. at 849. See 4 BI-rKER &
LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 103-17 (discussing the case); Frank Oliveti & Vincent P.
Belotsky, Jr., Careful Use of Royalties May Reduce Unrelated Business Income from
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exists is not determined solely upon the basis of a particular activity, but
the Service may bifurcate activities into related and nonrelated uses. '
An example of this is a university golf course. 3 While the income
generated from the use of the golf course by students and faculty would
be related, income from nonstudent or faculty use would be unrelated,
unless excluded by another provision, and would be subject to the
UBIT
4
The regulations expressly point out that when a nonprofit organization
"exploits" its nonprofit status the income will not be considered as
related to its exempt purpose.245 Examples in the regulations of how a
nonprofit can exploit its nonprofit status include an exempt scientific
organization selling endorsements of scientific instruments,'2 and the
mailing of advertisements to the general membership of a nonprofit
organization. 7
C. Exclusions from Unrelated Business Income
If the three elements set forth above are met, there are several
"modifications" (as they are titled in the Code) which act as exclusions
from the UBIT.m There are many exclusions of income from UBIT:
dividends, 9 interest,2 annuities, ' royalties,' " rents,' capital gains,L4
Advertising, 19 TAx ADViSOR 196 (1988) (discussing various methods for nonprofits to
avoid taxation from advertising in light of the holding in American College of
Physicians).
242. See Gallagher, supra note 187, at 931.
243. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-45-004 (July 17, 1996).
244. See id.
245. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(4)(iv) (as amended in 1983). See also 4 BrrnKR
& LoccEN, supra note 7, at 103-18; HOPKINS, supra note 37, at 668.
246. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(4)(iv) ex. (1) (as amended in 1983).
247. See id. § 1.513-1(d)(4)(iv) ex. (3) (as amended in 1983).
248. See LR.C. § 512(b) (2000). For additional discussion of the various
exclusions, see 4 BnTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 103-27, 103-35; FIs-MAN &
ScHwARz, supra note 24, at 802-18; HOPKINS, supra note 37, §§ 27.1, 27.2.
249. LR.C. § 512(b)(1) (2000). The exclusion of dividends from UBIT does not
apply to "debt financed property," LR.C. §§ 512(b)(4), 514; amounts paid from a
controlled corporation, 1i § 512(b)(13); or from certain real estate invesunent trusts
(REITS), LR-C. § 856(h)(3)(C) (2000). For additional discussion of the dividend
exclusion exception see 4 BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 103-27; HOPKINs. supra
note 37, at 726; Gallagher, supra note 187, at 932 (exploring the use of subsidiaries to
avoid UBIT); Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the UBIT, supra note 89, at 624-25
(agreeing with the exclusion of dividends from UBIT since it encourages nonprofits to
diversify).
250. LRC. § 512(b)(1). The exclusion of interest from the UBIT does not apply to
and income from certain research projects, to list a few.5' The royalty
exclusion is important to this Article because nonprofits are excluding
their income received from mailing list rentals and affinity card
programs under the "royalty" exception in I.R.C. section 512(b)(2). 2
6
The royalty exclusion will be examined in more detail now.
The exclusion for royalty payments is provided under I.R.C. section
512(b)(2) and reads: "There shall be excluded all royalties (including
overriding royalties) whether measured by production or by gross or
taxable income from the property, and all deductions directly connected
with such income." 7 The Code and regulations do not define the term
"debt financed property," I.R.C. §§ 512(b)(4), 514, or amounts paid from a controlled
corporation, id. § 512(b)(13). For additional discussion of the interest exclusion, see 4
BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 103-27; HOPKINS, supra note 37, at 726-27;
Gallagher, supra note 187, at 933-35.
251. I.R.C. § 512(b)(1). The exclusion of annuities from the UBIT does not apply
to "debt financed property," I.R.C. §§ 512(b)(4), 514, or amounts paid from a controlled
corporation, id. § 512(b)(13). For additional discussion of the annuity exclusion, see 4
BITKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 103-27; HOPKINS, supra note 37, at 726. I.R.C.
section 512(b)(1) also excludes from the UBIT payments made with respect to securities
loans. For additional discussion of the payments with respect to the securities loans
exclusion, see HOPKINS, supra note 37, at 727; Gallagher, supra note 187, at 941-42.
252. I.R.C. § 512(b)(2). The exclusion of royalty payments from the UBIT does not
apply to "debt financed property," I.R.C. §§ 512(b)(4), 514, or amounts paid from a
controlled corporation, id. § 512(b)(13). See infra text accompanying notes 256-69 for
additional discussion of the royalty exclusion.
253. I.R.C. § 512(b)(3). The exclusion of rents from the UBIT does not apply to
"debt financed property," I.R.C. §§ 512(b)(4), 514, or amounts paid from a controlled
corporation, id. § 512(b)(13). For additional discussion of the exclusion of rents, see 4
BrrTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 103-28, 129; HOPKINS, supra note 37, at 731-34;
Gallagher, supra note 187, at 935-40; Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the UBIT,
supra note 89, at 625 (stating that the exclusion of rental income is "harder to justify").
254. I.R.C. § 512(b)(5). For additional discussion of the exclusion of a nonprofit's
capital gains see 4 BITKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 103-31, 132; HOPKINS, supra
note 37, at 735-36.
255. See I.R.C. §§ 512(b)(7)-(9). For additional discussion of the exclusion for
certain research income, see HOPKINS, supra note 37, at 736-38.
256. See Or. State Univ. Alumni Ass'n v. Comm'r, 193 F.3d 1098, 1099 (9th Cir.
1999) (affinity card income); Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 307 (1994), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 86 F.3d 1526 (9th Cir. 1996) (mailing list and affinity card
income); Common Cause v. Comm'r, 112 T.C. 332 (1999) (mailing list income);
Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 2227 (1999)
(mailing list income); Miss. State Univ. Alumni, Inc. v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 458
(1997) (affinity card income).
257. I.R.C. § 512(b)(2). An "overriding royalty" is defined as follows:
As applied to an existing oil and gas lease is a given percentage of the gross
production payable to some person other than the lessor or persons claiming
under him. Royalty interest carved out of working interest created by oil and
gas lease, and is interest in oil and gas produced at surface free of expense of
production and its outstanding characteristic is that its duration is limited by
duration of lease under which it is created.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1104 (6th ed. 1990). For additional discussion on the royalty
exclusion, see 4 BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 103-27, 103-28; HOPKINS, supra
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"royalty."'' 8 The regulations state that whether an exclusion exists can
be determined only after reviewing all the "facts and circumstances" of
the case' 9 The Service has provided a definition of "royalty," one
which officials of the Service probably regret, in Revenue Ruling 81-
178.2" In the Revenue Ruling the Service defines "royalty" as any
payment received that is related "to the use of a valuable right." The
ruling goes on to say that payments made "for the use of trademarks,
trade names, service marks, or copyrights, whether or not payment is
based on the use made of such property, are ordinarily classified as
royalties for federal tax purposes." 2 However, royalty cannot "include
note 37, at 728-30; Gallagher, supra note 187, at 942; Ti. Sullivan, Unrelated Business
Income: Recent Developments, Planning Strategies for Multi-Corporate Entities, and
Selected Health Care Issues, 22 ExEMtir ORG. TAX REV. 447, 448 (1998); Swart, supra
note 164, at 1038-39.
Many Writers believe the royalty exemption is too broad. See FISHMAN & SCHWARz,
supra note 24, at 804 ("Because the royalty concept is so elastic, exempt organizations
have been encouraged to enter into licensing arrangements to exploit their valuable
forms of intangible property rather than developing them directly."); Paul Streckfus.
Sierra Club: Latest Nail in the UBIT Coffin, 64 TAx NoTES 1365, 1365 (1994)
(commenting about the royalties exclusion that "[w]e have just about reached the day
when any tax attorney who has a tax-exempt client paying unrelated business income tax
(UBiT) is probably guilty of malpractice").
Due to its wide scope, several papers have reviewed the royalty exclusion from the
UB1T and suggested changes. Generally, the authors writing on the royalty exclusion
have felt it was too broad and inconsistent with the rationale of the UBIT. See Jennifer
Anne Spiegel, Sierra Club: Rationalizing the Royalty Exception to the Unrelated
Business Income Tax, 63 FORDHAhi L. REv. 1697, 1701 (1995) (proposing an
"accountability" rationale upon which to base any exceptions to the UBIT); VanYe,
supra note 164, at 1188-90. VanYe suggests two methods to determine if royalty
payments would be taxable. The first is to use the same tests as either those used for sale
of a patent, I.R.C. § 1235, or transfers for property by controlling ownership to a
corporation, .LR.C. § 351, to determine any exclusions from the UBIT. The second is to
"consider the relative value of the services and property transferred." If the services are
less than ten percent of the value of the property, the income would be tax-exempt.
VanYe, supra note 164, at 1188-90.
258. See Common Cause, 112 T.C. at 339; Planned Parenthood, 77 T.C.M. (CCH)
at 2230. See also Richard A. Speizman & John R. Washlick, Mailing Lists Revisited:
The Disabled American Veterans in Tax Court, 47 TAX NoTs 1377, 1377 (1990)
(stating that "royalty" is undefined in Code and regulations); VanYc, supra note 164, at
1175, 1176 (stating same).
259. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-l (as amended in 1992). "Whether a particular item of
income falls within any of the modifications provided in section 512(b) shall be
determined by all the facts and circumstances of each case." Id. See also Rev. Rul. 81-
178, 1981-2 C.B. 135 (stating that all the facts and circumstances must be reviewed
before determining if a payment is a royalty).
260. Rev. Rul. 81-178, 1981-2 C.B. 135, 135.
261. Id.
262. ld-
payments for personal services.
' 26
1
This definition of a royalty as a payment related "to the use of a
valuable property right" has been adopted by the courts in cases
involving income received by nonprofits that the nonprofits designate as
royalties. 64 However, the various courts that have interpreted the royalty
exclusion have not been consistent.265
The legislative rationale for the royalty exclusion, and many of the
other exclusions listed in I.R.C. section 512(b)(l)-(2), is that these
sources of income were thought by Congress to be "passive" in nature."
The allowance for excluding passive sources of income from the UBIT
was due to Congress's belief that such sources of income would not take
the organization any time to run and not create any serious threat to for-
263. Id.
264. See Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 86 F.3d 1526, 1531-32 (9th Cir. 1996); Tex.
Farm Bureau v. United States, 53 F.3d 120 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding no royalty payment
since by the language of the agreement the payment received by the nonprofit was for
services and not for a property right); Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Comm'r, 92
T.C. 456, 469 (1989) (holding income from sales of programs at annual basketball
tournament not to be royalty payments), rev'd, 914 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1990). For
additional discussion of Texas Farm Bureau, see Tsilas, supra note 200, at 489-90;
VanYe, supra note 164, at 1179. Many secondary legal authorities have also cited
Revenue Ruling 81-178 as authority for the definition of "royalty." See 4 BITrKER &
LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 103-28; HoPKINS, supra note 37, at 728; Beers, supra note 232,
at 148 (stating that while Revenue Ruling 81-178 has broad language, the Service on its
own seldom finds royalty income); Osteen & Spitzer, supra note 37, at 267 (citing
Revenue Ruling 81-178 for the proposition that retaining the right to approve quality or
style does not prevent finding of royalty income); Tsilas, supra note 200, at 488-89;
VanYe, supra note 164, at 1176.
265. See HOPKINS, supra note 37, at 728 (noting a difference in the interpretation of
the definition in Revenue Ruling 81-178 between the Tax Court and Ninth Circuit);
VanYe, supra note 164, at 1186 (noting same).
266. The House Report stated the following:
The tax applied to unrelated business income does not apply to...
royalties .... Your committee believes that... "passive" income should not
be taxed where it is used for exempt purposes because investments producing
incomes of these types have long been recognized as proper for educational
and charitable organizations.
H.R. REP. No. 2319, at 38 (1950), reprinted in 1950-2 INTERNAL REVENUE BULL. 380,
409.
The Senate Report gave a similar rationale for the royalty exclusion:
[R]oyalties... are excluded from the base of the tax on unrelated income
because your committee believes that they are "passive" in character and are
not likely to result in serious competition for taxable businesses having similar
income. Moreover, investment-producing incomes of these types have long
been recognized as a proper source of revenue for educational and charitable
organizations and trusts.
S. REP. No. 2375, at 30-31 (1950), reprinted in 1950-2 INTERNAL REVENUE BULL. 483,
506. See also HOPKINS, supra note 37, at 724-26 (stating that the rationale for certain
exclusions was that the income was passive in nature); Gallagher, supra note 187, at 929,
930 (stating same); VanYe, supra note 164, at 1173.
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profit businesses.' In this way the activities could provide income to
the nonprofits but would not take time from the tax-exempt operations of
the organization, which is the actual reason the organization was
provided with the tax-exempt status.
While the "passive!' versus "active" income distinction by Congress
evolved from a desire to reduce unfair competition by nonprofits, an
examination of unfair competition is not required in the Code.' 0
1. Specific Application of the Royalty Exclusion Under Section 512(b)
This section will discuss how the royalty exclusion of I.R.C. section
512(b) has been applied by the courts to both mailing list and affinity
card income received by nonprofit organizations.- Except in one
267. The Senate Report on the UBIT exclusions stated:
The problem at which the tax on unrelated business income is directed is
primarily that of unfair competition. The tax-free status of section [501(c)]
organizations enables them to use their profits tax-free to expand operations,
while their competitors can expand only with the profits remaining after taxes.
Also, a number of examples have arisen where these organizations have, in
effect, used their tax exemptions to buy an ordinary business. That is, they
have acquired the business with little or no investment on their own part and
paid for it in installments out of subsequent earnings-a procedure which
usually could not be followed if the business were taxable.
S. REP. No. 2375, at 28-29 (1950), reprinted in 1950-2 INTERNAL REVENUE BULL 483,
504. The House Report contains similar language. See H.R. REP. No. 2319, at 36-37
(1950), reprinted in 1950-2 INTERNAL REVENUE BULL 380,409.
268. See Note, 7he Macaroni Monopoly, supra note 173, at 1283. The article
suggests Congress allowed "passive" income since:
there was an underlying concern that excessive participation in business affairs
caused a diversion of energy from exempt purposes.... Income-producing
techniques which did not seem to involve this splitting of attention generally
remained exempt from taxation under the revision. The most important
categories of income thus exempted--rents, royalties, capital gains, and
dividends-were characterized as "passive," suggesting that their production
was not considered business activity at all.
Id.
269. See 4 BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, at 103-10.
270. The cases that involve either mailing list or affinity card income are:
Mailing list: Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 86 F.3d 1526 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding
income from mailing list rentals excluded as royalty from UBIT). Disabled Am.
Veterans v. United States, 650 F.2d 1178 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (finding income from mailing
list rentals taxable UBI); Common Cause v. Comm'r, 112 T.C. 332 (1999) (finding
income from mailing list rentals excluded as royalty from UBIT); Planned Parenthood
Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 2227 (1999) (finding income from
mailing list rentals excluded as royalty from UBIT).
Affinity card: Or. State Univ. Alumni Ass'n v. Comm'r, 193 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999)
(finding income received from affinity card program excluded as royalty from UBIT);
instance, all the courts which have looked specifically at the royalty
issue have found that the organizations are receiving payments relating
"to the use of a valuable right" and have found royalty income.
a. Income Received from the Rental or Exchange of Mailing Lists
The cases which involve mailing list income can be broken down into
two main categories. On the one hand, there is the Disabled American
Veteran line of cases, where the income from mailing list rental activity
was not excludable from the UBIT.27' On the other hand, there are all
the other mailing list cases, the first being Sierra Club, which excluded
the income received from the UBIT.272
2. Disabled American Veterans (DA V) Mailing List Cases
The exclusion of mailing list income from the UBIT first was heard by
the Court of Claims in Disabled American Veterans v. United States.",
The Disabled American Veterans have litigated the taxation of mailing
lists in three different cases.27 The first was in the Court of Claims, the
Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 307 (1994), affid in part and rev'd in part, 86
F.3d 1526 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding income received from affinity card program excluded
as royalty from UBIT); Miss. State Univ. Alumni, Inc. v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH)
458 (1997) (finding income received from affinity card program excluded as royalty
from UBIT).
271. See Disabled Am. Veterans v. Comm'r, 942 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1991)
(reversing the Tax Court's decision on collateral estoppel); Disabled Am. Veterans v.
United States, 704 F.2d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Disabled Am. Veterans v. Comm'r, 68
T.C.M. (CCH) 915 (1994).
272. See Sierra Club, 86 F.3d 1526; Common Cause, 112 T.C. 332; Planned
Parenthood, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 2227.
273. 650 F.2d 1178, aff'd and remanded, 704 F.2d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1983). For
additional discussion of the Court of Claims opinion, see Beers, supra note 232, at 148
(providing a short summary of facts and holding); Richard Holbrook, Note, The
Royalties Exception to Unrelated Business Income: Sierra Club v. Commissioner, 49
TAX LAW. 517, 518-19 (1996) (summarizing all the DAV cases); Speizman & Washlick,
supra note 258, at 1377-78 (discussing the congressional reaction to the Court of Claims
opinion in Disabled Am. Veterans, 650 F.2d 1178); Swift, supra note 18, at 576-77
(providing a short summary of facts and holding); Tsilas, supra note 200, at 489
(summarizing the facts and holding); VanYe, supra note 164, at 1171 (stating that
Disabled Am. Veterans, 650 F.2d 1178, was "the first case in which a court
considered.., if income derived from renting and exchanging mailing lists" could be
excluded as royalty payments from the UBIT).
274. See Disabled Am. Veterans, 650 F.2d 1178 (Court of Appeals affirmed the
Court of Claims' decision and remanded for allocation of expenses between taxable and
exempt income); Disabled Am. Veterans v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 60 (1990), rev'd, 942 F.2d
309 (6th Cir. 1991); Disabled Am. Veterans, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 915. See also David A.
Brennen, What's in a Name: IRS's Attempts to Tax Nonprofits on the Exploitation of the
Organization's or Its Members' Names, 4 COMMUNrrY TAX L. REP. 7, 8-9, 22 (2000)
(discussing the three DAV cases).
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second and third in the Tax Court." For simplicity and clarity this
Article will refer to the different cases as DA V 1,-"6 DA V II," and DA V
xI.27
8
The facts for each of the DAV cases are similar. The Disabled
American Veterans are a section 501(c)(4) organization whose primary
activity is to hire and train disabled veterans who then represent other
veterans before the Veteran Administration Board with respect to their
benefits. The group had an extensive mailing list of contributors that
contained a wealth of information.' The mailing list took "considerable
time, effort and expense" to maintain, and two paid employees were
fully devoted to its maintenance and the rental activities.2'
The group used the mailing list for two reasons. First, the Disabled
American Veterans solicited their own contributions.' Second, they
allowed other nonprofit and commercial groups and organizations to use
the DAV mailing list for a fee.m The reason the group rented the list
was to "gain additional revenue" especially "in the light of the
substantial costs [DAV] incurred in the regular maintenance of its donor
list." These rental transactions were completed through a list broker or
275. See Disabled An. Veterans, 650 F.2d 1178 (Court of Claims); Disabled Am.
Veterans, 94 T.C. 60 (Tax Court), rev'd, 942 F.2d 309; Disabled Am. Veterans, 68
T.C.M. (CCH) 915 (Tax Court).
276. Disabled Am. Veterans, 650 F.2d 1178 [hereinafter DAV 1].
277. Disabled Am. Veterans, 94 T.C. 60 [hereinafter DAV 11]. rev'd, 942 F.2d 309
(6th Cir. 1991).
278. DisabledAm. Veterans, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 915 [hereinafter DAV 1111.
279. DAVI, 650 F.2d at 1182.
280. The list could "identify individual donors and segment them according to
several categories such as geographic locale, amount of contribution (for example. SI,
$5, $10), recency of contribution (for example, contribution within the last 6 months,
contribution within the last 1 year), and other selections." DAV 11, 94 T.C. at 63.
281. DAV I, 650 F.2d at 1182; DAV II, 94 T.C. at 66. The maintenance of the list
was not provided by volunteers of the organization. Disabled American Veterans, 942
F.2d at 311 (reversing DA VII).
282. DAVI, 650 F.2d at 1182-84.
283. id. at 1184-85. Mailing lists are valuable commodities since "they are
collections of names and addresses of people with similar characteristics such as
willingness to respond to solicitations received by mail and interest in supporting certain
types of tax-exempt organizations." Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Comm'r,
77 T.C.M. (CCH) 2227, 2228 (1999). The price the Disabled American Veterans
charged to use the list was higher for nonprofit than for commercial organizations. DAV
1, 650 F.2d at 1184-85. See also GAUL & BOROWSKI, supra note 20, at 33 (calling the
Disabled American Veterans "one of the largest participants in the mail-list business").
284. DAV 1, 650 F.2d at 1184. In a typical rental transaction the party seeking to
use the mailing list will pay the owner of the mailing list for a right to use the mailing list
for one mailing. See Common Cause v. Comm'r, 112 T.C. 332 (1999); DAV 11, 94 T.C.
list manager who marketed the list and provided rate information."'
DAV I was based on a claim for refund of tax liability imposed for the
tax years 1970 through 1973 on the income received by DAV from
allowing other organizations and businesses to use the mailing list of the
Disabled American Veterans."' The additional tax liability related to the
DAV's mailing list activities during those years was over four million
dollars2 7
The DAV I opinion first discussed whether the income received was
unrelated business taxable income. 8 The judge found the mailing list
income was from a trade or business, regularly carried on, which was
unrelated to its exempt purpose." After finding the mailing list income
to be unrelated business taxable income, the judge held that the
payments were not "royalty" income due to all the work which the
Disabled American Veterans put into maintaining the list'90
Congress did not agree with the DAV I opinion and sought to change
the outcome for certain cases in the future by legislation. 9' Congress
at 65-66. Any individuals or entities on the mailing list who respond to the mailing
become the property of the mailer, and they may continue to send mail to that individual
or entity without paying the list owner. Common Cause, 112 T.C. at 334. To prevent the
later misuse of the mailing list by list users the owners of the mailing list frequently
"seed" the mailing list with their employees' names and addresses to see if any
unauthorized mailings occur. See id. at 334-35.
285. See Disabled Am. Veterans, 942 F.2d at 311. A list broker serves as an
intermediary between the nonprofit organization with a mailing list to rent and the party
wishing to use it. See Anthony Giorgianni, The Donor Name Game, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 12, 1999, at 21, 22. A list manager is a private firm which is hired
by the nonprofit organization to manage and maintain the organization's mailing list.
See id.
286. See DAV I, 650 F.2d at 1180. The other two Disabled American Veterans
cases involved a claim for refund for the tax liability imposed on mailing list income
from different tax years. DA V II involved the tax years 1974 through 1985, except 1976.
DAV II, 94 T.C. at 61. DAV III involved the same mailing list income issue but was for
the tax years 1986 and 1987. DAV III, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) at 915.
287. DAVI, 650 F.2d at 1180.
288. Id. at 1181.
289. Id. at 1185-89.
290. Id. at 1189. "DAV's list rentals are the product of extensive business activity
by DAV and do not fit within the types of 'passive' income set forth in section 512(b)."
Id.
291. The House Report stated:
The U.S. Court of Claims held in 1981 that income received by the
Disabled American Veterans from other exempt organizations and commercial
businesses for the use of its mailing lists constituted unrelated business
income, and did not constitute "royalties" expressly exempted from the tax
under section 512(b)(2) ....
The Congress concluded that the unrelated trade or business income tax
should not be imposed on income from exchanges or rentals of donor or
member lists among tax-exempt organizations eligible to receive charitable
contributions ....
272
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decided that the best way to accomplish this was by enacting section
513(h)(1)(B), which excludes from the term "unrelated trade or
business" any exchange or rental income made in transactions between
organizations to which donations are deductible?2  These organizations
are charities, churches and educational institutions, or certain veterans
organizations, the last of which includes the Disabled American
Veterans. 3
While Congress somewhat closed the door to finding unrelated
business income from mailing lists by enacting I.R.C. section
513(h)(1)(B), the Service tried to use the new Code language to its
advantage. The Service interpreted the section to mean that income
from mailing lists exchanged or rented between the organizations not
listed within the new section 513(h)(1)(B) was nonexcludable unrelated
business income?'4 The Service argued this in several cases, but to date
STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX
REFORMACrOF 1986, 1324-25 (Comm- Print 1987) [hereinafter GENERAL EXPLANATION
OFTHETAXREFORM ACTOF 1986].
The Senate Report for the bill contained similar language stating that the "committee
believes that the unrelated trade or business tax should not be imposed on income from
exchanges or rentals of donor or member lists among tax-exempt organizations eligible
to receive charitable contributions." Tax Reform Act of 1986, Report of the Committee
on Finance, S. REP. No. 99-313, at 884 (1986).
292. I.R.C. § 513(h)(1)(B) (2000) reads:
(h) Certain distributions of low cost articles without obligation to
purchase and exchanges and rentals of member lists
(1) In general
In the case of an organization which is described in section 501 and
contributions to which are deductible under paragraph (2) or (3) of section
170(c), the term "unrelated trade or business" does not include-
(B) any trade or business which consists of-
(i) exchanging with another such organization names and addresses of
donors to (or members of) such organization, or
(ii) renting such names and addresses to another such organization.
Id.
For cases which state that section 513(h)(1)(B) was passed in reaction to DAV 1, see
Common Cause v. Comm'r, 112 T.C. 332, 348 (1999); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of
Am., Inc. v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 2227, 2235 (1999). For additional sources
saying the same, see Osteen & Spitzer, supra note 37, at 268; Speizman & Washlick,
supra note 273, at 1377. See also GAuL & BOROWSKI, supra note 20, at 34 (stating that
only twenty percent of all mail list rental transactions are to for-profit firms).
293. See LR.C. § 170(c)(2), (c)(3) (2000).
294. See General Counsel's Memoranda 39827, (1986-1990 Transfer Binder] IRS
Positions (CCH) 2222, at 7612 (Oct. 5, 1989) (commenting that "section 5131h)(l(B)
is the sole exemption from taxation of mailing list income"); Bree Ermentrout & Charles
Barrett, UBIT: Current Developments, in CPE TECRNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAI
only one concurring opinion has agreed with the Service's
interpretation. 29' This lack of acceptance by the courts of the Service's
position is due to the language in the legislative history and debates
which states that no other inference should be drawn from the enactment
of I.R.C. section 513(h)(1)(B). 96 The list of the cases rejecting the
Service's position due to the legislative history is lengthy. 7
TEXTBOOK 239, 241 (1996) (stating same). See also Common Cause, 112 T.C. at 348
(summarizing the Service position on the effect of section 513(h)(l)(B) as "Congress has
agreed with the holding of the Court of Claims in DAV I that the mailer's list rental
payment in a mailing list transaction is not a royalty that is excludable from UBTI under
section 512(b)(2)"); Andrew R. Ben-Ami, Current Unrelated Business Income Tax
Developments, in 26 N.Y.U. CONF. TAX PLAN. FOR EXEMPT ORG. 4-1, -29, -30 (1998)
(discussing Private Letter Ruling 9635001 which ruled that mailing list exchanges which
are not between section 501(c)(3) organizations are taxable); Halloran, supra note 218, at
46-47 (citing Private Letter Ruling 40-29-047 for the proposition the Service would tax
mailing list income).
295. The concurring opinion was by Judge Martin in the Sixth Circuit's review of
DAV II (Tax Court finding mailing list income an excludable royalty from the UBIT).
Judge Martin wrote:
The acceptance of DAV's position that the monies it receives from list rental
are royalties under § 512(b)(2) would totally eviscerate section 513(h).
Section 513(h) would be reduced to mere surplusage under DAV's
interpretation of § 512(b)(2) which would hold that all list rentals, and not just
those to other exempt organizations, are excludable from unrelated business
taxable income. Although § 513(h) was enacted after the relevant time period
at issue in this case, its implications cannot be ignored.... There is simply no
way to reconcile Congress' intent as evidenced by the enactment of § 513(h)
and the position advanced by DAY. I would reverse the decision of the tax
court and find that the monies received by DAV from list rentals are not
excludable from unrelated business taxable income as royalties under §
512(b)(2).
Disabled Am. Veterans v. Comm'r, 942 F.2d 309, 317-18 (6th Cir. 1991) (Martin, J.,
concurring) (DA V II).
There has been one law review article also in agreement with the Service's
application of section 513(h)(1 )(B).
[T]o give section 513(h)(1)(B) meaning, the section 512(b)(2) royalties should
be understood as not including mailing list rental income; in 513(h)(1)(B),
Congress has specifically chosen to exempt that rental income that would
otherwise be UBTI. Since general principles of statutory construction favor
interpreting statutes in order to avoid nullifying other statutes and parts thereof,
the opinion of the Tax Court that royalty income under section 512(b) includes
mailing list rental income must be rejected.
Holbrook, supra note 273, at 530 (citations omitted).
296. See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, supra note 291,
at 1325 (1987) ("No inference is intended as to whether or not revenues from mailing list
activities other than those described in the provision.., constitute unrelated business
income."); 132 CONG. REC. 8361 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Rostenkowski) (commenting that the new legislation "carries no inference whatever that
mailing list revenues beyond its scope ... should be considered taxable to an exempt
organization").
297. See Common Cause, 112 T.C. at 348-49; Planned Parenthood, 77 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 2234-35; Miss. State Univ. Alumni, Inc. v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 458,
468 (1997); Or. State Univ. Alumni Ass'n, Inc. v. Comm'r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 1935,
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While the first mailing list case was a victory for the Service, since
then there have been only defeats. "'s The second attempt by the Disabled
American Veterans (DAV II) before the Tax Court to obtain a decision
declaring their mailing list income to be excludable from taxation is
typical, although the case was later reversed by the Sixth Circuit. DAV
11 involved the same mailing list and income made therefrom, but
focused upon different tax years.' While the Service said that collateral
estoppel precluded relitigation of the issue, the Tax Court held that a
Revenue Ruling issued by the Service shortly after DAV I was a "change
in the legal climate" which warranted "consideration of [DAV's]
arguments."' The Revenue Ruling defined a royalty as a payment
related "to the use of a valuable right.""sr " The Tax Court held that the
definition applied to the mailing list income received by the Disabled
American Veterans, because "business activity does not transform
payments that would otherwise be royalties into something else.""" The
1940-41 (1996); Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2582,2588-89 (1993).
298. See Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 86 F.3d 1526, 1535-36 (9th Cir. 1996)
(finding mailing list income excluded as royalty); Conmnion Cause, 112 T.C. at 347
(finding mailing list income excluded); Planned Parenthood, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2235
(finding same); DAV II, 94 T.C. at 78, revd, 942 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1991) (on collateral
estoppel).
299. DAV II, 94 T.C. 60. DAV I was reviewed by the entire Tax Court, with twelve
judges finding excludable royalty income and four judges dissenting. See id. at 79, 82.
Tax Court cases are tried before only one judge who then submits his or her opinion to
the Chief Tax Court Judge. See RICHMONqD, supra note 1, at 121. The Chief Judge then
determines if the opinion will stand as written or the Chief Judge can submit the opinion
to be reviewed and decided by the full panel of Tax Court judges. See id. See also
FREELANDETAL., supra note 1, at 29.
300. The tax years involved in DAV IH were from 1974 to 1985, excluding 1976.
See DAV II, 94 T.C. at 61. The DAV's income from its mailing list from the years in
controversy was $16,204,384. See itL at 67. Breaking it down year by year the income
was: 1974 ($1,301,971), 1975 ($1,205,313), 1977 ($1,025,727), 1978 (SI,073,186), 1979
($1,237,108), 1980 ($1,267,422), 1981 ($1,285,408), 1982 (SI,566,050), 1983
($1,956,883), 1984 ($2,246,875), and 1985 ($2,038,441). Id. The number of names
rented in the years 1982 through 1985 was: 1982 (41,685,385), 1983 (49,864,621), 1984
(53,706,024), and 1985 (44,701,712). Id.
301. Disabled Am. Veterans, 94 T.C. at 69 (DA V 11). Collateral estoppel is a legal
doctrine which prevents the relitigation of the same issue between the same parties or
their privies except in certain extraordinary circumstances. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
237 (5th ed. 1979). See also 21 FEDERAL PROCEDURE: LAWYERS EDMON §62:81 (1981)
(discussion of pleading collateral estoppel).
302. DAVII, 94 T.C. at 69 (quoting Revenue Ruling 81-178). Revenue Ruling 81-
178 is discussed supra text accompanying notes 260-63.
303. DA VII, 94 T.C. at 74. The commentary on the Tax Court's opinion in DAV II
was one of shock. See Beers, supra note 232, at 149 ("DAV 1I represents a significant
departure in the treatment of royalty income by the Tax Court."); Sheppard, supra note
Tax Court's opinion in DAV II was reversed by the Sixth Circuit on
collateral estoppel grounds.0
No other cases before the Tax Court have applied the UBIT to mailing
list income. All such income has been found to be excludable from the
UBIT as a royalty payment.39
18, at 859 (stating that the Tax Court's analysis was a "'royalties are royalties' reading,"
which meant that "commerciality [did] not matter" and breaking "any link between
unrelated business and royalties"); Speizman & Washlick, supra note 273, at 1377
(calling the decision "somewhat surprising"). See also Tsilas, supra note 200, at 489
(giving a short summary of the facts and holding of DA V I1).
304. Disabled Am. Veterans v. Comm'r, 942 F.2d 309, 314 (6th Cir. 1991). The
Sixth Circuit did not view Revenue Ruling 81-178 as having any bearing on the case. Id.
While the Sixth Circuit reversed on collateral estoppel there is dicta in the opinion which
seems to support the Service's position that for income to be a royalty payment there
cannot be an element of services provided. See id. at 315 ("Whether revenues received
from the use of a donor list could ever be royalties is itself highly questionable."). The
concurring opinion of Judge Martin ruled on the merits of the case and taxed the income.
See id. at 317-18. See also Holbrook, supra note 273, at 519 (commenting on Judge
Martin's analysis); Swift, supra note 18, at 577 ("In its opinion, the Sixth Circuit
discussed the merits of the case and concluded that excluding all royalties that constitute
unrelated business income from taxation is inconsistent with Section 513(h), which
specifically excludes only payments to an exempt organization from another exempt
organization for mailing list rentals.").
Because they are not quitters, the Disabled American Veterans tried yet again to have
their mailing list income excluded as a royalty payment, re-relitigating their case to the
Tax Court. See DAV III, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 915 (1994). The facts were the same as in
DAV I and DAV 1I but involved income from their mailing list for the tax years 1986 and
1987. See id. at 915. The Tax Court this time found collateral estoppel applied and the
payments remained taxable under the UBIT with no royalty exclusion. See id. at 916-
17. For a discussion of the case, see Marlis L. Carson & Paul Streckfus, Would You
Believe DAV IlI?-Or, Once More into the Royalties Fight, 64 TAX NoTES 563 (1994).
305. There have been three post-DAV I mailing list income opinions (in
chronological order): Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 307 (1994), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 86 F.3d 1526 (9th Cir. 1996), Common Cause v. Comm'r, 112 T.C. 332
(1999), and Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 2227
(1999). A fourth case was settled before a decision was rendered. See Sullivan, supra
note 257, at 449 (reporting about American Acad. of Ophthalmology Inc. v. Comm'r, Tax
Ct. Dkt. No. 21657-94). One commentator said of the Tax Court mailing list opinions
that he was "disappointed by the decisions" and criticized them for "basically ignoring
the statute." Jon Almeras, Common Cause, Planned Parenthood Prevail in Mailing List
Cases, 83 TAx NoTES 1856, 1857 (1999).
The Sierra Club opinion dealing with mailing list income was the first of two Tax
Court opinions involving the Sierra Club and payments which it wanted protected from
the UBIT by the royalty exclusion. The second dealt with income received from the
Sierra Club's affinity card program. See Sierra Club, 103 T.C. 307. The first Sierra
Club case involved mailing list income for the tax years 1985 through 1987. See Sierra
Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2582, 2583 (1993). The Sierra Club utilized
various outside vendors to do the maintenance, updating, solicitation, and renting of its
mailing list. See Sierra Club Inc. v. Comm'r, 86 F.3d 1526, 1527 (9th Cir. 1996). One
vendor maintained the list by adding new names and removing stale names from the list,
a "list manager" administered and oversaw the external uses of the lists, and a "list
broker" arranged for the rental on behalf of the renting organization. Id. The Sierra
Club's income on the list was $142,636 (1985), $317,579 (1986), and $452,042 (1987).
Sierra Club, 65 T.C.M. at 2584. The Tax Court held the mailing list was an intangible
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3. Beyond DA V I: Sierra Club
The first case in which a United States Court of Appeals reviewed
whether mailing list income could be excluded as royalty payments was
the Ninth Circuit in Sierra Club v. Conunissioner. The Ninth Circuit
asset and that any money paid for it would be excluded by the royalty exclusion of
512(b)(2). See id. at 2592. As to any services which might have been provided the
judge said "[w]e made it clear [in DAV 11] that we could distinguish payments for the
use of an intangible, which constitute a royalty, from payments for advertising,
compensation for services, or other profits masquerading as royalties." Id. at 2585. For
additional comments on the first Sierra Club case, see Edward Gonzalez & Charles
Barrett, UBIT: Royalty Income and Mailing Lists, in CPE TEcHNICAL INSTRUcTION
PROGRAM TEXTBOOK 122-26 (1994); Holbrook, supra note 273, at 523 (stating that the
opinion "radically changed the meaning of royalties by omitting previously important
factors such as the frequency of transactions and the effect of those transactions on tax-
paying competitors"); Sheppard, supra note 18, at 859 (disagreeing with the holding);
Tsilas, supra note 200, at 490-91 (providing an in-depth discussion of facts and holdings
of the Tax Court opinions for the mailing list and affinity card income).
The Tax Court decision in Common Cause v. Commissioner is much the same in facts
and analysis. 112 T.C. 332. Common Cause is a section 501 (c)(4) organization "formed
for the purpose of improving governmental institutions, processes, and policies by
making them more responsive to the needs of the Nation and the will of its citizens." Id.
at 333-34. The organization's mailing list contained the information such as name,
address, gender, frequency of contribution, how recent, amount of contributions, and
ethnicity. See id. at 334, 336-37. The mailing list was maintained and promoted, and
the rental transaction handied, by outside vendors. See id. at 335. For the tax years in
question, 1991 and 1992, Common Cause received $188,171 and $243,959, respectively,
in mailing list income. Id. at 338. The Tax Court held that Common Cause did "not
directly engage in any significant activities with regard to a rental list transaction." Id. at
344. The outside vendors were also held not to be agents of Common Cause so their
activities were not attributable to the organization. See id. at 344-47. After making
these finding the Tax Court had no problem finding that the income was excluded as a
royalty payment under section 512(b). See id. at 347. For additional discussion of the
opinion, see Almeras, supra, at 1856 (providing advice to practitioners and comments on
case and holding); Sullivan, supra note 257, at 449 (giving a brief discussion of the
case).
The most recent mailing list decision by the Tax Court is Planned Parenthood v.
Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 2227, and has almost the exact same wording as
Common Cause. Planned Parenthood is a section 501(c)(3) organization created "for the
purpose of assuring quality reproductive health care for women." Id. at 2227. The
mailing list was maintained and promoted, and the rental transaction handled, by outside
vendors. Id. at 2230. For the tax years in controversy, 1991, 1992, and 1993, Planned
Parenthood made $191,415, $161,273, and $192,185, respectively, in mailing list rental
income. Id. at 2235. The Tax Court found, after ruling that no agency relationship was
present and that no inference could be made from I.R.C. section 513(h)(l)B), that the
mailing list income was not unrelated business income. See id. at 1270. See also
Sullivan, supra note 257, at 449 (giving a brief discussion of the case).
306. 86 F.3d 1526 (9th Cir. 1996). The Sixth Circuit reviewed the DAV II decision
but reversed on collateral estoppel grounds. See Disabled Am. Veterans v. Conmm'r, 942
F.2d 309, 314-16 (6th Cir. 1991).
found that while royalties had to be payments for the right to use
intangible property, such payments could not be compensation for
services.' After defining "royalty," the Ninth Circuit then applied it to
the Sierra Club's mailing list income.3°8 Since the Sierra Club did not
provide any services, the court excluded the sums received from the
UBIT under the royalty exclusion."
After its latest string of losses the Service signaled that it will take a
different tack and will discontinue litigating many of the mailing list
income cases which it previously was pursuing."' A memo issued to
area managers directed them to stop litigating all cases involving
nonprofit income from the rental of mailing lists unless the facts "clearly
point" to the income being unrelated business income.3" For the facts to
"clearly point" to unrelated business income, most likely the mailing list
would have to be maintained and updated by the nonprofit receiving the
307. See Sierra Club, 86 F.3d at 1532. While the Ninth Circuit adopted the".passive/active" approach to defining royalty, as opposed to the Tax Court's definition in
which the amount of services did not seem to matter, some practitioners thought there
was an ulterior motive. See Milton Cerny & Albert Lauber, Ninth Circuit Rules on
Sierra Club Mailing List and Affinity Card Income, 72 TAX NoTES 353, 354 (1996)
(suggesting that the Ninth Circuit adopted the "passive" approach to avoid the possibility
of conflict in the Circuits and to lessen the possibility of Supreme Court review of the
decision). Several commentators were critical of the Ninth Circuit's opinion. See Cain,
supra note 20, at 370 ("Unfortunately, by following the 1970s DAV analysis, the Ninth
Circuit adopted an outdated and incorrect approach to list maintenance activities.");
Ermentrout & Barrett, supra note 294, at 244 (suggesting that the Ninth Circuit's
decision leaves unanswered the question of what services an exempt organization can
perform in connection with mailing list rentals and still treat the income from them as
royalty income); VanYe, supra note 164, at 1185-86.
The difficulty with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning is that it fails to resolve
adequately the issue of the quantity of services, if any, that can be transferred
with "the right to use intangible property" before a tax-exempt organization
will no longer qualify for favored tax treatment. After Sierra Club, tax-exempt
organizations are left only with the knowledge that acceptable levels of activity
fall somewhere between that of the Disabled American Veterans and Sierra
Club. Because a wide range of activities could fall between these two
extremes, an approach is needed that will achieve consistent results when
determining whether income related to a tax-exempt organization's activities
in conjunction with a transfer of a property right should be taxed.
Id. (citations omitted).
308. See Sierra Club, 86 F.3d at 1535-36.
309. See id. at 1536. The opinion states that to find "otherwise would require us to
hold that any activity on the part of the owner of intangible property to obtain a royalty,
renders the payment for the use of that right UBTI and not a royalty." Id.
310. See IRS Memorandum to Area Managers on Affinity Card Cases, 28 EXEMPr
ORG. TAx REv. 141, 141 (2000) [hereinafter IRS Memorandum]. See also Fred Stokeld,
IRS Memo Tells Area Managers to Stop Litigating Affinity Card, Mailing List Cases, 28
EXEMPTORG. TAx REv. 18, 18 (2000).
311. See IRS Memorandum, supra note 310, at 141. See also Stokeld, supra note
310, at 18.
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mailing list rental income, as in the DAV line of cases."' It will be
argued later in this Article that mailing list income should be taxable to
the organization and not excluded by the royalty exemption since it does
not fit within any existing rationale for a nonprofit's tax exemption.",
Based on this position, the author believes that the cases in this area
have been decided incorrectly, and that the Service should continue to
litigate the cases and Congress should repeal I.R.C. section
513(h)(1)(B).
a. Income Received by Nonprofit Organizations from
Affinity Card Arrangements
The courts have consistently held that the income received by
nonprofit organizations from affinity card programs constitutes royalty
income. 3' The first affinity card case heard by any court involved
312. See supra text accompanying notes 273-304.
313. See infra text accompanying notes 334-75. The analysis for taxing a stream of
income due to its negative effect on public trust can also be applied to other UBIT
exclusions. However, discussion of that application is beyond the scope of this Article.
314. See Or. State Univ. Alumni Ass'n v. Comm'r, 193 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999);
Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1569 (1999); Miss. State Univ. Alumni,
Inc. v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 458 (1997).
For additional articles discussing the Oregon alumni association cases, see Susan Ruth
& Charles Barrett, UBIT: Current Developments, in CPE TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION
PROGRAM TEXTBOOK 129, 131 (1998) (summarizing the facts and holding); Sheppard,
supra note 18, at 860-62 (summarizing facts and holding of the Tax Court opinion and
commenting "[ilt is as though the Tax Court has collectively decided that the destination
of the earnings justifies the unfairness of the method of getting them"); Fred Stokeld, IRS
Litigation of Affinity Card Cases Likely to Stop, Owens Says, 85 TAX NOTES 433, 433
(1999) (reporting on comments made by the director of the IRS Exempt Organization
Division); Tsilas, supra note 200, at 493-94 (discussing the facts and holding of the
Ninth Circuit opinion); IRS Reviewed Briefs: University Alumni Association Received
UBTI From Affinity Card Program, IRS Argues, I 1 ExEMNPT ORG. TAX REv. 767, 767-68
(1995) (discussing the litigation strategies of both sides in the University of Oregon and
Oregon State University alumni cases).
For additional articles discussing the Mississippi State case, see Ruth & Barrett. supra,
at 131 (summarizing facts and holding); James K. Hasson, Jr., Controversies Old and
New Mark Recent UBIT Developments, 10 J. TAX'W EXEtPT ORG. 123, 123 (1998)
(providing an overview of the case and commenting that the grounds on which MSU
wanted a ruling were that the income received was not unrelated business income under
LR.C. section 513 (2000)); Howard A. Levenson, Afflnity Card Income Not UBTI, 29
TAX ADvisER 7, 10-11 (1998) (providing brief description of facts and holding of the
case); Carolyn D. Wright, Is Miss. St. Alumni the UBIT Case the IRS Has Been Waiting
For?, 76 TAX NoTs 1393 (1997) (discussing facts and analysis of opinion and
commenting that since MSU updated its own mailing list the Service might prevail if the
case were appealed).
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payments made to the Sierra Club.35 This section of the Article will
cover the general aspects of affinity card programs and how the courts
have been applying I.R.C. section 512(b) to the nonprofit's income
received from this program.
Affinity cards are credit cards that bear the name, logo, or picture of
the cardholder's selected charity, college, car, airline, celebrity, or
group.16 The nonprofit is often contacted by a financial institution or
bank about issuing a card to its members and supporters. 37 The card
issuer enters into these agreements to gain access to a nonprofit
organization's mailing list and the ability to use their logos, seals, and
colors on the credit card and other promotional materials. 8 The
nonprofits enter into the affinity card agreements for various reasons, the
primary one being to make money. Typically, a nonprofit receives a
certain percentage of each transaction made on the affinity card and a set
amount for each new account or renewal fee paid.39 The arrangements
315. See Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 307 (1994) (Sierra Club 1), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 86 F.3d 1526 (9th Cir. 1996). Since the affinity card opinion
followed the mailing list income opinion, it is known also as "Sierra Club II." See, e.g.,
Spiegel, supra note 257, at 1699; Streckfus, supra note 232, at 1762; VanYe, supra note
164, at 1183, n.106. Both the mailing list and affinity card income issues were heard by
the Ninth Circuit. Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 86 F.3d 1526 (9th Cir. 1996). For
additional articles on various issues involving the Sierra Club's affinity card income, see
Ben-Ami, supra note 294, at 4-28, 4-29; Marlis L. Carson, 72 TAx NoTEs 18, 18 (1996)
(reporting exempt organization practitioners celebrated the Ninth Circuit's opinion and
hailed it as a victory for nonprofits); Sheppard, supra note 18, at 860 (commenting about
the Tax Court's holding that the affinity card income was a royalty payment and that
"Judge Halpern let the tail of the Sierra Club logo on the credit card wag the dog of the
marketing agreement"); Sullivan, supra note 257, at 448 (giving holding of case);
Wright, supra note 314, at 1394-95 (summarizing facts and holding); Wright & Stokeld,
supra note 22, at 1898-99 (reporting on the Tax Court's opinion in the remanded portion
of the case from the Ninth Circuit).
316. See Stark, supra note 15, at W13. See also Sierra Club, 86 F.3d at 1528 n.2;
Miss. State Univ. Alumni, 74 T.C.M. (CCH), at 459. See generally Swift, supra note 18,
at 575 (describing typical affinity card arrangements).
317. See, e.g., Sierra Club I, 103 T.C. at 311; Or. State Univ. Alumni Ass'n, 71
T.C.M. (CCH) 1935 (stating that the alumni association contacted and then solicited
other proposals); Alumni Ass'n of the Univ. of Or., Inc. v. Comm'r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH)
2093, 2094 (1996) (same as Oregon State); Miss. State Univ. Alumni, 74 T.C.M. (CCH)
at 459 (same as Oregon State).
318. See, e.g., Or. State Univ. Alumni, 193 F.3d at 1099; Miss. State Univ. Alumni,
74 T.C.M. (CCH) at 460 (bank gained access to MSUs mailing list, name and
trademark-the walking bulldog). See also supra note 17 for additional reasons for
banks to enter into affinity card agreements with nonprofit organizations.
319. See, e.g., Sierra Club II, 103 T.C. at 314-15 (stating that Sierra Club was to
receive 0.5 or 0.6% of each transaction depending on whether certain conditions were
met); Or. State Univ. Alumni, 193 F.3d at 1099 (the alumni associations received 1% of
each transaction and between four and seven dollars for each new account or renewal);
Miss. State Univ. Alumni, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) at 460 (MSU received 45 cents for each
cardholder transaction and three dollars for each card membership or annual fee paid).
See also supra note 17 for additional particulars on the agreements.
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can be quite lucrative.'2 Besides this relatively easy money, nonprofit
organizations use affinity cards to keep their members aware of the
organization and keep the organization's name before the public." '
The Ninth Circuit in Oregon State University, Ahmni Association v.
Commissioner is the only United States Court of Appeals to review the
issue of whether affinity card income may be excluded under the royalty
exception.32 The sole issue in the case for the Ninth Circuit was whether
"what the bank was paying the alumni associations for was the good will
associated with the schools' names, seals, colors and logos, or whether it
was paying them for mailing list management and promotional
services,"32 which would raise the simple issue of whether the payment
is for a property right or for services. The court used the same definition
of "royalties" as it had before in the Sierra Club case-that royalties are
payments for the right to use intangible property but cannot include
320. For example, for the two years in controversy the Sierra Club made over
$300,000, while Oregon State and University of Oregon alumni associations made over
$500,000 in a two-year period. Sierra Club II, 103 T.C. at 320; Or. State Univ. Ahmni,
193 F.3d at 1099.
321. Or. State Univ. Alwuni, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1936 (stating that the alumni
association entered the agreement to "to keep alumni aware of their ties to OSU, to keep
OSU's name before the public, to provide a low-cost credit card to alumni and other
OSU supporters"). See also Alunmi Ass'n of the Univ. of Or., 71 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2094
(same language as OSU opinion). An article in the Wall Street Journal notes that by
using affinity cards to make the public aware of an organization it turns the marketplace
"on its ear" since "[c]onsumers advertise to salespersons and vendors." Stark, supra
note 15, at W13.
322. 193 F.3d 1098. See also Carolyn D. Wright & Fred Stokeld, Ninth Circuit
Rejects IRS's UBTIArgument in Oregon Cases, 85 TAX NOTES 151, 151 (1999) (stating
that the Nimth Circuit opinion was "the first time that an appeals court has ruled on the
merits of an affinity card case"). One nonprofit practitioner thought that "Judge
Kleinfeld must have written the opinion himself... because no law clerk would dare
submit an opinion that contains no legal citations in the body (and very few footnotes)"
and that "[plerhaps a clerk wrote one opinion, the panel rejected it, and Judge Kleinfeld
started from scratch." Id. at 153.
323. Or. State Univ. Alumni, 193 F.3d at 1101. This simple analysis was not
present in the earlier Sierra Club I opinion in which the Service tried many different
arguments, which all failed. See Sierra Club 1, 103 T.C. 307. One was that the nonprofit
organization was involved in a joint venture with the financial institution which meant
the income would be for its own services. See id. at 318, 321-30. For a discussion of the
joint venture aspects of the Sierra Club I opinion, see Swift, supra note 18, at 577-78
(discussing the joint venture analysis in the Sierra Club I opinion); Tsilas, supra note
200, at 492 (discussing the joint venture analysis in the Sierra Club I opinion); Affinity
Card Income Was Royalty, Not UBI, 81 J. TAX'N 316, 316 (1994) (discussing the joint
venture analysis in the Sierra Club I opinion). Another was that the financial institution
was the agent of the nonprofit organization and, therefore, all its services should be
attributed to the nonprofit. See Sierra Club I, 103 T.C. at 330, 337.
compensation for services."' The court held that the payments were for
use of a valuable property right, primarily because of the lack of services
that the alumni associations provided to the bank.3z2
The Service presently will litigate the royalty exception to affinity
card income only when the facts "clearly point" to unrelated business
income.32 As discussed in the next section, the exclusion from taxation
of affinity card income agrees with the overall scheme of nontaxation for
nonprofit income.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR THE HANDLING OF MAILING LIST
AND AFFINITY CARD INCOME
This Article has examined the Code sections permitting federal tax
exemption for nonprofit organizations,' the major rationales for
allowing the federal tax exemption,32 the history and legal requirements
of the UBIT,329 the exclusions/exceptions to the UBIT, 330 and how the
royalty exclusion has been applied by the courts to the mailing list and
affinity card income of nonprofit organizations.33" ' This final section of
the Article will review whether mailing list or affinity card income
should be taxable. First, this section will discuss why the courts and
Congress incorrectly permit an exclusion from the UBIT for income
received from the rental or exchange of mailing lists.332 Next, it will
cover why allowing affinity card income to be excluded from the UBIT
is appropriate.33 The difference in treatment for each source of income
324. See Or. State Univ. Alumni, 193 F.3d at 1100-01. While the Sierra Club had
an affinity card program and the issue of whether the payments received were royalties
was before the Ninth Circuit in that case, the affinity card income issue was reversed and
remanded because of a procedural error by the Tax Court in interpretation of the
agreement. Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 86 F.3d 1526, 1536 (9th Cir. 1996).
325. See Or. State Univ. Alumni, 193 F.3d at 1101-02. The opinion stressed that it
was not believable that the bank would have paid over $1 million for services which took
50 hours of "mostly secretarial and clerical work." Id. at 1101. If this were true, the
bank would have been paying approximately $22,000 per hour for the services. See 0.
326. See IRS Memorandum, supra note 310, at 141. See also Stokeld, supra note
310, at 18. Even before this memorandum was issued the Service had determined not to
appeal the ruling in Miss. State University Alumni. See Carolyn D. Wright, Tide Could
Be Shifting on IRS Pursuit of Affinity Card UBI, 78 TAx NoTES 293, 293 (1998) (stating
that after the MSU loss in the Tax Court the director of the Exempt Organizations
Division said the Service might be "fairly close to the end" of affinity card litigation);
Wright & Stokeld, supra note 22, at 1898; Government Won't Appeal Mississippi State
Alumni Affinity Card Case, 78 TAx NOTES 667, 667 (1998).
327. See supra text accompanying notes 24-40.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 48-152.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 153-247.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 248-69.
331. See supra text accompanying notes 270-326.
332. See infra text accompanying notes 336-75.
333. See infra text accompanying notes 376-92.
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is based on how it concurs with the underlying rationale for all nonprofit
theories for the federal tax exemption-public trust.
A. Mailing List Income
When a nonprofit organization distributes mailing list information,
without patron consent, for use by other nonprofit or for-profit firms, it
violates the privacy of those individuals included on the mailing list."
In turn, this violation of privacy causes the public to lose faith in the
nonprofit. Since the underlying rationale of all theories for the nonprofit
tax exemption is based on the public's trust of these organizations, any
activity that undermines this trust should be taxed."'
1. Background
As discussed earlier in this Article, many nonprofit organizations rent
or exchange their donor information.3" These mailing list transactions
are between the nonprofit organization and either another nonprofit or a
for-profit firm.337 The lists contain such information as name, address,
gender, frequency of contribution, last contribution made, amount of
contribution, and ethnicity.138 The organization which rents the list then
takes the information and uses it for its own purposes, usually mailing
334. See infra text accompanying notes 345-72.
335. The notion that the public's trust in nonprofit organizations is generally present
in all social and hybrid theories should apply even though several authors only
specifically apply their rationales to charitable organizations. See supra note 151. While
it may be said that the public's trust is not an important factor in providing a tax
exemption to all nonprofit organizations (i.e., social clubs under I.R.C. section
501(c)(7)(2000)) this should not prevent its use to determine the taxation of mailing list
and affinity card income. This is due to the fact that the vast majority of nonprofit
organizations are exempt under provisions which are covered by one of the hybrid
theories discussed earlier. See id.
336. See Disabled Am. Veterans v. United States, 650 F.2d 1178, 1184-85 (Ct. Cl.
1981), ajfd and remanded, 704 F.2d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Common Cause v. Comm'r.
112 T.C. 332, 334-37 (1999); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Comm'r. 77
T.C.M. (CCH) 2227, 2230 (1999). See supra text accompanying notes 271-313
(discussing case law regarding how various courts have treated mailing list income).
337. See Direct Marketers Being Told to Disclose Data-Sharing: Association
Adopts Policy to Better Guard Consumers' Privacy, BALT. SLYN, July 7, 1999. at 3C
[hereinafter Direct Marketers] (stating that "if you donate money to a charity, you could
get a pitch from a music club or a solicitation from a credit card company without ever
requesting such information").
338. Common Cause, 112 T.C. at 334, 336-37. See also Disabled Am. Veterans v.
Comm'r, 94 T.C. 60, 63 (1990), revid, 942 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1991).
literature for its cause to the names and addresses on the list.
3 39
There are two primary reasons why nonprofit organizations rent and
exchange mailing lists. The first is to replenish their own mailing lists:Y4
The other is to generate income, and lots of it.Y' For example, in 1991
the Smithsonian Institution collected $3 million in rental income from its
mailing list 42 The Disabled American Veterans, who have one of the
largest mailing list rental operations, earned over $16 million in eleven
years starting in 1974.3 The renting of lists to acquire additional funds
is done in part because of the decreasing amount of donations received
by nonprofits and the increasing competition for those donation
dollars.2
339. See Disabled American Veterans, 650 F.2d at 1184; Common Cause, 112 T.C.
at 334; Planned Parenthood, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2230. See also Putnam Barber, How
Donors Can Keep a Lid on Charity Costs, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Oct. 21, 1999, at
Opinion 51.
Everyone has experienced some variation of fund-raising hell: You donate to a
charity or attend one of its events, and then you start receiving a flood of
newsletters, membership offers, and pleas for additional support-not only
from the organization you supported, but from others you've never heard of
before. You may politely try to stop those solicitations by contacting the
charities through letters, e-mails, and telephone calls, but they just keep
coming-a trash-can monument to inattention and waste.
Id. Some mailings have such high overhead that all the money received from the
solicitation is used to cover salaries and mailing expenses. See Jane Bryant Quinn, A
Warning to Donors, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 19, 1988, at 48. See also Espinoza, supra note 20,
at 635-61 (giving a history of attempted legislation dealing with nonprofit solicitation of
funds, including direct mailings).
340. See Disabled American Veterans, 650 F.2d at 1183; Common Cause, 112 T.C.
at 334. See also Giorgianni, supra note 285, at 22 (commenting that even groups which
do not rent out their own lists rent lists from other groups for mailings).
341. See Sierra Club Inc. v. Comm'r, 86 F.3d 1526, 1528 (9th Cir. 1996) (reporting
$912,257 of mailing list income in a three-year period); Common Cause, 112 T.C. at 338
($432,130 in two years); Planned Parenthood, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2230 ($544,873 over
three years).
342. GAUL & BOROWSKI, supra note 20, at 34 (also noting that in one year the
March of Dimes earned $1.2 million and the National Audubon Society $596,000 of
mailing list income).
343. Disabled Am. Veterans v. United States, 942 F.2d 309, 311 (6th Cir. 1991).
See also GAUL & BOROWSKI, supra note 20, at 33.
344. A national survey completed by the Independent Sector, a nonprofit
organization, found that from 1995 to 1998, after taking into account inflation, the
amount of average household contributions decreased slightly. See Independent Sector,
Giving and Volunteering: Key Findings, http://www.independentsector.org/GandV
/skeyf.htm (last visited June 25, 2000). The decrease in the amount of donations for
any given nonprofit is also caused by increased competition for the pool of donation
dollars. See Jill Smolowe, READ THIS!!!!!!!! TIME, Nov. 26, 1990, at 62, 63 (reporting
that more money is spent by nonprofits on direct mailings than on all other media
advertising (magazines, radio, television) combined. This increase in competition
"drives direct-mail marketers ever higher (and lower) to distinguish their message from
the rest. To target potential customers more accurately, they compile and swap lists that
provide increasingly detailed information about individual consumers, a practice that
raises citizen concerns about privacy.").
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2. Infringes on Donors' Privacy and Trust
Although Congress and the courts currently permit mailing list income
to be excluded from the UBIT," mailing list rental income should be
taxable. As discussed earlier, a foundational premise of the nonprofit
tax exemption is that these organizations are more trustworthy than for-
profit firms. 6 However, the rental or exchange of donor information
violates public trust. The public desires privacy and does not want its
personal information exchanged or bartered. The public's trust in
nonprofit organizations is not complete and unwavering, and the actions
of nonprofits can affect that trust. Selling this information is a breach
of trust which should not be encouraged by exempting the activity from
federal taxation."
This trading of personal information causes a loss of personal
privacy:49 The public is concerned about this loss of privacy,"r and the
345. See LR.C. §§ 512(b)(2), 513(h)(1)(B) (2000); Or. State Univ. Alumni Ass'n v.
Comm'r, 193 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999); Miss. State Univ. Alumni, Inc. v. Comm'r, 74
T.C.M. (CCH) 458 (1997).
346. See supra text accompanying notes 60 (discussing how social and policy
rationales focus on benefits nonprofit organizations provide so public trust is
imperative), 108 (discussing capital subsidy theory based on public trust of nonprofit
organizations), 129 (stating public trust paramount to donative theory), 146-50 (stating
that public trust is important to the "deservedness" of an organization).
347. See Avner Ben-Ner & Theresa Van Hoomissen, Nonprofit Organizations in a
Mixed Economy: A Demand and Supply Analysis, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN THE
MIXED ECONOMY 35 (Avner Ben-Ner & Benedetto Gui eds., 1993) (stating that even
though nonprofits do not distribute profits "some suspicion regarding the organization's
incentives" remains).
348. See, e.g., ROBERT E. HALL & ALvIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX 12, 84-85 (2d
ed. 1995) (discussing taxes as a disincentive to work and driving people from the work
force); FREELAND Er AL., supra note 1, at 32 ("To impose a tax on a transaction is to
some extent to discourage it."); Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case
for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 417, 437 (1952) (stating that the higher
rates of a progressive income tax might "impinge on the productivity of the society...
by reducing the amount or quality of work put forth").
349. See GAUL & BORowsKI, supra note 20, at 33 ("Buying and selling donor lists
comes at a price-the donor's privacy. Most donors have no idea their favorite charities
sell their names and addressees to other groups.").
350. See Cain, supra note 20, at 363 ("One of the more sensitive issues any
organization must face is whether to market its customer list for other direct marketers'
use. The income potential for this commodity is significant. Nevertheless, the public is
extremely sensitive to concerns about lost privacy from the public sale of such
information."). However, some nonprofit organizations rely on donors' and members'
knowledge that they can opt out of having their information sold to rationalize the rental
and exchange of the nonprofit organization's mailing list. See Giorgianni, supra note
285, at 21. See also William J. Fenrich, Conmon Law Protection of Individuals' Rights
desire for privacy is becoming more and more important in the
information age. 5' This rising concern for privacy can be expected to be
more of a public priority in the future."'
The reaction to the discovery of a public television station sharing its
mailing lists with the Democratic National Committee is an example of
the public's sensitivity toward the exchange of personal information.3"3
The transactions were revealed when the Democratic National
Committee sent a four-year-old boy fundraising and voting material.3"
The boy had been placed on the WGBH mailing list since his mother
had included his name with hers when sending a donation to the public
in Personal Information, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 951, 962-63 (1996) (discussing the Mail
Preference System (MPS) which allows consumers to write or call to request
discontinuation of direct mail solicitations); Direct Marketers, supra note 337 (reporting
that in July, 1999 the Direct Marketing Association ("DMA") required its members to
disclose to consumers when they are sharing their information with other marketers. The
DMA includes nonprofit organizations and other commercial organizations). While it is
true that individuals may opt out of being on an organization's mailing list, those
organizations do not want to have an "opt in" requirement. See Holly Hall, Donors
Raise a Red Flag Over Privacy, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Mar. 23, 2000, at Fund Raising
1. A spokesperson for the Disabled American Veterans, the largest seller of mailing
lists, said that an opt-in requirement would "put [the DAV] out of business" since it
would be "like raising a red flag" to donors and members. Id. The DAV estimated that
only twenty-five percent or less of those on its mailing list would give permission. See
id. Nonprofit organizations also do not want donors to opt out since it reduces the value
of the mailing list and creates administrative problems tracking those who do not want
their information released. See Giorgianni, supra note 285, at 23.
351. See Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for
Control of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REv. 1033, 1053 (1999). Sovem cites
several sources which give different reasons for the preference for privacy. See id.
These reasons could be biological, social, or the avoidance of disapproval. See id. (citing
ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 8-11 (1967) (discussing privacy as biological
in nature); Charles Fried, Privacy: Economics and Ethics-A Comment on Posner, 12
GA. L. REv. 423, 477 (1978) (discussing privacy as sociological in nature); Cathy
Goodwin, A Conceptualization of Motives to Seek Privacy for Nondeviant Consumption,
1 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 261, 261 (1992) (stating that consumers desire privacy to
avoid disapproval)).
352. See Alan F. Westin, "Whatever Works"-The American Public's Attitudes
Toward Regulation and Self-Regulation on Consumer Privacy Issues, available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/selfregl.htm (visited Oct. 1, 2000). Westin
reports surveys showing that the American public has "strong concerns about threats to
their personal privacy from both government and business, and this concern is still
rising." Id. The surveys also showed that almost 90% of the public was concerned about
their personal privacy, of which 55.5% said they were very concerned in 1996. See id.
This figure was up from 82% and 8%, respectively, just one year earlier. Id.
353. See Patricia Wen, WGBH Swaps Lists with Democrats, BOSTON GLOBE, May
8, 1999, at Al (originally reporting the exchange of donor lists by WGBH with political
organizations). See also Jennifer Moore, Swapping of PBS Mailing Lists Raises Issue of
Donor Privacy, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, July 29, 1999, at Fundraising 29; Lee Sheppard,
Big Bird Is a Democrat; And the Consequences, 84 TAx NOTES 510 (1999) (discussing
the possible tax ramifications of a nonprofit organization exchanging mailing lists with a
political organization or candidate).
354. Wen, supra note 353, at Al.
286
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television station. It was then discovered that WGBH was not the only
public broadcasting station involved in the exchange of donor lists with
political candidates or organizations. An investigation revealed that a
total of fifty-three stations, twenty-nine television stations and twenty-
four radio stations, had been involved in similar mailing list
transactions. 56  The public outcry was enormous and led to
congressional hearings into the matter by the House Commerce
Telecommunications Subcommittee.39 The exchanges brought out
strong emotions from the Chair of the House Subcommittee,
Representative Tauzin (R.-La.), who said, "That a publicly supported
entity should think for a moment that it has the right to trade private
information about the citizens of this country who deign to support it
with any third party for commercial benefit is outrageous" and that "[i]t
should be outlawed. 358
355. Id.
356. Jon Almeras, CPB Issues Report on Mailing List Swapping, 84 TAX NOTES
1577, 1577 (1999) (reporting on the Corporation for Public Broadcasting inspector
general's report on public broadcasting stations exchanging mailing lists with political
organizations).
357. Id. at 1578. See also Peter J. Howe, Mailing Lists Proving a Booming
Business, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 2, 1999, at Al (reporting on mailing list rentals by
nonprofits and stating that WGBH "violated a cardinal rule for nonprofits: Do not expose
your supporters to annoying junk mail they can trace back to your group"); Shawne K.
Wickham, Donor List Exchanges: What's The Big Deal?, N.H. SUNDAY NEWS, Aug. 8,
1999, at 1A (reporting that "[m]uch sound and fury followed" the WGBH story in the
Boston Globe); Time for Charities to Guard Mailing Lists, VENTURA COUNTY STAR. July
29, 1999, at Opinion B8 ("A charity organization's best policy is to keep its mailing list
secret."). The spokesman for Chairman of the House Subcommittee, Representative
WJ. (Billy) Tauzin (R.-La.) said that, "More and more people are complaining about the
fact that their names are given to other organizations without their permission."
Giorgianni, supra note 285, at 21.
358. Moore, supra note 353, at 29.
Two bills were introduced regarding public broadcasting stations exchanging their
donor lists. The bill introduced in the House never made it out of committee. See H.R.
2791, 106th Cong. (1999) (prohibiting any station receiving funds from the Corporation
for Public Broadcasting from distributing their donor list unless proscribed by law). A
Senate bill sponsored by Arlen Specter (R.-Pa.) originally had language prohibiting
funding to any public broadcasting station which exchanged donor lists, but this
language was removed before it was voted on in the Senate. See S. REP. No. 106-166, at
322 (1999) (prohibiting any station receiving funds from the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting from selling, exchanging, or otherwise transferring, either directly or
indirectly, the names of current or former members or donors to any political
organization).
After a study of the issue the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) issued new
requirements on mailing lists for stations receiving CPB grants. See Almeras, supra note
356, at 1578. Two of the new requirements were: (1) that the organization not sell, rent,
When an individual's privacy has been violated this can lead to very
deep and unpleasant emotional feelings."' The trading of personal
information is distasteful to the public in part because of the perceived
lack of control over personal information." This feeling of helplessness
is only going to increase in the new information age as the amount of
electronic information available and the speed with which it can be
obtained continue to rise. As the debate grows, and as the amount of
information marketers compile on individual buying and internet habits
increases, these feelings of helplessness will escalate.361 Another reason
for the public's displeasure with the sale of mailing list information is
that an increase in direct mailings takes time to answer and wastes
resources.
362
Although nonprofit organizations realize that the public is concerned
about the sale of their personal information, few organizations can resist
the income that the rental of their mailing lists provides. 3 However, the
or exchange member or donor names with any candidate, political party, or political
organization; and (2) that the organization inform those on the mailing list that their
names might be rented or exchanged and give them a method to opt out of such use. Id.
See also Controversy over Shared Donor Lists Prompts Broadcast Agency to Revise
Rules, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 12, 1999, at Fund Raising 23 [hereinafter
Controversy] (reporting the Corporation for Public Broadcasting list of new criteria for
the exchange and rental of donor lists).
359. Sovem, supra note 351, at 1053 (stating that "[d]eep feelings can be generated
by privacy invasions" even when "the data are accurate and they do not suffer any career
or social damage").
360. See Westin, supra note 352, at I (commenting that a growing percentage of the
public feel that they have "lost all control over how personal information about them is
circulated and used by companies, (from 71% in 1990 to 80% in 1995 and 83% in
1996)" (internal quotation marks omitted)). See also Fenrich, supra note 350, at 955.
Public opinion polls and privacy surveys seem to indicate the widespread
belief of many Americans that they cannot control information about their
personal lives. Many persons believe that they possess an innate right to
control personal information, but also feel that they have lost the ability to
control that information. Not surprisingly, most Americans seek to gain more
control over the dissemination of personal information.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Wickham, supra note 357, at 16A (quoting the president
of a direct market firm as saying the public might not like their information being
exchanged since "[p]eople today are left with the feeling that their privacy is being
violated, that they can't move a muscle without some marketer knowing what they're
doing").
361. See Margaret Mannix & Susan Gregory Thomas, Exposed Online: On the
Web, Your Personal Life Is Merely Marketable Data, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., June
23, 1997, at 59 (reporting that Internet commerce has been hampered by "consumer
concern over privacy").
362. See Sovem, supra note 351, at 1054-55 (reporting that "the average
professional in the United States will spend [an estimated] eight months sorting junk
mail over the course of his or her lifetime" and there are complaints "that important mail
[gets] lost in the flood of junk mail").
363. Some nonprofit organizations state bluntly that they know individuals do not
like their information distributed. See, e.g., Giorgianni, supra note 285, at 23 (quoting
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fact that releasing mailing list information would upset those on their
lists keeps some nonprofit organizations, and even some for-profit firms,
from exchanging their mailing lists.3 Others may simply try to follow
the "cardinal rule for nonprofits ... not [to] expose your supporters to
annoying junk mail they can trace back to your group."
This violation of donor privacy comes at a cost, a loss of trust and
alienation of those individuals whose names have been rented and
information released.' When an individual on the mailing list discovers
that his or her information has been released they can respond negatively
for several reasons. The first is that this is a violation of their privacy,
even though they are usually not aware that not only their name and
address, but other information such as the amount and recency of their
contribution, ethnicity, and other personal information, were sold.'
the president of the Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability as saying. "When
contributors give a name to an organization ... they don't expect that it's going to get
bounced all over, especially outside the charitable community"); Hall, supra note 350. at
43 (quoting the vice-president of the Disabled American Veterans as saying that twenty-
five percent or less of those on its mailing list would give permission to the DAV to rent
their names); Honey Meir-Levi, Some Shocking Advice on Keeping Costs Down. CHRON.
PNLANTHmoPY, Dec. 2, 1999, at Opinion 41 (reporting director of a nonprofit stating
flatly that "charities should never sell any part of their mailing lists"); Wickham, supra
note 357, at 16A (reporting that several nonprofit organization directors agreed that "list-
swapping leaves a bad taste" with the public, with one calling the practice "dumb").
Another nonprofit director stated, 'The more the public understands that what they
thought of as private may well not be-and furthermore that it's being used by parties
hoping to raise money from them-people are going to start crying out for some
protections." Hall, supra note 350, at 41.
364. See Giorgianni, supra note 285, at 22 (reporting that Focus on the Family, one
of the largest Christian-based ministries with an extensive following, will not exchange
the information on its mailing list); Smolowe, supra note 344, at 66 (reporting that, due
to sensitivity to customer concerns about privacy, the Red Cross, Reader's Digest, and
AT&T do not rent their mailing lists).
365. Howe, supra note 357, at Al.
366. See Cain, supra note 20, at 375 ("In addition, an organization needs to avoid
short-sighted attempts to pursue an income stream without considering if the marketing
program might alienate or offend contributors through its 'commercialism.' Such issues
might be particularly relevant if the non-profit organization sells contributors' names
without notice or consent...."); Giorgianni, supra note 285, at 22 (quoting one
nonprofit spokesperson as saying, "You don't develop a good relationship with
constituents by violating their trust, even in minor ways"); Hall, supra note 350. at 44
("Due to their reliance on contributions ... charities cannot afford to alienate donors
who tend to hold non-profit organizations to a higher standard than companies when it
comes to issues like privacy.").
367. See Common Cause v. Comm'r, 112 T.C. 332, 334, 336-37 (1999). See also
Disabled Am. Veterans v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 60. 63 (1990), rev'd, 942 F.2d 309 (6th Cir.
1991).
Donors and members respond negatively to the implication that the
organization's quality of product is low or that it is losing sight of its
organizational purpose.3" Their negative reaction stems from the fact
that the organization is spending time on unrelated activities or is in
reality just another business trying to maximize profits. In either event,
the organization has lost focus on its original nonprofit purpose.
This violation of public trust by one organization is not limited to just
the organization which rents the information, but also will be felt by all
nonprofit organizations. 69 The public perception of the nonprofit ideal
368. Richard Steinberg, "Unfair" Competition By Nonprofits and Tax Policy, 44
NAT'L TAx J. 351, 359 (1991) (stating that the reaction of donors to unrelated
commercial activity is either negative or neutral). Steinberg cites other papers which
suggest this is due to the fact that either "donors may regard the fact that an organization
engages in commercial activity as a signal that the quality of their output is low" or that
the nonprofit "is losing sight of its charitable mission." Id.
An example of a nonprofit violating the general public's, as well as its members', trust
is the Arthritis Foundation's agreement to sponsor pain relievers. In mid-1994 the
Arthritis Foundation joined with the McNeil Consumer Product Company and Johnson
& Johnson to market the "Arthritis Foundation Pain Reliever" line of products. See
Pamela Sebastian, Nonprofit Group's Name to Go on For-Profit Pills, WALL ST. J., July
13, 1994, at B 1. The products marketed included acetaminophen, ibuprofen, and coated
aspirin. Id. While Johnson & Johnson distributed the products, their name did not
appear on the bottle. Lee A. Sheppard, supra note 223, at 421. All of the products were
to be sold at a price twenty percent below the price of other national brands and came
with a one-year free membership to the Arthritis Foundation. Id. at 420. Normally, a
twenty dollar fee is required for this membership. See id. While the cost for the
products was less than name brands, they cost four to six times as much as the generic
brands of the same products. What's in a Name? Credibility and Profit, 59 CONSUMER
REP. 688 (1994). In a letter to its members, the Arthritis Foundation said the benefit of
using its brand of pain reliever was that the packaging, advertising, and promotional
materials of the product will have the Arthritis Foundation's toll-free number. Letter to
Arthritis Foundation Chair Armin Kuder, 11 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 78 (1995). The
Arthritis Foundation was to receive a guaranteed one million dollars per year. See
Sebastian, supra, at B 1.
Members responded that the licensing agreement "seriously compromises [the
Foundation's] image and undermines [the Foundation's] efforts to serve [their] target
audience." Letter to Arthritis Foundation Chair Armin Kuder, supra, at 79. The product
was pulled in 1997 after slow sales and a $2 million settlement by Johnson & Johnson
with nineteen states which charged the company with misleading marketing. Arthritis
Foundation Products Pulled, 62 CONSUMER REP. 9 (1997). For another example of a
negative royalty agreement, see Bruce Japsen, Profit Motive Bad for AMA: Report;
Sunbeam Debacle Symptom of Resulting "Tension," CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 1998, at I
(reporting on the American Medical Association's (AMA) agreement to endorse
Sunbeam products and how it cost the AMA $20 million due to breach on contract and
the dismissal of many of their top executives). See also Jeffrey R. Bennett, A Look Back
at the Year in Health Law, 7 ANN. HEALTH L. 217, 217 (1998) (reporting same).
369. See Controversy, supra note 358, at 23 (quoting the text of new criterion for
the exchange of mailing lists by stations which receive grants from the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting as stating "[a] bedrock principle of public broadcasting is our
support from the American people. Because we operate in the public interest, our future
relies on a bond of public trust."); Hansmann, supra note 36, at 819-20 (stating that
"distrust handicaps those organizations in raising funds and otherwise securing the
290
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and the reality of what nonprofits are, or are becoming, is widening.'
As nonprofits go into more commercial enterprises, the public will tend
to see them as just that: for-profit businesses. This seems to be a fair
assessment since the source of a nonprofit's funding is an important
factor for the distribution of its benefits."' Funds which are deemed by
donors for a certain objective or project are more likely channeled to an
organization's nonprofit purpose.'
3. Decreases Need for Donations
Another reason to tax mailing list income is to decrease such activity
by nonprofit organizations. 3" This is a positive step since allowing
mailing list income to be received tax-free by nonprofit organizations
decreases their reliance on donations.37 This decrease in reliance on
donations means that the nonprofit will be less accountable to its donors
and more apt to stray from its nonprofit purpose."'
4. Summary,
Therefore, because the rental and exchange of donor lists abuses the
public's trust in nonprofit organizations, which is the primary underlying
commitment and support of the public").
370. Avner Ben-Ner, Who Benefits fron the Nonprofit Sector? Reforming Law and
Public Policy Towards Nonprofit Organizations, 104 YALE LJ. 731, 734 (1994) (book
review) (stating that "the gap between our perception and the reality of nonprofit
organizations is widening"). Ben-Ner writes that any reforms in nonprofit law should be
toward "improving access to the decision-making process of nonprofit organizations by
consumers, sponsors, and donors and allowing them to assert more oversight over
management." ld. at 735.
371. See Charles T. Clotfelter, The Distributional Consequences of Nonprofit
Activities, in WHO BENEFITS FROM THE NONPROFIT SECTOR? 22 (Charles Clotfelter ed.
1992).
372. See id.
373. See supra note 348.
374. See Bennett & Rudney, Conunercialit, Test, supra note 235, at 1096 ("The
accelerated expansion of commercialism among nonprofits, which began as a means of
supplementing contributions and government support, is converting the fundamental
donative or philanthropic character of public-benefit nonprofits into essentially a
commercial one.").
375. See Ben-Ner, supra note 370, at 735 (commenting that any nonprofit reform
must begin by "improving access to the decision-making process of nonprofit
organizations by consumers, sponsors, and donors and allowing them to assert more
oversight over management"); Crimm, supra note 24, at 458 (stating that organizations
should keep to their original purpose to remain exempt from taxation).
rationale for all theories which permit the tax exemption of nonprofits,
these activities, or any activity which tends to diminish the public's trust
in the nonprofit, should be taxable.
B. Affinity Card Income
The treatment of mailing list income contrasts with the receipt of
income from affinity card programs. Income from nonprofit affini
card programs should remain exempt from taxation for two reasons.
First, these programs do not decrease the public's trust in the nonprofit
organizations that allow the use of their names and logos on credit cards.
Second, the income received by most programs can be viewed as a
voluntary, though indirect, contribution by those who use the cards and
does not create any unfair competition with for-profit firms.
1. Background
Affinity cards are credit cards that typically bear the name and logo of
a group or organization .3  An independent financial institution contracts
with a nonprofit organization to use its name and logo in marketing the
credit card to donors and members of the nonprofit organization.78 The
amount received by a nonprofit group is normally linked to the amounts
which are charged to the card, plus an amount received for each new
card or renewal.379  Since the amount received by the nonprofit
376. This assumes that the nonprofit organization supplies very limited services in
support of the affinity card program. For the opposite opinion, asserting that affinity
card income be taxed by the UBIT, see UBIT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 11, at
3040 (recommending that affinity card income be taxable); Sheppard, supra note 18, at
862 (commenting that the "[licensing and collection of royalties is an active business
when name and reputation are the most valuable thing the business has to sell" and that
"Congress did not intend for exempt organizations to sell the benefit of their exemptions,
or to expend their resources marketing and defending their goodwill"). See also Spitzer,
supra note 189, at 198 (commenting on the UBIT RECOMMENDATIONS above). The
subcommittee's draft report did allow for "cause related" funding to be non-taxable. See
UBIT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 11, at 3040-41. After closely looking at the
exclusion for cause-marketed income, the only difference between it and affinity card
income is the existence of a contract. See id. at 3041. However, the presence of a
contract in itself should not cause the income to be taxable.
377. See Sierra Club, Inc. v. Comm'r, 86 F.3d 1526, 1528 n.2 (9th Cir. 1996); Miss.
State Univ. Alumni, Inc. v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 458, 459 (1997). See also supra
note 17 (describing typical affinity card arrangements).
378. See supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
379. See, e.g., Or. State Univ. Alumni Ass'n v. Comm'r, 193 F.3d 1098, 1099 (9th
Cir. 1999) (finding that the alumni associations received one percent of each transaction
and somewhere between four and seven dollars for each new account or renewal), aff'd,
193 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999); Miss. State Univ. Alumni, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) at 460
(stating that MSU received forty-five cents for each cardholder transaction and three
dollars for each card membership or annual fee paid). See also supra note 17 for
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organization directly relates to the amount the card holder charges,
affinity card income can be considered an indirect contribution from
donors. Although the agreement hinges on the ability of the financial
institutions to use a nonprofit organization's mailing list, this is not in
itself a reason to subject the entire affinity card income to the UBIT.
That portion of the income could be easily separated and taxed using the
prevailing rates for mailing list rentals. The rest of the payment can be
deemed to be for the use of the nonprofit organization's name and logo.
2. Protects Privacy and Trust
Unlike mailing lists, donors and members of a nonprofit organization
can determine whether they would or would not like to accept or use an
affinity card. Affinity cards are popular because of people's desire to
show their loyalty to the nonprofit organization, and the cards provide an
easy way to donate."' The ability to choose to sign up for an affinity
card and the ability to decide to terminate the card make the transaction
voluntary and not coercive, in contrast to rentals of mailing list
information.'
Affinity cards also serve other purposes in addition to providing
income for the nonprofit organization. The card reminds the individual
of his or her ties to the nonprofit organization. The card also allows
additional particulars on affinity card agreements. The higher the percentage rate
charged on the card, the greater the percentage of each transaction received by the
nonprofit organization. Evans, supra note 17, at D5 (stating "the higher the rates, the
more the groups get").
380. See Holbrook, supra note 273, at 529 (agreeing that affinity card income
should be exempt from taxation since "the Club's members, and the public in general,
regard [the nonprofit] as a valuable cause they wish to support, thereby allowing the
Club to earn revenues").
381. See Vickers, supra note 17, at 138 (stating that affinity cards are popular since
"cardholders are more loyal.... Part of that loyalty stems from the idea that the
cardholder is donating to his or her school or alma mater each time the card is used").
382. See Belknap, supra note 24, at 2039. Belknap states that the nonprofit tax
exemption should be allowed since the "essence of the advantage.., is that it is
automatic." Id. He stresses that the "government does not control the flow of funds to
the various organizations; the receipts of each organization are determined by the values
and choices of private givers. The donors determine the direction of their own funds,
and the distribution of 'tax savings' as well." Id. This determination by donors is also
present in affinity card arrangements.
383. See Or. State Univ. Alumni Ass'n, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1936 (stating that the
alumni association entered the agreement "to keep alumni aware of their ties to OSU, to
keep OSU's name before the public, to provide a low-cost credit card to alumni and
other OSU supporters"), aft'd, 193 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Alumni Ass'n of
individuals to make donations to nonprofit organizations very easily."
This indirect donation is due to the link between the amounts charged to
the card and the payment made to the nonprofit organization."'
Individuals feel good about using an affinity card.386 Unlike the
unauthorized release of donor information which produces negative
feelings, individuals seem to enjoy using affinity cards. This enjoyment
probably accounts for the tremendous growth of the use of affinity cards
in the past few years."'
3. No Unfair Competition Exists
One of the early rationales for the UBIT claimed that it would prevent
unfair competition between nonprofits and taxable entities. However, no
unfair competition exists in affinity card arrangements."' If the
nonprofit organization does not offer the credit card itself, it is not in the
business of offering credit cards, and therefore does not compete against
financial institutions. The majority of affinity cards carry higher interest
rates than nonaffinity cards, reducing the demand for such cards. 89
Individuals obtaining the card would be doing so primarily out of a
desire to associate themselves with the nonprofit organization.
To add to the disincentive of using an affinity card is the fact that any
contribution which does eventually go to the nonprofit is nondeductible
the Univ. of Or., Inc. v. Comm'r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2093, 2094 (1996) (same reasons),
affd, 193 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). One writer noted that the presence of different
affinity cards in one's wallet, some from nonprofits and some from for-profit firms, can
create a "strange kind of competitive arena between commercial and nonprofit
organizations." Stark, supra note 15, at W13 (noting that individuals must decide
between giving a donation versus getting some benefit, like frequent flyer miles, for
oneself).
384. See Credit Cards for Causes, supra note 17, at 191 (quoting one nonprofit
director as saying, "People feel good every time they use the [Kidcare] card because they
know they're raising money for a good cause.").
385. See supra note 379.
386. See Holbrook, supra note 273, at 529; Vickers, supra note 17, at 138 (quoting
the CEO of a credit-card tracking service as stating that, "it's like being part of a club.
There's pride involved.").
387. See Anita Womack, Where Can Affinity Programs Take You?, BANK
MARKEnNG, Aug. 1998, at 8.
388. See Spitzer, supra note 189, at 198 (noting that "it seems difficult to make an
'unfair competition' argument with respect to [affinity card] arrangements"). See also
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by the card holder? Only donations which are "charitable
contributions" are permitted a deduction from income taxes."'
"Charitable contributions" is a defined term in the Code and only
includes direct donations to certain organizations; these do not include
financial institutions that run affinity card programs." By simple
economics, an affinity card is no bargain to the user. Individuals choose
to apply for and use an affinity card because of their good feelings
toward the organization represented on the card.
4. Sumnary
Since income from affinity card programs does not violate public
trust, and does not create any unfair competition, the income from these
programs should remain excluded from the UBIT. The positive feelings
which these programs foster, plus the fact that individuals are free to
choose to sign-up for the program, often against their own economic
interests, are important considerations for allowing the continued
exclusion of this income from the UBIT.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress failed to provide a rationale for allowing the nonprofit tax
exemption. Many authors have since tried to fill in this void with their
own theories for why the tax exemption should exist. Upon closer
review the public's greater trust in nonprofit organizations is a central
tenet of the social/public policy and hybrid theories (those which
combine social/public policy and economic rationales) rationalizing the
federal tax exemption of nonprofit organizations. If the public's trust in
nonprofit organizations is central to the tax exemption, then it follows
that activities engaged in by nonprofits that violate this public trust
should be taxed under the UBIT. This Article applies this premise to
two sources of nonprofit income: (1) the rental or exchange of a
nonprofit's mailing list, and (2) affinity card programs. In doing so it
was found that mailing list income, presently excluded from the UBIT in
390. Evans, supra note 17, at D1 (noting that "an individual can give more to
charity by making a direct donation with the cash saved by using a standard credit card
with a lower interest rate" and that such a donation "has the additional advantage of
being tax-deductible").
391. LR.C. § 170(a)(1) (2000).
392. Id. § 170(c)(l)-(5).
most cases, should be taxed. This contrasts with the income received
from affinity card programs which should be excluded from UBIT. This
proposal, if put into legislation by Congress, will help to decrease the
widening gap between the nonprofit ideal and public perception of
nonprofits. The taxation of mailing list income would also help to
protect the fundamental premise upon which the tax exemption is based:
public trust.
